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ABSTRACT 
 
Death and dying are emerging as substantial topics for political and social debate in 
contemporary UK society. The management of end of life, traditionally defined within a 
medical model of care, is being challenged by a cultural shift that is apparent in the changing 
trajectory of dying, increasing healthcare consumerism and a rising human rights rhetoric. To a 
significant extent, liberty to determine one’s own death, and to request assistance to die, has 
come to be articulated by some as a “right to die”. Human rights discourses grounded in the 
values of dignity and freedom of choice are important and relevant to dying in the UK. These 
discourses have the potential to influence law and policy, practices and public opinion on end 
of life. However, there is no sociological analysis of how or when rights have come to be 
appropriated in an end of life context and no explanation of in what way, or to what extent, 
social actors are using rights discourses in relation to death and dying.   
 
This research explores the centrality of human rights discourses to end of life policy and 
debate on assisted death in the UK. A broad social constructionist approach to rights is taken 
to illuminate the ways in which selected actors understand and articulate rights in an end of 
life context, and how, as a result of this, a right to die may be conceived. It includes the 
examination of: current UK law and policy documents; transcripts of the historical and 
contemporary House of Lords debates; a case study of a highly influential organisation (Dignity 
in Dying) who campaign to legalise assisted dying, and three focus group discussions with 
Death Café Hampstead participants. Analysis of the data reveals that rights discourses 
involving individual liberty, dignity and human vulnerability are central to defining the end of 
life debate and policy. A notion of rights at the end of life has impacted our perception of dying 
but in ways that are complex, and arise as a reflection of dying at a specific period in time.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Each year approximately 460,000 people die in England (Gomez et al, 2010). Contemporary 
dying across the UK has become a somewhat standardised and sanitised experience, largely 
overseen by the medical profession, within a clinical environment. Significant advances in 
clinical research and the development of medical technologies have enabled earlier diagnosis 
and an ability to prolong the lives of seriously ill patients including those suffering from 
progressive or terminal illness. Successful treatment of previously fatal infections, combined 
with a reduction in sudden deaths, has resulted in a longer life expectancy and a growing 
elderly population to the extent that the percentage of deaths occurring in the group of people 
aged 85 years or more is predicted to rise to 44% by 2030 (NHS England, 2014). Against this 
ever expanding technical-medical model of healthcare, Parkes et al (1997:4) highlight that 
“[d]espite all the advances in modern science 100% of people still die”. Death is an inevitable 
phenomenon, which will be universally experienced and, on this basis, how people die is an 
issue of broad social relevance.  
 
1.1 Background context 
Dying in late modernity in the UK typically involves a progressively ageing population 
diagnosed with a chronic medical condition. This is frequently characterised by multiple 
ailments and periods of sporadic deterioration, facilitating longer time to reflect upon 
impending death and the choices to be made. The notion of choice that traditionally 
determined decision-making in everyday life is evolving to encompass decision-making over 
where, when and how we die and this is being more openly discussed in the public domain. As 
one example, Dying Matters was established in 2009 to support the implementation of the 
Department of Health End of Life Care Strategy 2008. This is now a coalition of over 30,000 
members including NHS organisations, voluntary and independent healthcare sectors, and 
community initiatives across England and Wales. Their mission is to help people talk more 
openly about dying, death and bereavement, and to make plans for the end of life that enable 
people to attain “a good death”1 (Dying Matters, 2015). Dying Matters is encouraging people 
                                                          
1
 A good death was referred to as early as the 17
th
 century originating from the Greek word 
“euthanasia”. It traditionally defined a gentle and easy death, “Eu” derived from the Greek meaning well 
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to communicate their preferences for the end of their lives – what they want to happen when 
they are approaching death; what they want when they are dying, and what they want to 
happen afterwards (Dying Matters, 2015). 
 
There are also a number of social initiatives and national events including London Month of 
the Dead, Kicking the Bucket Festival in Oxford and a growing Death Café movement2, all of 
which suggest an increasing visibility and discussion around end of life issues. As part of this 
research, I myself acted as a regular facilitator at monthly Death Café events in Hampstead, 
London over a two year period. The individuals I encountered were comfortable speaking 
about death and dying. Death Café participants shared their experiences of serious illness or 
bereavement and thoughts about end of life. This included articulating their own perceptions 
of a good death that mostly involved aspects of choice, as the following excerpts demonstrate: 
I think most people do, given the choice, want to die in their own homes…What would 
be nice is to go quietly in your sleep when your body says it’s had enough, just drift 
away that would be the nicest way, not a violent death. If you know that the end is 
near you could put your affairs in order so your mind is at peace as well as your body 
and you just drift away (Male, aged 65)3. 
I would really like to be helped to go on my way without a slow or a drawn out death, 
if I request that, and to be able to die at home, not in hospital, or in the outdoors 
somewhere. In the garden would be nice. I don’t want to be kept alive in a hospital on 
a machine surrounded by people I don’t know (Female, aged 50). 
 
Freedom of choice that embodies individualism, self-determination4 and successful 
management of the self has become an especially important concept in healthcare and is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and “thanatos” meaning death (Collins English Dictionary, 2012). This historic reference to euthanasia 
that constituted a good death contrasts with the contemporary understanding of euthanasia which 
incurs criminal liability. 
 
2 Death Cafe was originally conceptualised by a Swiss sociologist and anthropologist, Bernard Crettaz, 
under the name Café Mortel and then developed in the UK, in 2011, by Jon Underwood in London. It 
operates as a not for profit social franchise with the objective “to increase awareness of death with a 
view to helping people make the most of their (finite) lives” (Death Café, 2014). Groups of people, often 
strangers, meet to enjoy refreshments and discuss death with no agenda, objectives or themes. They 
do, however agree to rules of respect and confidentiality. 
3
 Participants’ contributions have been anonymised in the same manner used for focus group 
discussions in this research. Further details are given in section 4.2. 
 
4
 In a conventional human rights context, “self-determination” typically refers to minority or group 
rights in relation to social, political economic determination.  However within end of life debates and 
literatures, the concept of “self-determination” is more commonly articulated in relation to the context 
of personal autonomy, involving a right to decide one’s own end.  The latter approach (“self-
determination” as personal autonomy) will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
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argued by some to be dominating the discourse on end of life (Judd and Seale, 2011:225). In 
contemporary UK5 society, the notion of choice, where individuals determine the manner and 
timing of their own death, demonstrates a cultural shift in thinking for reasons that are not 
immediately obvious and warrant closer inspection. In February 2015, the Choice in End of Life 
Care report was published by the Department of Health. This review, based on wide public 
engagement, highlighted many negative incidences where individuals had not experienced 
having control over their death or had not received, in their opinion, high quality care. In doing 
so, the report championed greater choice in end of life care. It advised actions for 
Government, wider society and the healthcare system regarding how this could be achieved. 
Particularly interesting was how this well-intentioned, but vaguely defined, proposal in this 
document was supported by, what was articulated as, a “right in the NHS Constitution for 
everyone to be offered choice in end of life care and have these choices and preferences 
recorded and held in their individual plan of care” (Choice in End of Life Care, 2015). The report 
also revealed a previously uncharted demand for end of life care to reflect personal values and 
preferences that enhanced personal dignity (Choice in End of Life Care, 2015). Dignified care 
and dignity-conserving practices feature prominently in healthcare policy and NHS strategies. 
Provision for end of life care is underpinned by concepts of liberty and dignity that are 
frequently expressed in connection with rights, but there is no analysis of why these strategies 
are being grounded in, or articulated as, rights.  
 
Recent indicators of interest in the end of life debate are evident through proposals in the 
House of Lords (2014) and the House of Commons 6(2015) to change the law and establish a 
legal right to die. From a political perspective, the current debate on assisted death is largely 
argued in terms of rights. The complexity of the dilemma can be illustrated through the 
contribution of Baroness Kennedy in the most recent House of Lords debate who described 
assisted dying as: 
…one of the most challenging moral issues of our times. On the one hand, we are 
dealing with the right to individual autonomy and to bodily integrity and with the right 
to make decisions about our own lives. So it is a profound issue of human rights. On 
the other hand, there is a need to preserve the wider fabric of an ethical society with 
an overriding principle that human life is to be valued and guarded against violation 
and abuse (House of Lords, 2014 col 872).   
                                                          
5
 The debate on assisted dying is generally indicative of UK sentiment. Some aspects of law and policy 
differ between countries and these are clarified in Chapter 5 that addresses law and policy in depth. 
 
6
 The most recent Assisted Dying Bill in the House of Commons was raised by Labour MP, Rob Marris. It 
did not pass the second reading debate on 11
th
 September, 2015. 
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Essentially, the current assisted dying debate rests between two powerful, competing claims. 
One perspective emphasizes the right to individual liberty in choosing the manner and timing 
of one’s death. Individuals in favour of legalising assisted death commonly argue on the basis 
of respect for personal autonomy and human dignity; rational individuals are entitled to exert 
free will based on informed choice to make decisions that affect their bodily integrity in 
accordance with their own values and beliefs (Warnock and McDonald 2008, Howarth 2007, 
Battin 1994). Especially during a protracted or painful illness, requests for assistance to die 
could be associated with, and justified through, a desire to avoid actual or anticipated suffering 
and die a dignified death. The counter-argument highlights the sanctity and value of all human 
life and the responsibility that democratic states attach to protecting the rights of vulnerable 
third parties against a relaxation in the current law. Opponents are concerned that if a right to 
die was granted, albeit to those meeting the safeguarding criteria, it may potentially lead to 
abuse as the lives of elderly, ill and disabled individuals become less highly regarded (Jeffrey 
2009, Keown 2002).  
 
Mainstream UK media, including national, regional, and local newspapers and the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) television news has also demonstrated a growing interest in 
the end of life debate. Media representation has been generally supportive of appeals for an 
assisted death, evidenced through their use of graphic, emotive testimonies to highlight the 
daily lives of those requesting assistance to die as being undignified and unbearable (see, for 
example The Telegraph 2013, BBC News 2012, Daily Mail 2012). The personal stories of 
individuals requesting assistance to die, cases of assisting death and people travelling to the 
Swiss clinic Dignitas to end their lives have been covered extensively (see, for example BBC 
televised coverage of Simon Binner 2016, Paul Lamb 2013, Tony Nicklinson 2011, Dr Anne 
Turner 2006). Typical media discourses, argued in terms of rights, are illustrated in the 
headlines by Bannerman and Gibb, “Life is cruel, says Paul Lamb taking on right to die 
campaign” (The Times, 20th April, 2013 [online]) and Stanford, “Why must I go on living like 
this?: Locked in stroke victim Tony Nicklinson has embarked on a landmark legal battle to win 
the right to die” (The Daily Telegraph, 2nd December, 2011:35). In the public domain, the 
mainstream media and civil society organisations have had a role in contributing to the 
historical changing and shaping of attitudes toward death and dying. Constructing specific 
discourses that frame the notion of assisted death as a right to die has implications for the 
terms of the current debate.  
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A number of what are commonly referred to as “right to die” organisations are campaigning 
for the legalisation of assisted death. Dignity in Dying (DiD), as one such national organisation, 
has commissioned opinion polls and surveys that demonstrate very high levels of public 
support for assisted dying. British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys from 2007 and 2010 
respectively claimed that 80% and 82% of people “probably or definitely agree that a doctor 
should be allowed to help end the life of a person suffering from a painful, incurable disease at 
their persistent request” (DiD, 2013). Following the most recent Populus poll, commissioned 
by DiD in March 2015 with 5,018 British adults, the statistic has remained consistent and this is 
highlighted on the Dignity in Dying website “82% of adults support a change in the law on 
assisted dying for terminally ill adults” (DiD, 2016). Interestingly, this poll that claims to be 
representative of the British public, does corroborate support for a change in law across all 
categories of people represented in the employment sector, voting intention, readership and 
tenure (Populus, 2015). These figures suggest that a cultural shift is occurring. The notion of 
choice at the end of life is elevating personal decision-making to a level that would enable 
individuals to determine the timing of death and to request assistance from another person to 
achieve their desire. Polls may be criticised as inadequate to explain in-depth personal 
motivations and reasoning regarding one’s own death (see Lewis 2001, Noelle-Neumann 1993, 
Dworkin 1993), but research in the form of polls, surveys or questionnaires can give a general 
indication of thoughts at the end of life. All recorded statistics to date do support this 
overwhelming public majority view in favour of physician assisted suicide7.  
 
As part of the 2011 campaign initiative for Dignity in Dying to target members of the public, 
leaflets with the wording “Your life. Your death. Your choice?” were delivered to private 
homes, including my own, in the London area (see Appendix One). This leaflet initiated a 
personal interest in end of life by provoking consideration of how, and to what extent, 
personal choice could, or should, determine the circumstances of one’s own death. I became 
intrigued to examine the discourses used to define the end of life, particularly in regard to 
assisted death and to explore how particular discourses, which may be time and context 
specific, could impact attitudes towards death and dying. Assisted dying is often referred to in 
the public domain and has been articulated by some social actors as a right to die. 
Sensationalised media focus on high profile “right to die” cases and in-depth coverage of the 
                                                          
7
Accepting that questions and subjects can be fashioned and manipulated to support particular 
arguments, a number of different surveys over an extended time period have all shown strong support 
for assisted dying (see National Opinion Polls conducted between the 1970s and 1990s, European 
Values Study (EVS) surveys for the period 1981-2008, and British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys 
undertaken between 1983 and 2012).  
 
11 
 
recent political debates on assisted dying suggests that rights discourses have increasing 
salience. This raises a series of questions about how this is happening, who is driving this 
change and the manner in which this issue can be thought about. O’Byrne suggests that certain 
rights or claims expressed as rights only emerge in particular social settings and are based on 
the culture and context of the community in which they operate (O’Byrne, 2003:39). Calls to 
legalise a “right to die” are one example of this and this drives the research interest to address 
the question eloquently posed by Scolding (2011:320), “how can a right to something that 
inevitably happens to all of us suddenly arise?” 
 
1.2 Research focus 
There appears then to be, at present, a high level of public engagement with end of life issues. 
Changes in the late modern dying trajectory, facilitated by advances in medicine and 
technology, have raised new areas for debate. Members of the public, as healthcare 
consumers, are beginning to challenge the established medical model of care by drawing upon 
discourses that involve concepts of individual liberty and human dignity and a range of social 
actors are articulating requests for assistance to die as a right to die. In a contemporary UK 
context, claims and entitlements appear to be more frequently expressed in terms of rights as 
in having a “right to” something. The emergence of new and proposed rights suggests an 
apparently expanding core of social and moral controversies that are being framed as rights 
claims in what has been termed by Bobbio (1999) as “the age of rights”. However, there has 
been little investigation into how, by whom, or indeed, when rights discourses have come to 
be used and resonate as important in discussions on death and dying. 
 
As new rights are proposed there is an increasing emphasis on personal liberties and less 
consideration of the wider societal impact so that new rights may be criticised for prioritising 
individual desires and challenging traditional community values (Etzioni 1997, Glendon 1991, 
Durkheim 1951). Human beings function as part of a collective society, the ways in which 
individuals die or are permitted to die, through legal or other provision, will impact the 
perception of dying by all members of the community. To this effect, communitarian 
discourses might be applicable to the study of dying. Government legislation on assisted dying 
raises a dilemma that would involve negotiating the extent to which rights at the end of life are 
considered individual, fully recognising personal values and preferences, or whether rights 
ought to reflect expressions of community interest. It is generally argued that while respect for 
individual rights are important, this does entail a responsibility to consider the wider 
12 
 
implications of individual actions and an obligation to reflect upon those choices with regard to 
the effect upon other members of society (Jeffrey 2009, O’ Neil 1996, Finlay 1996, Etzioni 
1997, Glendon 1991, Habermas 1990). This is an extant issue for debate among human rights 
scholars, but one that this research does not engage deeply with. Whilst Communitarian and 
other rights-based discourses may hold traction in other contexts, this research focuses on 
analysing the appropriation of rights discourses by the social actors identified as important to 
the debate and policy in order to understand how rights become embedded in an end of life 
context. 
 
With such lines of analysis in mind, there are clearly a number of different ways of addressing 
these questions including philosophical, historical, sociological and normative approaches. 
Hynes et al (2010:813) suggest that a sociological perspective can help facilitate an 
understanding of human rights through analysing the context of human rights law, discourses 
and practices. Their contribution was used to open Sociology and Human Rights: New 
Engagements, a Special Issue of the International Journal of Human Rights (published in 2011) 
where they argued, 
Drawing together socially contextualised analyses of the formation and development 
of human rights law, discourses and practices with sociological understandings of the 
full social contexts in which they are situated can in our view facilitate critical 
understandings of the significance of human rights in contemporary societies (Hynes et 
al, 2010:813).  
O’ Byrne (2012:830) supports this idea by arguing that sociology is sufficiently equipped with 
the tools of enquiry that enable a valuable contribution towards a multidisciplinary 
interpretation of human rights. According to O’ Byrne (2012:832), a sociology of human rights 
might include “the sociological study of the language of human rights, an institutional 
framework within which meanings are negotiated and practices formalised”. This perspective 
can contribute towards explaining: when, and to what extent, rights discourses8 have come to 
determine the end of life debate and policy; how this may have occurred, and; who are the key 
actors shaping the debate.  A constructionist approach is invoked in this research because it 
enables a focus on exploring how different actors understand and articulate rights in particular 
social settings, and can provide an explanation for how and why rights may emerge and be 
validated in changing social contexts.  
 
                                                          
8
 Acknowledging the wider debate on differentiating between rights and human rights, both terms are 
used interchangeably in this thesis and should be understood as the rights one holds on account of 
being human. 
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Wilson (2006) highlights the importance of examining how rights operate in social practice and 
articulates a notion of the “social life of rights” that involves interpreting how different actors 
understand claims articulated as human rights. His contribution, which will be developed in the 
following chapter, considers: the role and influence of new social movements; the trajectory of 
rights claims through political and legal channels, and; how rights claims are formulated by 
different actors and embedded in different types of social practice (Wilson 2006). Goodale 
(2007:5) also notes that human rights claims are projected across a wide range of boundaries. 
Their meanings are subject to interpretation by a diverse range of actors and these meanings 
are adapted to suit the purposes and practice of everyday life (Goodale, 2007:5). However, as 
yet, human rights scholars have not given a great deal of attention to interpreting the nature 
and scope of rights claims in an end of life context. 
 
To explore the controversial assisted dying dilemma as a sociologist, it is necessary to examine 
the social, historical, political and legal context of death and dying in the UK, first with 
reference to how rights discourses are being used and understood in the debates on assisted 
death, and, second, to assess the use of human rights discourses by the actors who have a 
pivotal role in defining and shaping attitudes on end of life. In order to answer the overarching 
research question articulated in the title of the thesis, “A right to die? Examining the centrality 
of human rights discourses to end of life policy and debate in the UK”, the following objectives 
are specified:  
 examine evidence of rights discourses in UK law and policy;  
 explore the prevalence of rights discourses in the historical and contemporary 
debates on assisted dying; 
 analyse how and why an organisation which campaigns to legalise assisted death 
use rights discourses;  
 assess the extent to which public perceptions on death and dying invoke rights 
discourses. 
Generating and comparing different sorts of texts and evaluating different actors’ perspectives 
on assisted death, can provide rich data for analysis and enable a comprehensive 
understanding of the research question (Torrance 2012, Denzin and Lincoln 1998). Accordingly, 
this sociological approach to a notion of rights at the end of life can illuminate how, and for 
what purposes, a right to assisted death may be conceived, the ways in which rights discourses 
are used and understood by a range of social actors, and how central or influential this has 
become. A review of the literatures in the following chapter addresses the work of other 
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scholars who are interested in end of life research and have driven the research question 
through illustrating what is already known, and revealing areas where this thesis can 
contribute to knowledge.  
 
1.3 Outline structure of thesis 
There are a further eight chapters in this thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on a Western 
model of death and dying to set the context for this research. Review of the literature includes 
clinical studies on assisted death and suggests the management of modern death, primarily 
defined within a medical framework of care, is being challenged by a cultural change in 
Western societies that encourages management of the body as a personal project. This shift is 
reinforced by an emerging emphasis on the contemporary values of liberty and choice in 
healthcare policy. Individualistic tendencies perpetuate a shift away from a sense of 
community and more traditional frames of reference leaving individuals to negotiate their own 
lifestyle choices. Subject to a number of influences and prevailing discourses, the “good death” 
is emerging as a topic of interest, but review of the literature reveals there is little explanation 
of how individual liberty, human dignity and vulnerability come to be theorised in this context. 
This chapter identifies concepts of liberty and dignity understood as human rights discourses 
as important and relevant to the end of life and to the public perceptions of dying well. 
However, it reveals an area that has not been fully investigated, namely to what extent and in 
what manner have different social actors used rights discourses to articulate issues in an end 
of life context and which positions on rights have they drawn upon to do this? 
 
Chapter 3 explores human rights frameworks to illustrate how rights may be understood and 
articulated by different actors in an end of life context and how, as a result of this, a right to 
die may be conceived. Concepts of personal liberty, human dignity and vulnerability of the 
body are examined and embedded as human rights discourses. This chapter explores 
foundational and anti-foundational perspectives on rights. A social constructionist conception 
of human rights grounds and interprets claims to rights within a social context, recognising 
them as a discursive tool which can be used to influence public opinion and, ultimately, law 
and/or policy. Social constructionism is explored in relation to (new social movement) 
organisations that strategically use rights discourses to serve their purposes. This chapter 
contributes to the research by illuminating perspectives on rights, clarifying positions from 
which various arguments can be made and suggesting how social actors interpret rights when 
they express options at the end of life as a “right to die”.  
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Chapter 4 articulates the research methodology. A broad social constructionist approach is 
adopted to explore how particular discourses have developed over time and how selected 
social actors use and understand these discourses. This can give meaning to the ways in which 
issues of death and dying have come to be received and perceived in society. This chapter 
clarifies the research objectives then focuses on each of the four stages of the research design: 
document analysis of current UK law and policy; transcripts of the historical and contemporary 
House of Lords debates from 1936, 2003 and 2014; a case study analysis of Dignity in Dying, 
and focus group discussions with Death Café Hampstead participants. For each of these stages, 
the rationale for selection and process for data collection are discussed, and limitations 
reflected upon. Through generating and comparing different sorts of data from a range of 
sources, the research was designed to provide a multi-level analysis of how rights discourses 
are used at the end of life. This chapter concludes with discussion of the research sensitivities 
and ethical implications of the study. 
 
Chapter 5 examines UK statutory law and selected government healthcare policy documents 
that relate to assisted suicide and end of life provision. It highlights areas of ambiguity in the 
current law in relation to the end of life. These include: the questionable ability to apply 
discretion in hard cases; confusion over the differentiation between killing/letting die, and the 
conflict between the Suicide Act 1961 and the Director of Public Prosecution’s Policy for 
Prosecutors 2010. The latter tolerates assisting suicide under particular circumstances. In 
comparison to the law, human rights discourses grounded primarily in individual liberty and 
dignity are used prominently, if rather erratically, to define end of life healthcare policy and to 
outline national standards of care and duties. This chapter includes analysis of the legal 
appeals of Diane Pretty in 2001 and Tony Nicklinson in 2012 that utilised provision in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 to petition the higher courts to grant them a right to die. In both the 
Pretty and the Nicklinson cases, rights arguments were invoked as the basis for permitting an 
assisted death and the scope of existing rights deliberated and appropriated in order to 
challenge current institutional practice. The involvement of the European Court of Human 
Rights in these cases highlights that the UK exists within a European context. This chapter also 
provides a brief overview of other countries where assisted dying is legal that could potentially 
influence the UK debate and policy.  
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Chapter 6 explores the centrality of human rights discourses through analysis of the transcripts 
of the House of Lords debates from 1936, 2003 and 2014 in regard to the legalisation of a right 
to receive assistance to die. The House of Lords has considered Bills on assisted dying on a 
number of occasions since 1936, and, as part of the UK’s political heritage, it has a key role in 
influencing legislation. This chapter provides an overview of the proposed bills from 1936, 
2003, and 2014 and examines the ways in which rights discourses feature in members’ 
arguments throughout the debates to articulate their views and overall positions on end of 
life. Examining these debates facilitates mapping of specific discourses over time. The 1936 
debate was not defined by rights, but compassion. Contributions in the later debates more 
commonly drew upon rights discourses either explicitly or implicitly to underpin their values 
and beliefs. Arguments that involved some understanding of rights were evident both in 
favour of, and opposition to, the legalisation of assisted death and this demonstrates the 
extent to which the end of life debate is characterised by rights discourses.  
 
Chapter 7 involves a case study on Dignity in Dying (DiD) as the largest national, campaigning 
organisation supporting a change in law to permit an assisted death under specific criteria. DiD 
draw upon the values of liberty and dignity to underpin their suggestions that individuals 
should be permitted “choice”, “access”, and “control” at the end of life and they claim this is 
best achieved through their objective to legalise assisted death (DiD, 2016). The organisation 
strategically uses a rights frame in mediated communication, personal narratives and the 
voices of Patrons featuring on their website to interpret and position the notion of requested 
death as being natural and dignified. Analysis of the data collected demonstrates how and to 
what extent rights discourses, including concepts of autonomy and dignity, have been 
purposefully utilised. The findings corroborate DiD as an example of an organisation using a 
rights-framed approach as proposed by Miller (2010) in the context of campaigning on a 
specific issue. 
  
Chapter 8 analyses data from three focus group discussions conducted with members of the 
public who attend or are familiar with Death Café, Hampstead. The research explores how an 
original sample of adults use and understand human rights discourses to contemplate issues at 
the end of life. Concepts of personal liberty, dignity, suffering and their perception of a “right 
to die” are discussed by participants to discover how and to what extent rights discourses are 
used to negotiate end of life priorities and inform their attitudes on death and dying. The data 
in this chapter suggests initially that rights discourses are not central to focus group 
participants all of whom had difficulty articulating how they understood a right to something. 
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However, there was widespread and compelling support for individual liberty, with an 
emphasis on choice and the maintenance of human dignity, as the basis for making claims at 
the end of life. Choice, as part of an implicit discourse of rights, was frequently highlighted as 
important to participants who respected this as an expression of free will. Some articulated 
this as a “right to choose”.  
 
Chapter 9 draws together the data collected from the research. Through a sociological analysis 
of rights, the use and application of rights discourses was revealed as variable. Understandings 
of rights were flexible, and there was potential to validate and appropriate rights, including a 
“right to die” in a new context: at the end of life. The nature of death and dying in late 
modernity has shifted in a number of ways that reflect the social, cultural and political 
landscape. The end of life debate and policy in the UK is largely defined through, and operating 
on, a terrain of rights involving individual liberty, dignity and human vulnerability. A number of 
social actors draw on rights discourses to support a notion of rights at the end of life but in 
ways that are complex and arise as a reflection of dying at a specific period in history. These 
findings indicate that further research regarding the reasons why rights discourses hold tenure 
over others in the current social context could build upon this analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the context for the research by way of illuminating areas 
that have been investigated and identifying those that have not yet been addressed. It is 
divided into three sections that depict contemporary death and dying in the UK. The first part 
of this literature review chapter focuses on the established medicalised model of care that has 
traditionally defined end of life practice and it examines the emerging prioritisation of 
individual choice and human dignity in healthcare. The second section explores understandings 
of a “good death” including what this may involve and how this is developed, and influenced 
by, individual values or beliefs. Concepts of choice and dignity are discussed alongside human 
suffering that may justify arguments for assisted death. The lack of research into liberty and 
dignity understood from a human rights perspective, and the implications of what is now 
apparent as the prevailing discourse of dying, becomes evident here. The third part of this 
chapter examines dying in a contemporary social context to suggest how a right to die may be 
constructed. It focuses on the role of human rights discourses and practices, with particular 
reference to the media and new social movement actors, who use rights discourses to 
influence how certain issues are received and perceived through their activities and 
campaigns. There are limited studies on what is commonly termed “right to die” organisations 
and, as yet, no analysis of their language strategies that invoke rights discourses to conceive a 
right to assisted death. Review of the literature suggests this study can contribute to 
knowledge through a sociological perspective that illuminates how rights discourses have 
come to determine the end of life debate and policy, when and to what extent this may have 
occurred, and who the key actors are shaping the debate. 
 
2.1 Challenging medicalised death 
This section examines the current medical model of care and reviews clinical studies on 
assisted death. It critiques the changing nature of medical provision and the role of doctors to 
19 
 
determine care at the end of life. This sets the context for contemporary dying in the UK and 
highlights areas of controversy. 
 
 
2.1.1 The medical model 
The National Health Service (NHS) evolved in 1948 from a much deliberated but eventual cross 
party initiative that prioritised medical treatment for all, including the dying, free at the point 
of delivery and given according to need. Post WWII, individuals were encouraged to attend 
these newly established hospitals where medical equipment, services and skills were centrally 
located and could offer a standard of care that was not available at home. As a result of this, 
the majority of dying individuals were hospitalised and subject to a medical model of care that 
promoted the institutionalisation of death. The medical model traditionally embraced a 
patriarchal approach to healthcare where medical professionals diagnosed illness, sanctioned 
the most appropriate treatment and had the authority to determine when any prescribed 
treatment was withdrawn or withheld. In effect, the patient was dependent upon medical 
professionals to define their needs, give advice, decide how much information should be 
shared and then provide solutions (Bradburn 2003, House 2011).  
 
This conception of healthcare where the doctor/ patient relationship assumed the patient as a 
passive beneficiary of care was accepted practice, both historically and in the context of a 
newly established healthcare system, but it has become increasingly contentious and subject 
to criticism. Death and dying, and the discourses associated with this, have traditionally been 
the remit of doctors and healthcare professionals who have expert knowledge articulated 
through specialised and exclusive language. However, the literature suggests their authority is 
being challenged on a number of levels. Foucault’s early writing examined the exercise of 
professional medical knowledge under what he termed the “medical gaze” (Foucault, 1973). 
Rituals of the doctors’ examination and decision-making processes under the medical gaze 
were criticised by Foucault (1977) for using techniques of an observing hierarchy and 
normalising judgement that included superimpositions of power/ knowledge relations. 
Foucault (1977), Turner (1995) and others argued that a medicalised model of care allows the 
medical profession and healthcare law and policy to dictate behavioural norms that deny 
individual liberty. Turner (1995) further developed this critique of the medical model to liken 
the practice of medicine to a form of social control, standardising different illnesses into 
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phenomena managed by bureaucratic agencies. For Turner (1995:153), the hospital represents 
a structure of authority symbolic of the social power of the medical profession, and the site at 
which contemporary political conflicts of an ideological, economic, and cultural nature occur. 
(Other aspects of Turner’s contribution to the end of life debate are discussed below in a 
sociological context and in the following chapter in relation to developing a universal ontology 
of human rights).  
A range of literature has evaluated the significance and development of the doctors’ role in 
death and dying throughout the last century (Turner 1995, Walter 1994, Aries 1981, Foucault 
1977). Alongside this, it has been noted that medical autonomy and status have diminished 
over the last two decades and this decline in medical authority challenges the practice of 
contemporary medicine (Elston 2009:17, Harrison and McDonald 2008:54). The hospice 
movement9 and organisations including Marie Curie and McMillan Nurses, have emerged in 
late modernity as alternative providers to fill the “gaps in NHS service provision”, suggesting 
that the NHS lacks resources to provide a multidisciplinary, personally tailored approach to 
address the care needs of dying individuals (Harrison and McDonald, 2008:117). The increasing 
demand for hospice and community care10 reflects a “symbolic critique” of the medicalised, 
institutionalised death and an emerging desire to die according to personal values including 
physical, emotional and spiritual preferences at the end of life (Harrison and McDonald, 
2008:117). The hospice movement strives to provide a comprehensive service and support to 
dying individuals and their families but critics suggest that, like the NHS, it has also been 
subjected to “routinisation” and “bureaucratisation”. Hospices are beholden to economic and 
consumer forces, they receive 34% of their funding from Government and are therefore 
required to be accountable and transparent (James and Field, 1992 cited in Howarth, 
2007:142).   
 
                                                          
9 The UK hospice movement was pioneered by Dame Cicely Saunders in the late 1960s to provide a 
holistic approach to death and dying and to address social, psychological, and spiritual aspects of care in 
addition to physical concerns (Harrison and McDonald, 2008:117). Motivated by compassion and her 
Christian faith in the sanctity of all human life, she established the first hospice, St Christopher’s in 
London in 1967, with the conviction, “How we die remains in the memory of those who live on”. 
10
 A report by the Dame Cicely Saunders Institute on public preferences for place of death in England, 
obtained from a population-based telephone survey in 2010, revealed the majority of deaths in 2010 
took place in hospitals (53%) and only 21% died at home despite most participants across all regions 
stating that they would rather die at home if circumstances allowed (Gomez et al, 2010). Hospice was 
the second most frequent choice, especially in the South East and the East of England, where about a 
third of participants chose this, home and hospices together accounted for the preferences of at least 
89% of participants in every region (Gomez et al, 2010). 
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The history and activities of the NHS have been widely discussed in the literature. In the six 
decades since its conception, the NHS has been challenged by frequent organisational change, 
fluctuations in the social and political environment, periodic scandal, huge financial cost and 
threatened collapse (Klein 2010, Doyal and Doyal 2009). The NHS and the medical profession 
has undergone major restructuring at regular intervals. Recent changes focus on user 
involvement and public accountability in an attempt to adhere to national strategic 
frameworks and targets but the priority increasingly rests on patient empowerment and 
satisfaction (Klein, 2010). Relevant to this research is Klein’s (2010:166) observation that from 
1991 onwards the NHS, in response to the ever-broadening demands, was defined by a period 
of adaptive policy with two new themes emerging, namely the health policy paradigm and the 
transformation of patients into consumers. NHS market mechanisms based on choice and 
competition developed inside state provision. These market forces reconstructed matters of 
health and illness as one’s own responsibility promoting healthy lifestyles and encouraging 
members of society to be accountable for their own welfare and more discriminating in using 
NHS services (Kellehear 2008, Clark and Seymour 1999, Seale 1998, Turner 1995). The effects 
of this shift in government responsibility have been widely discussed from a sociological 
perspective (see Conway 2013, Howarth 2007, Schilling, 2003, Turner 1995, Giddens 1991, and 
Mellor 1993). Obligations and responsibilities are placed upon patients, including those who 
are dying, as individual and critical consumers and this endows them with the challenging task 
of negotiating their own lifestyle choices and validating these choices as important and 
legitimate.  
 
The nature and extent of personal choice has developed over time and a Western notion of 
choice can be understood to encompass an individual’s basic convictions, allegiances, life 
plans, objectives and moral principles, all of which contribute towards a sense of personal 
identity (Jennings 1996, Giddens 1991, Feinberg 1980). Borgstrom and Walter (2015) recently 
documented the concept of “choice” as the dominant rhetoric in government policy relating to 
end of life care and provision. Their study examined the comparative discourses of “choice” 
and “compassion” in UK end of life policy 2008-2014 and analysed the ways in which 
discourses of choice and compassion have become detached from each other. With reference 
to the End of Life Care Strategy 2008, the findings revealed, “the word compassion makes no 
appearance”, but the use of “choice” appears 44 times in the 168 page document, referring 
most frequently to patient choice either directly or through programmes that support it 
(Borgstrom and Walter, 2015:100).  This analysis of English policy discourse focused on how 
discursive power operates and argued that the government end of life strategy is clearly 
22 
 
designed to resonate with a neo-liberal political agenda that has divided the NHS into internal 
markets where patients and healthcare professionals exercise choice over buying and 
accessing services (Borgstrom and Walter, 2015:99-105).  What has not yet been made clear, 
and needs further exploration, is why and how and particular discourses hold tenure over 
others.   
 
Despite the emphasis on patient choice in government policy, the extent of choice has been 
criticised as inadequate.  There is some degree of choice over where but not when end of life 
choice is realised, these choices are offered by powerful social organisations such as the NHS, 
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) or hospice providers but do not 
reflect real or unlimited citizen choice (Borgstrom and Walter, 2015). Providing an overview of 
policies and trends in patient choice, Milewa (2009:163) supports this analysis and argues,  
 …if the reality of choice  is linked to ideas on an accentuated consumerist identity on 
the part of health service users, we need to be very clear about whose understanding 
of choice is being employed.  
The comparative study by Borgstrom and Walter (2015) and arguments by Milewa (2009) 
revealed some interesting findings which suggest further enquiry into current end of life policy 
and legal provision is necessary to examine which discourses support a notion of actual and 
unlimited choice in end of life decision-making and the reasons for this. 
 
Palliative medicine is ideally placed to conduct research in an end of life setting but the 
majority of studies in this field focus largely on pain relief as a priority of care rather than 
phenomenological accounts of dying. Research methods used often take the form of polls or 
surveys that cannot provide in-depth data to analyse the dying experience. Chen et al, (2014) 
recently surveyed 77 palliative care researchers using semi-structured interviews and 
identified five distinct impediments to research progress. These included:  
…funding, institutional capacity, researcher workforce, challenges of the topic and 
population, public and professional misunderstandings of palliative care, and aversion 
to topics related to serious illness and end of life (Chen et al, 2014).  
The dearth of end of life research in palliative care has also been explained by the priority 
given to direct care needs over establishing a research base, the skills of healthcare workers 
who may lack the time or interest in research and that hospices are often geographically 
situated away from academic or research institutions (Addington-Hall 2002, Field et al 2001). 
Most importantly, research on the critically ill is constrained by rigorous ethical frameworks 
and gatekeeping by medical ethics committees (Addington-Hall 2002, Field et al 2001).  
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The apparent lack of palliative care research conflicts with a growing awareness and discussion 
of dying in the public sphere and the growing emphasis on developing a framework of care to 
manage expectations of “patient centred” dying and improve end of life care (Bradburn 2003, 
Clark and Seymour 1999). The development of alternative research methodologies that 
comprehensively elicit the needs of the dying is suggested as an important yet neglected area. 
This finding stimulated interest in the expectations of “patient centred” and public perceptions 
of dying well and prompted closer analysis of the discourses that are defining the end of life. A 
sociological exploration of these discourses to discover how they arise and operate in a 
contemporary social context could inform end of life healthcare policy and practice. 
 
2.1.2 Clinical studies on assisted death 
 
Trends in polling data and academic studies on doctors’ role and attitudes have confirmed the 
overall negative stance of professional medical bodies and general lack of support among 
healthcare practitioners towards assisted dying with doctors working in geriatric or palliative 
care medicine most likely to oppose the practice (McCormack et al 2012, Seale 2009). Based 
on their medical knowledge, doctors would be the natural choice to provide the practical 
means for an assisted death. The relationships they form with their patients would enable 
competent assessment of whether requests for assistance to die were expressed as a rational 
choice. However, all of the major medical bodies remain opposed to the participation of 
doctors in the practice of assisted death. Medical literature notes assisted death to contravene 
the traditional “care over killing” philosophy of the medical profession. Such opposition is 
articulated clearly by the British Medical Association (BMA) position, which recently stated 
that permissive reform was “contrary to the ethics of clinical practice as the principle purpose 
of medicine is to improve patients’ quality of life, not to foreshorten it” (BMA, 2012). There is, 
however, careful acknowledgment by healthcare professionals that the practice of assisting 
death, in circumstances where doctors act in the best interests of the patient, does occur. The 
most direct indication of this was revealed in a study by Professor Clive Seale (2010) who has 
extensively researched the attitudes and practices of doctors at end of life. He discovered a 
“significant minority” of UK doctors reported making decisions they think will hasten the death 
of a patient and that non-religious doctors were more likely to report decisions taken with 
some degree of intent to end life, or provide continuous deep sedation leading to death, 
suggesting that the practice of assisting death does occur (Seale, 2010:677). 
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Systematic review of the international literature by Hendry et al, (2013:13) examined the views 
of patients, carers and the public on assisted dying to reveal that attitudes were diverse and 
complex but confirmed that in general “[p]eople valued autonomy in death as much as in life”. 
The majority of clinical studies suggest that concepts of personal autonomy and human dignity 
are prioritised at the end of life. There is general concern for the loss of autonomy and dignity 
in dying and whilst suffering is a factor, requests for assisted suicide are driven primarily by 
fear; fear of pain, fatigue and loss of function that can lead to dependency (Ganzini et al 
2008a, Pearlman et al 2005, Mak and Elwyn 2005, Pacheco et al 2003, Emanual et al 1996, 
Chochinov et al 1995). The Oregon-based study by Ganzini et al (2008a) surveyed family 
members who had experienced a recent bereavement of loved ones due to an assisted death. 
Reasons cited for the deceased having chosen the legal option of assisted death were: the 
desire to control the circumstances of their death including the option to die at home; 
concerns regarding loss of dignity and future losses of independence; quality of life, and self-
care ability (Ganzini et al, 2008a). Deceased individuals had regarded the actual physical 
symptoms of their illness as less important compared to future worries about the severity of 
symptoms (Ganzini et al, 2008a).  
 
Concern for an undignified death was also cited as a factor that could provoke requests for 
assisted death. Chochinov et al (2002) noticed that clinical studies had documented a loss of 
dignity as reasons for requesting an assisted death in 50-60% of cases and on this basis 
attempted to design an empirical model to understand how concepts of dignity were defined 
and understood by dying patients. The study revealed a strong correlation between a sense of 
dignity and autonomy in control over life events. This was primarily centred on self-identity 
rather than functional ability (Chochinov et al, 2002). This is an important finding that has not 
yet been further developed and has implications in relation to this research question. How, 
when, and to what extent, have concepts of autonomy and dignity that can also be understood 
in terms of human rights, become so highly esteemed in an end of life context? Review of the 
medical and clinical literature in this section demonstrates that both of these concepts feature 
prominently in the contemporary discourses of death and dying. Notably dignity and 
autonomy are also important components of a human rights approach. However, studies have 
neglected to examine this relationship in-depth or investigate the potential implications, 
outcomes or meaning of this relationship.  
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2.2 Determining the good death 
This section examines the status of death and dying within the current social context. A 
nationwide decline in religiosity is demonstrated. This, among other factors, has left 
individuals with an increased responsibility for negotiating their own lifestyle choices and 
these are subject to prevailing discourses that, at present, emphasise liberty, dignity and a 
desire to avoid suffering and to achieve what is considered a good death. The findings suggest 
closer exploration of the discourses that relevant social actors use to express and support their 
positions in an end of life context is necessary. 
2.2.1. Death as taboo 
A range of literatures, particularly in the second half of the 20th century, noted that death had 
become more withdrawn from public life, and the experience of dying gradually privatised, 
subjectivised and more individualised (see Howarth 2007, Turner 1995, Mellor 1993 and Aries 
1981). Mellor (1993) suggests death has been “hidden” in late modernity. He argues that an 
increasing sense of self-identity relating to the body and “shrinkage in the scope of the sacred” 
have privatised experiences of death that now occurs as an event absent from the public 
domain (Mellor, 1993). Hospitalisation could be argued as a compassionate response to 
provide optimal treatment or protect the dying individual and their family from the care-giving 
burden of their situation, however, by removing the dying person from their community and 
family environment the mystery surrounding death is perpetuated and it becomes a less visible 
or “taboo” subject (Walter 1991, Aries 1974). Taboo subjects are less commonly spoken of in 
public and private and in this respect are likely to remain status quo. Bringing end of life issues 
into the public arena means that they become susceptible to a range of influences and 
discourses, which can shape or potentially change, existing attitudes. 
 
Walter (1994) and Seale (1998) contest death as a taboo or hidden phenomenon on the basis 
that public interest in death and dying has increased. This is evidenced by frequent discussion 
of NHS plans, marketing of life insurance sales, pre-paid funerals and media coverage of death. 
An interest in death is also apparent in the extent and variation of its graphic representation in 
plays, books, art and the media (Copp, 1999:1). At national level, the Dying Matters Coalition 
are encouraging people to speak more openly about, and plan for, end of life in general. 
Privately funded initiatives including Death Café and Death Salons are now deliberating the 
topic of death and dying in the public domain (see Dying Matters 2015, Dignity in Dying 2016 
and Death Café 2014). The media has been instrumental in raising public awareness of assisted 
death as an issue discussed in terms of rights, not only through coverage of emotive legal 
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appeals and individual accounts that request a “right to die” but also through bringing the 
Parliamentary debates into the public consciousness and highlighting the arguments of high 
profile individuals. The idea of human rights in an end of life context has recently been taken 
up by the British Institute of Human Rights. Their research included the publication of End of 
Life Care and Human Rights: A practitioner’s guide, a document aimed at providing accessible 
information on human rights to healthcare practitioners to support them in delivering care 
services with respect for human rights (BIHR, 2016).  
 
2.2.2 Religious and cultural influences 
A range of literature has noted the decline of religious affiliation, practice and belief in the UK 
over the past several decades, arguing that religious influence and religiosity has fallen 
(Danyliv and O’Neill 2015, Bruce 2013, Voas and McAndrew 2012). Traditional religious and 
community frames of reference that give some indication of normative values have become 
weakened. This now leaves individuals to negotiate and validate their own lifestyle choices 
within the prevailing social discourses (Schilling, 2003, Turner 1995, Mellor 1993, Giddens 
1991). Religion traditionally provided a source of self-identity, enabling individuals to locate 
their chosen practices within an affirmed set of moral values and UK attitudes towards death 
and dying have been primarily influenced by a Judaeo-Christian perspective. From this religious 
position, human beings are created by and are at the mercy of God who has dominion over 
both life and death. Divine approaches condemn suicide and assisting suicide as immoral, and 
arguments grounded in a Judaeo-Christian tradition are mostly centred upon respect for the 
inherent sanctity and worth of all human life (Jeffrey 2009, Keown 2002).  
 
Research on patterns of religious affiliation, practice and belief revealed a confusing and 
limiting picture. Danyliv and O’Neill (2015) used the British Social Attitudes Survey to explore 
changes in attitudes to the legalisation of physician assisted death over the period 1983-2012 
in association with religious belief. They discovered that, perhaps as expected, increasing 
support for assisted death did correlate with an increase in secularisation (Danyliv and O’Neill, 
2015). Ho and Chantagul, (2015:273) examined a number of studies and also found significant 
differences between believers and non-believers in attitudes towards the legalisation of 
assisted death. However, their research also discovered that while some studies found 
religious groups to be largely against assisted death, others contested this. These studies 
suggested instead that a majority in these religious groups favoured legalisation, or were 
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prepared to assist themselves. Conflicting findings suggested a complex and variable 
relationship between religion and attitudes towards assisted death.  
 
Trends in research on religion from a Judaeo-Christian11 perspective suggest that UK society is 
becoming “progressively more secular as each generation emerges” (Voas and McAndrew 
2012:46). The boundaries between life and death have become blurred by advances in medical 
technology that can prolong life. Given the changes in the dying trajectory which sees 
individuals living longer with chronic illness, it has become less clear who controls the dying 
process, under what conditions death should, or could, occur, and which criteria are used to 
determine a good death. Religious and cultural frames of reference are losing traction. In 
regard to culture, Seale and Van der Geest (2004:883) noted “considerable cross-cultural 
variation in patterns of disease, demographic factors and cultural norms that influence the 
experience of death, dying and grief”. Personal autonomy, freedom of choice and human 
dignity are indicative of contemporary, secular, Western values at the end of life (Seale, 1998) 
but these values may not be common to all and can be disputed from other religious, cultural 
or personal perspectives. Koenig and Gates-Williams (1995:249) argue 
The cultural values and beliefs that inform the new bioethics practices are white, 
middle class and based on western philosophical and legal traditions that emphasise 
the individual and individual decision-making. Successfully implementing “death by 
decision” depends on a set of cultural attributes including the open disclosure of 
distressing information, the desire for control, and future orientation, described 
elsewhere as the “autonomy paradigm”… 
Experiences of death and dying in the UK seem to focus on individual liberty and choice. These 
concepts have also been articulated by some social actors as constituents of a “good death” 
that is an emerging focus for study (see Pierson et al 2010, Seale and Van der Geest, 2004, Carr 
2003, Steinhauser et al 2000, Hart et al, 1998). 
 
2.2.3 The concept of good death 
A key trend in recent research has been to establish what a “good death” entails. Both clinical 
and academic disciplines have evaluated personal priorities and preferences at the end of life 
in an attempt to illuminate the concept of dying well. Despite this, a good death in 
                                                          
11 The role and attitudes of other religions than Judaism and Christianity in the end of life debate and 
policy is largely absent, even though data from the Office of National Statistics in 2001/2011 record 
sizable populations of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists. Reasons suggested for the absence of 
correlative studies on other religions are not apparent but may have to do with the differences in 
behaviours and practices that characterize other religions (Bruce, 2013:376).  
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contemporary society remains difficult to define and is highly individual depending on a range 
of influences (Kemp, 2002:4). Hart et al (1998:71) argue a good death in late Western 
modernity emphasises the value of meaningful, personal activity at the end of life that could 
include adjustments to and preparation for death, relinquishing of roles and responsibilities, 
and the opportunity to take leave of loved ones. Steinhauser et al (2000) conducted focus 
group discussions with participants who identified six major components of a good death, 
these included, “pain and symptom management, clear decision making, preparation for 
death, completion, contributing to others, and affirmation of the whole person”. Research by 
Carr (2003) also found a good death to be enhanced by “physical comfort, social support and 
good medical care”. In addition, Seale and Van der Geest (2004) proposed that in more affluent 
societies, a good death ideally occurs at home with family and friends, at the end of a long and 
fulfilled life where wealth is accrued and children raised, culminating in an appropriate funeral 
ritual.  
 
Expectations surrounding death are determined by cultural and religious negotiation, social 
factors, personal circumstances, prior experience, and discourses that shape attitudes at the 
end of life. The literature suggests that individuals generally aspire to die in a manner 
consistent with their own coping mechanisms and in relation to their own values and beliefs in 
a death and life context (Dunlop 2007, Gustafson 2007, Smith 2000). Quests for a good death 
attempt to maintain individual priorities and a sense of personhood in the dying process, 
supporting concepts of human agency and autonomy in regard to decision-making. Discourses 
that respect individual liberty and human dignity could potentially enhance the aspiration of 
dying well or dying a good death and this may be one reason for their increasing popularity.  
 
Choice 
Very few academic studies have addressed the concept and boundaries of personal choice in 
end of life decision-making directly. Burchardt et al (2014) critique a failure to conceptualise, 
measure and analyse the intrinsically valuable aspects of choice and claim this leads to 
inequalities in the opportunities people have to exercise control over important aspects of 
their lives. Auerbach, (2001: 191-203) examined the extent of patient involvement in their own 
care to find that, whilst there was a strong desire for information during illness, there was less 
interest in taking decisional control at the end of life. Instead patients prioritised collaboration 
with medical professionals. Individual choice may be intended as a tool to improve 
effectiveness and economy in service provision and involve the dying in self-management of 
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their conditions, but literature highlights that the concept of choice is not commonly 
understood.  
 
In complex and sensitive matters including end of life decision-making, Thorns (2010) proposes 
there is a key distinction between respecting autonomy and respecting personal choice. 
Elaborating upon this difference, Thorns (2010) suggests that the notion of personal autonomy 
does involve elements of choice and decision-making within a clinical setting, however mere 
choice may be an inadequate and non-conducive framework for supporting individuals at the 
end of life. He uses a practical example to illustrate this point. By directly asking a person 
“Would you like to die at home?” they are offered a choice expressed as a personal 
preference. In contrast, respect for autonomy encompasses and recognises aspects of human 
agency and rational free will. This is demonstrated when the implications and consequences of 
this decision are explained, and time is taken, to ensure a person has the capacity and 
understanding to acknowledge these (Thorns, 2010). Differentiating between autonomy and 
choice involves making an informed and rational decision based upon freely given and relevant 
information, rather than a mere preference. This is especially important in an end of life 
context. 
 
To respect individual models of autonomy and ensure the patient/ personal narrative is not 
neglected in a wider social context involves recognising the complexity of end of life decision-
making in a socio-cultural environment where interpretations of morality and ethics differ 
(Ingleton et al, 2013). Nordgren (2010) commented on the emergence of freedom of choice in 
healthcare as serving to reconceptualise the notion of patients as a self-determining 
participant in the management of life and death constructing this participation as a democratic 
and personal “right”. The reconceptualisation of choice aligned with human rights discourses 
through understandings of personal liberty and human freedoms could suggest a new 
perspective on end of life that could influence the terms of the debate. This drives forward the 
research interest in determining how autonomy and choice can be grounded in frameworks of 
rights and the extent to which these different perspectives can be used to conceive and 
support a right to assisted death. 
 
Dignity 
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There is recent focus in the literature on concepts of dignity that are widely promoted as 
desirable in end of life care. Achieving a dignified death is increasingly expressed as indicative 
of a good death. Gennip et al (2013a) surveyed 163 family caregivers of deceased older adults 
where 69% were of the opinion that their family member had died with dignity. Contributory 
factors that supported their personal interpretation of a dignified death included: the patient 
feeling ready to die; the absence of anxiety; that they were fatigued, and that doctors had 
provided a clear explanation of treatment choices at end of life (Gennip et al, 2013a). This 
study, perhaps surprisingly, revealed that symptoms not significantly related to conceptions of 
dignity or associated with a good death included the (primarily) physical symptoms of pain, 
breathlessness, incontinence and reduced physical ability (Gennip et al, 2013a). Further study 
by Gennip et al aimed to develop a conceptual model of dignity to illustrate how serious illness 
could undermine patient dignity. They discovered that illness affects dignity indirectly by 
affecting the way in which patients perceive themselves and that this self-perception is shaped 
by three components. These involved: the individual themselves, based on the subjective 
experience and internal qualities of the patient; the relational self, based on reciprocal 
interaction with others, and the societal self, based on their experience as a social object from 
another’s perspective (Gennip et al, 2013b). Dignity is an important principle in end of life care, 
the maintenance of dignity and avoidance of indignity is highly prioritised among the dying and 
their loved ones. However, dignity in dying is subject to interpretation and influenced by 
personal values, backgrounds and experiences. What one person deems as dignified may be 
undignified for another.  
 
The status and protection of human dignity reflects a central issue in human rights. There are 
newly emerging areas where research is being conducted on concepts of dignity and choice 
that encompasses concepts of rights. Nordgren (2010) questioned the development and 
extent of freedom of choice as part of a healthcare discourse and Jacobsen (2009) referred to 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 to define a taxonomy of dignity and establish 
dignity as a link between human rights and healthcare. The notion of choice is frequently 
coupled with dignity in the context of dying using rights as the common basis for this 
association, as in this example: 
…the right to choose12 is a basic expression of one’s dignity and there is no more 
fundamental expression of one’s dignity than the right to make life-saving or life-
terminating choices (Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2001:242). 
                                                          
12
 Where the extent of individual freedoms are debated in an end of life context, choices that reflect 
individual liberty and human agency are expressed by a range of social actors as a right to choose. This 
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 In the dying process, conditions that further genuine self-respect and enhance dignity of the 
dying experience are often reciprocally linked with autonomy.  For example, Paust (1995:480) 
connects autonomy with notions of dignity at the end of life claiming “When quality of 
remaining life would reek of indignity and suffering, it is all the more appropriate to respect 
the dignity of personal choice”. 
 
Extensive research on assisted death by Battin (1994:12) draws closest to situating the end of 
life debate within a normative framework of rights claiming that the issue is one of “civil 
liberty”. Individuals in a democratic society should have the right to determine their own 
death.  She also suggests that assisted suicide arises in response to the standardisation of 
medical care, so that when self-identity and human agency are threatened, the desire for self-
determination increases. Writing on the relationship between suicide and rights, Battin 
(1994:279) argues this is a “fundamental human right” that equates with the right to life, 
freedom of speech and belief. Her understanding is that individuals have certain rights that are 
conducive to human dignity. This existing research is helpful but does not adequately explore 
concepts of choice and dignity within conceptual frameworks of human rights, nor offer any 
suggestion to how a right to die may be conceived. Examining different positions on human 
rights to understand how or why issues at the end of life use rights discourses or come to be 
articulated as rights has not yet been addressed.  
 
Suffering  
Achieving a dignified or good death can be challenged by the experience of serious illness, 
especially in circumstances involving unbearable or protracted suffering. Against the backdrop 
of current medicalised models of care that perpetuate a longer dying trajectory, the 
experience of human suffering may lead some individuals to contemplate ending their lives 
prematurely. Kellehear’s (2009) literature review finds suffering characterised as a series of 
explanations about distress rather than a single concept. His general perceptions are that 
some loss due to pain, injury and/ or deprivation occurs but this is usually time and culture 
specific. The work of Kohn and Steeves (1996) supports the position that suffering is relative: it 
is a unique, private lived experience. There is no standardised empirical tool of measurement 
that can assess personal interpretations of suffering so that it can only be defined as an 
                                                                                                                                                                          
articulated right to choose is not legally binding, but is constructed and substantiated as a reflection of 
inherent personal autonomy and human dignity, the reasons for and implications of which are 
considered further in section 3.2.2. 
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“individual experience of threat to self and meaning given to events such as pain or loss” (Kohn 
and Steeves, 1996). That said, their extensive ethnographic research finds that all suffering has 
basic structural elements. These include: disruption of human experience; an altered sense of 
embodiment; a constricted social world in relation to others and the lived space, and a 
changed perception of time (Kohn and Steeves, 1996).  
 
Dees et al (2011) conducted a study involving 31 face-to-face interviews with individuals who 
had requested assisted suicide in order to explore how suffering had contributed to their 
requests. They found that suffering comprised medical, psycho-emotional, socio-
environmental and existential themes. In particular 
…fatigue, pain, decline, negative feelings, loss of self, fear of future suffering, 
dependency, loss of autonomy, being worn out, being a burden, loneliness, loss of all 
that makes life worth living, hopelessness, pointlessness and being tired of living were 
constituent elements of unbearable suffering (Dees et al, 2011). 
Suffering was found to be the outcome of an intensive process that originates in the symptoms 
of illness and/or ageing and the burden of suffering was influenced by individual personality 
characteristics and backgrounds (Dees et al, 2011). Concepts of suffering were dependent on 
the patients' perspectives of the past, the present and expectations of the future and in this 
way relate to a social and cultural context13 (Dees et al, 2011). Human suffering may be an 
authentic and generally accepted reason to justify requests for assisted death. Actual or 
anticipated suffering has the potential in some individuals to shape the end of life decision-
making process and prompt requests for assistance to die. However, achieving consensus on 
what constitutes suffering is difficult and particularly subjective. It is dependent upon 
individual and variable perceptions that necessitates deeper investigation of death and the 
circumstances of dying as a social construct.  
 
2.3 Constructing assisted death 
                                                          
13 Suffering is not always viewed negatively. Penn and Malik (2010) highlight that evolutionary theory, 
psychology and other schools of thought claim suffering is necessary for human development. Suffering 
arises with a consciousness of disparity between the current state and future desired state and this acts 
as a motivator driving human development. Badham (1996:109) comments that Christian doctrine 
attributes value to enduring suffering with patience and endurance believing this may provide time and 
opportunity for spiritual growth of the dying individual. It may also be plausible to suggest that a 
protracted period of illness enhances the notion of a good death by allowing family and friends a time 
for reconciliation including the opportunity to care for the dying person, facilitating the process of 
saying farewell and taking leave of the community in which they have participated.  
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This section explores how rights may arise and become embedded at the end of life from a 
sociological perspective. The role of social actors, including the media and new social 
movement organisations, is discussed in relation to how or why they employ particular 
discourses to define and promote specific issues.  
 
2.3.1 Actors in the debate 
Mainstream UK media including national, regional, and local newspapers and the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) television news has extensively covered the end of life debate. 
There is a wide body of literature on the impact and ability of the media, civil society 
organisations and new social movement (NSM)14 actors to affect the institutionalisation of 
rights through the use of framing techniques (see Miller 2010, Campbell 2006, Stammers 1999, 
Byrne 1997, Seale 1998, Snow and Benford 1992). Chong and Druckman (2007:99-118) 
elaborate that the major premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a 
variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or 
considerations. Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular 
conceptualisation of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue (Chong and Druckman, 
2007:99-118). 
 
Use of the media is an effective method of reaching a large audience, promoting awareness 
and bringing the debate into the public arena (Dalton, 2007:64). Media representation of high 
profile right to die cases through their graphic, heartrending testimonies have a “symbolic 
potency” in the public imagination, their suffering has been imbued with moral and political 
meaning (Richards, 2014). A 2006 study by Birenbaum-Carmeli et al (2006:2153) typified UK 
media coverage of family assisted suicide through newspaper articles that examined court 
cases in which a family member had been charged with assisting suicide. Their observations 
revealed 
 …a consistently supportive stance towards family assisted suicide that is produced by 
depictions of dying persons and perpetrators as autonomous and conscientious 
individuals; by idyllic portrayals of family relations; and by praising judges for their 
                                                          
14 In contrast to traditional social movements, NSM’s generally arise from middle class initiatives and 
focus on cultural change enhancing personal/civil liberties linked with identity. They tend not to desire 
political power or stem from economic grievances (Byrne 1997: 48). Stammers’ (1999:984) definition of 
an NSM that is indicative of the right to die movement involves 
Collective actors constituted by individuals who understand themselves to share some common 
interest and who also identify with one another, at least to some extent. 
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lenient verdicts. Presentations of the law as a dated State system, as well as the 
marginalization of opposing voices, further enhanced the supportive message 
(Birenbaum-Carmeli et al, 2006:2153). 
Social anthropologist Naomi Richards has studied media coverage of “right to die celebrities”. 
Her research focused on the reach of the media in shaping public attitudes towards assisted 
death where she argued            
 …the commodification of experiences; the instrumentalisation of suffering, all of 
which may have a significant impact on the ‘national mood’ when it comes to the 
social sanction of deliberate death (Richards, 2014:17) 
 
The media are also a major public forum for claim-making by social movement activists 
(Richards, 2014:17). Through the use of strategic framing, the media, civil society organisations 
and new social movement actors render the issue of assisted death relevant, determine how it 
will be discussed from an ideological perspective, identify who is accountable and promote 
strategies for achieving potential solutions (Birenbaum-Carmeli et al 2006, Seale 1998, Snow 
and Benford 1992). It is important to acknowledge that, as social actors, the media have 
influenced the current debate by featuring heartrending individual cases, asking key questions, 
highlighting support from a range of sources, and framing the issue as a right to die. However, 
the role and rhetoric of the UK media in the end of life debate is not the focus for this thesis. 
Other academics are pursuing this line of research.15 
 
As the topic of death and dying moves into the public arena, commonly termed “right to die” 
organisations become instrumental in generating public interest and constructing specific 
discourses to frame the end of life debate. There is a World Federation of Right to Die Societies 
(WFRtDS) that consists of 52 right to die organisations from 26 different countries. Their 
purpose, articulated specifically in terms of rights, is to provide “an international link for 
organizations working to secure or protect the rights of individuals to self-determination at the 
end of their lives” (World Federation of Right to Die Societies, 2015). In the UK, there are two 
main organisations that are actively campaigning in support of assisted death for terminally ill, 
mentally competent people, Dignity in Dying, (DiD) and Friends at the End, (FATE) based in 
Glasgow. In contrast to FATE, DiD are not full members of the World Federation, but listed as 
                                                          
15
 Medical sociologist Professor Clive Seale is currently developing computer software that can analyse 
large portions of text to explore media coverage of the right to die over time. Dr Naomi Richards is 
investigating from an anthropological perspective the role of media coverage of right to die cases in 
contributing to the “national mood” on assisted death. 
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an affiliated organisation.16 These organisations share a common understanding of human 
rights that includes exercising individual liberty to determine the manner and timing of their 
death, especially in circumstances where suffering could prevent a dignified death. But what is 
not apparent, is how or why rights discourses appear to hold traction in this context. 
Right to die organisations promote concepts of autonomy/ choice, dignity, rights and suffering.  
These generalised values can also be understood as human rights principles encompassing 
“individual choice, liberty rights, privacy17 and freedom of the will” (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2001). Gibbs (2007:60) proposes that discourses with which social movement organisations 
choose to communicate their objectives can be a powerful tool used to influence the way that 
people think about, and give meaning to, their interests and is often used to “help groups 
define an issue or their collective stance towards it”. Miller’s (2010) contribution supports this. 
She argues (albeit in the context of development) that campaigning organisations use human 
rights frames for strategic purposes. “Rights-framed approaches” as developed by Miller 
(2010) are used as a way to serve the ideology of the organisation by repackaging ideas and 
beliefs to promote and advance the campaign objectives. Miller’s (2010) contribution is 
explored further in section 3.2.2, her findings are also used to develop the case study analysis 
of the campaign for Dignity in Dying in Chapter 7. 
 
Review of the literature exposes a lack in analysis of the framing techniques and campaign 
strategies used specifically by right to die organisations or civil society organisations promoting 
the right to die. Two studies have been conducted to date, both on FATE.18 Judd and Seale 
(2011) distributed questionnaires to FATE members for the purposes of obtaining a 
                                                          
16 Email correspondence with the President of the WFRtDS, Rob Jonquiere, to question this status 
revealed that DiD had strategically reconsidered their association with the World Federation in order to 
reduce controversy and resistance to furthering their own objectives in the UK. He provided this 
explanation: 
Dignity in Dying used to be a member of the  WFRtDS, but decided they ‘had to’ quit a couple of 
years ago because they did not want to be associated with a Federation that was presided by 
someone active in organisations that propagate Do It Yourself (DIY) methods. They consider 
such activities as damaging to their objective and lobby, especially-as I understood-because of 
damage being caused by media when they…discover this association (Jonquiere, 2015). 
  
17
 The concept of privacy, both in terms of healthcare and human rights has been largely under-
theorised. It is addressed briefly in the following chapter and emerges in this research findings mostly in 
regard to the legal petitions of Diane Pretty and Tony Nicklinson discussed in section 5.2. 
 
18
 FATE, as an organisation, was not selected for in-depth analysis in this research. It does provide a 
befriending function that accompanies dying individuals to Dignitas but in comparison to Dignity in 
Dying it has fewer members and resources and has been less significant in shaping the public and 
political debate. 
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demographic profile of these members to gain insight into their individual values and beliefs 
and their motivation for joining the organisation. Thirteen percent of individuals stated that 
their reasons for joining FATE revolved around concepts of rights in that they thought it a 
fundamental right to decide the manner and timing of death or to die with dignity (Judd and 
Seale, 2011:232). The second study by Naomi Richards investigated older people and death 
activism through interviews with members of FATE. She discovered the primary motivation of 
FATE activists involved “fear of a protracted dying period in which the fragmenting of social 
bonds and loss of sociality would precede death, entailing a loss of personhood” (Richards, 
2012:11). These studies contribute to understanding the appeal of assisted death and the 
motivation for joining a right to die organisation, but do not address the discourses with which 
the organisation frames its aims to define the issue of assisted dying. The finality of death, the 
variation in the dying trajectory, personal experience, social relations, cultural values and 
religious beliefs highlight specific dilemmas that organisations in support of a legalised assisted 
death encounter. This emphasises the necessity of framing their objectives within widely 
agreeable discourses.  
 
2.3.2 A sociology of rights 
Findings of the literature thus far demonstrate that research has been conducted into areas of 
death and dying to locate this in a contemporary UK context, to determine what is important 
to dying individuals, and to evidence how concepts of liberty and dignity including relief of 
suffering have been prioritised. However, the issue of assisted death articulated as a right to 
die has not yet been a focus for sociological study. The earlier work of Professor Bryan Turner 
raised the critique that sociology had not engaged sufficiently with normative theories of 
rights. He argued that 
Human rights debates and legislation are major features of the socio-political 
processes and institutions of modern societies, but sociology apparently possesses no 
contemporary theory of rights (Turner, 1993:490). 
Turner theorised that a concept of human rights could be located within a sociology of the 
body, particularly in regard to human vulnerability. This could be understood from a 
sociological perspective through a need for provision in social institutions to protect this 
vulnerability (Turner, 1993:502). His contribution grounded a sociology of the body in a social 
context of action and reciprocity and argued that human beings are subject to a diverse range 
of threats and influences, including those from the institutions that are designed to protect 
them (Turner, 1993:502). Vulnerability of the body as a universal concept forms the basis for 
Turner’s “frailty theory of human rights”. This is discussed in depth in the following chapter. 
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The experience of human suffering and an understanding of universal vulnerability are 
important in an end of life context and Turner’s frailty theory of rights could be valid where 
individuals are at the mercy of their impending mortality and the institutions that define end 
of life provision.  
 
Short (2009) noted the reluctance of sociology to engage with, and develop, an analysis of 
rights that was due to a widespread preoccupation by the discipline with the concept of 
citizenship. In an increasingly globalised world, nation state sovereignty is challenged through 
international mechanisms. Issues arise that are not necessarily confined to the nation state 
and this motivates an interest towards analysis of human rights in a broader and universal 
context rather than citizens’ rights solely in relation to a nation state framework (Short, 
2009:95). There is fast-growing interest in the sociology of human rights19. Issues expressed in 
the language of human rights have become a more prominent feature of the social and 
political landscape and this approach to rights enables complex claims to be analysed in the 
context of social power dynamics. Contemporary interpretations of rights centre upon the 
struggle for emancipatory change and, in an end of life context, the balance of power is 
between individuals who demand a right to die and the institutions that enable or constrain 
this.  
 
Where sociology had previously limited an analysis of rights to the realms of citizenship, 
anthropology had traditionally examined non-Western, “primitive” societies and had difficulty 
reconciling a concept of universal rights with their ethnographic approach, which involved 
studying diverse cultural difference (Short, 2009:99). Emerging trends within sociology and 
anthropology suggest these disciplines are now engaging with concepts of rights through a 
shared social constructionist approach that can help understand how rights operate in a social 
context. This approach can be used to analyse rights claims as the product of social processes. 
Lydia Morris argued that a social constructionist perspective on rights should be adopted to 
better inform 
…how rights come into social being and operate in social practice, whose purpose they 
serve and what interests they protect and whether they are guaranteed or constrained 
by the practice and letter of the law (Morris 2006:7). 
                                                          
19
 Demonstrated through the work of Frezzo (2014), Hynes et al (2012, 2011, 2010), O’ Byrne (2012), 
Miller (2010), Short (2009), Morgan and Turner (2009), Morris (2006) and, also, in 2007, through the 
formation of a new study group by the British Sociological Association to bring together people 
interested in promoting the sociological study of rights (School of Advanced Study, 2016). 
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The contribution of anthropology towards understanding the social practices of rights was 
instigated through the work of social anthropologist Richard Wilson. He argued that the earlier 
focus on rights assumed them to exist purely within a legal domain and had neglected to 
examine the “social life of human rights” (Wilson, 2006). This is indicative of the end of life 
debate. There are laws and policies in place to determine normative behaviours and practices 
at the end of life, but the process and experience of dying is a social, rather than legal, 
phenomenon. On this basis, it warrants deeper sociological exploration. Wilson’s contribution 
emphasised the social nature of rights. He distinguished between emphasis on the legal nature 
of rights and “human rights talk”, addressing the analytical import of the way social 
movements construct and deploy rights discourses to interpret particular issues or interests, 
and to determine “how people speak about those norms or aspire to expand or interpret them 
in new ways” (Wilson, 2007:350). O’Byrne, like Wilson (2007) emphasised the necessity of 
understanding rights within a sociological context. He argued “competing voices contest the 
ownership of this language and this discursive struggle is a profoundly social, not a legal 
process“(O’Byrne, 2012:831). 
 
Theorising the language-structure of human rights, O’ Byrne (2012:835) argued that human 
rights may be considered a legitimate framework within which individual claims can be made 
in so far as the “language of human rights provides us with a set of ethical validity claims which 
we as individuals and on behalf of ourselves and others make against society as a whole”. The 
value of “rights talk”, utilised in conjunction with political discourse, has been noted and this 
may be driven by the activity of social movement organisations and moral reformers using 
rights discursively as a tactic to assert the existence of real or imagined rights (O’ Byrne 2011, 
Miller 2010, Wilson 2007, Freeman 2002, Douzinas 2000, Glendon 1991). Liberal conceptions 
of personal freedoms and self-determination, expressed through rights discourses, suggest 
that individuals acting with rational capacity should be able to determine the manner and 
timing of their own death.  A right to die may be articulated explicitly as such, or implied 
through understandings of rights that involve personal autonomy, dignity, relief of suffering 
and vulnerability.  
 
Particular discourses develop over time. This is an important finding in the literature that may 
help explain how the expression “right to die” has come to be used and to what extent, and for 
what purposes, concepts of rights are now being invoked in the end of life debate and policy.  
The ways in which social actors articulate their needs and priorities in relation to the end of life 
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has implications for how society thinks about, and gives meaning to, the experience of dying. 
Closer analysis of how and why rights discourses are employed by a range of social actors in an 
end of life context is necessary. This is an area that has been neglected by the existing 
literature. A sociological approach to rights struggles, discourses and practices can help 
identify how issues come to be expressed in terms of rights and how rights claims arise and 
become embedded in new contexts.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that assisted death, on occasion expressed as a right to die, is a 
contemporary and complex issue that has arisen due to changes in the late modern, Western 
dying trajectory. The established medicalised model of care, which has defined end of life since 
the latter half of the 20th century, has been challenged by an increase in healthcare 
consumerism and a shift in state responsibility in favour of individual accountability for 
matters of health and death. Concepts of choice and dignity are being prioritised. These values 
were reiterated as important at the end of life through review of clinical studies on assisted 
death. Notions of a good death have developed and, although this is subjective, a well-
managed death generally involves limited suffering and a respect for individual personhood 
and values. The prevailing discourses that appear to characterise the dying process in the UK 
and the understanding of a good death currently involve notions of liberty and dignity. These 
are also integral to human rights discourses.  
 
This chapter has revealed that discourses involving individual liberty, dignity, and relief of 
suffering are increasingly defined as important. However, while a number of disciplines are 
researching end of life there is no sociological analysis of why assisted death has come to be 
expressed as a right to die, or how and for what purposes social actors interpret rights in an 
end of life context. Reviewing the literature has revealed the “social life” of rights at the end of 
life as a particularly interesting focus for study, and an area that has not yet been addressed. 
The understanding and appropriation of rights discourses in this different area is especially 
important because these discourses may resonate with current values, generate public 
support, and facilitate change so that different ideals become institutionalised. An 
understanding of rights at the end of life that includes new sets of rights claims has the 
potential to transform social norms.  To comprehend how a notion of rights at the end of life 
could arise and become embedded in practice, greater clarity is needed regarding how, for 
what purposes, to what extent, and by whom such discourses are employed. This research will 
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complement the work of other end of life scholars who have not yet considered the impact of 
rights discourses in the context of death and dying and existing research into a sociology of 
rights that has not yet studied rights in an end of life context. The findings in this research will 
enable a sociological understanding of rights to be developed in a new context. On this basis 
the study will contribute to 
…the growing strength and diversity of analyses in the sociology of human rights, 
characteristically moving away from a static and foundational view towards a more 
dynamic and critical analysis of the contested linguistic, normative and geopolitical 
content and parameters of human rights discourse and practices (Hynes et al, 
2012:790). 
 
Human rights frameworks are examined in the next chapter to illuminate different positions on 
rights that social actors may adopt when they articulate their interpretations and 
understandings of rights. Concepts of personal liberty, human dignity and vulnerability of the 
body are explored and embedded as human rights discourses. The following chapter will 
include foundational and anti-foundational perspectives on human rights to demonstrate how 
these approaches may be utilised in an end of life context and how, as a result of this, a right 
to die may possibly be conceived. These frameworks will reveal positions on rights that may 
subsequently be identified in the data as it emerges.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Human rights frameworks 
 
What is meant when a “right” to something is expressed? It appears the interpretation and 
application of human rights vary according to whom is articulating rights and, as Dembour 
(2010:2) argues, “[d]ifferent people hold different concepts of human rights”. The purpose of 
this chapter is to explore the ways in which human rights could be understood, demonstrate 
how rights discourses can be appropriated in an end of life context and, as a result of this, 
explain how a right to die may be envisaged. This chapter contributes to the research by 
illuminating perspectives on rights and clarifying positions from which various arguments can 
be made when different actors articulate issues at the end of life using the language of rights.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, a foundational position on rights 
is discussed. Within this perspective, the right to an assisted death can be grounded in 
conceptions of fundamental and innate personal liberty and human dignity that could explain 
or validate end of life decision-making. Turner’s “Frailty theory of human rights” is included 
here to support a foundational ontology. This is particularly poignant with regard to the 
vulnerability of dying individuals and those contemplating death. The second part of this 
chapter explores an anti-foundational position, which rejects the foundational assumptions of 
human rights, arguing instead that they are time and context specific. An anti-foundational 
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paradigm encompasses both a legal approach to rights and a social constructionist approach. 
Legal positivism includes examination of the role of the nation state that, from this 
perspective, is considered important for the recognition and protection of the human rights of 
its citizens. Social constructionism is explored in relation to how new social movement 
organisations use discursive strategies to influence how an issue is thought about and to help 
realise their objectives. In contrast to what has commonly been referenced as “rights-based” 
approaches, “rights-framed” approaches as developed by Miller (2010) are discussed here. The 
final section briefly acknowledges alternative approaches to rights to define end of life, 
primarily a utilitarian approach, which has traditionally informed the basis for law and policy-
making in the UK. Although a very different approach to that of rights, this perspective has 
implications in relation to selected arguments and documentation that are analysed in the 
following data chapters.   
 
3.1 Foundational approaches  
A foundational or essentialist approach to rights embraces the most common interpretation of 
human rights. Individuals are the bearers of human rights solely by virtue of their humanity. A 
foundational perspective, which encompasses natural law and liberal tradition, considers 
personal liberty, human dignity and, as more recently proposed by Turner (1993), vulnerability 
of the body, as foundations for the existence of rights. These concepts are examined below.  
 
3.1.1 Natural law 
A theoretical approach to human rights justified through natural law is centred upon the 
recognition of pre-social characteristics that define being human. These include “elements of 
the human condition that are essential to man’s nature and his full development as a human 
being” and are in some degree objective, accessible to reason, reflect human nature and 
enhance humanity (O’ Connor 1967, Whiting 1995).  Natural law theory links these universal 
elements with moral principles that are bestowed without outside influence upon rational 
individuals and these often have a lawful character that inclines people to act or refrain from 
acting in a particular way (Zuckert 1996, Cranston 1973). Natural scholars20 attribute human 
rights to being founded in nature but the majority recognise legal consensus and human rights 
law as a direct continuation of the human rights concept (Dembour 2010). 
                                                          
20
 A classification coined by Dembour in her 2010 paper “What are Human Rights? Four Schools of 
Thought”. 
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For natural scholars, the origins of human rights entitlements are found in nature, but the 
source of this nature is a topic for debate in the literature. A secular perspective grounds the 
source of the human condition in rational man as a freely thinking individual. In contrast, a 
divine perspective refers to man’s nature as a creation of God, acknowledging the universal 
and God-given inclination of rational man that centres on the awareness of doing good and 
avoiding evil. John Locke, as a key proponent of natural law, designated the character of 
natural law as a duty owed to God (Locke [1689] 1970).  Belief in the divine origins of natural 
law, and a God who is sovereign in matters of life and death, constitutes the foundation for 
religious opposition to the legalisation of assisted death. This view informs the contributions of 
some members in the House of Lords debates to be explored in Chapter 6.  
 
Ishay (2008) argued that rights are historically derived from humanity and a spirit of “brotherly 
love”. These views are echoed in ancient ethics and religious tradition and their origins can be 
found in Plato’s and Socrates’ conception of a universal “human goodness” (Ishay, 2008). 
Human nature has generally been argued as a foundation for a natural law perspective on 
human rights.21 Albers, Hoffman and Reinhardt (2014:1) highlight how “[h]uman nature as a 
concept is still widely used in contemporary philosophical and juridical discourse as a way of 
justifying the universal and egalitarian validity of the claim of human rights”. Human nature, 
whether divine or secular in origin, is defended as the basis for human rights through both the 
moral status of individuals and a connection with human need22 and vulnerability. Another 
substantive basis for human rights within a natural law perspective is that of human value. 
Human value reflects the inherent worth and innate potential of every individual. Respect for 
these ideals underpins national and international human rights mechanisms, including as one 
example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, promoting “the dignity and worth of the 
human person” (UDHR, 1948).  
 
Individual liberty 
                                                          
21 Grounding rights in human nature or human value necessitates belief that humans possess common 
attributes. However, human nature as a universal concept is contested by the constructionist argument 
noted by Freeman (2004:384) “[h]uman nature itself is partly a sociocultural product and consequently 
variable”. This perspective is explored further in section 3.2.2. 
22
 On the basis of human need, goods that are indispensable for a reasonable life should be protected by 
human rights (Mieth 2014). 
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Liberalism as a political approach regards human rights as natural and liberal ideology reflects 
commitment to the values of freedom and equality of every person in society, believing that 
an individual’s potential for rational action derives from their own reasoning and critical 
enquiry (Ishay, 2008, Heywood 2007, Jennings 1996). Key liberal philosophers John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant have formulated principles of liberty within different frameworks. Locke, as the 
founding father argued that all men are born free and equal. Human beings possess natural 
rights that are those values and moral norms deemed worthy of protection in a hypothetical 
“state of nature” independent of outside influence. Locke’s contribution grounded the concept 
of autonomy in Western liberal theory and natural law tradition, but he also situated his idea 
of natural rights within a political context whereby the legitimacy of a government depended 
upon the respect that it accorded these rights (Locke [1689] 1970). The state of nature was, 
according to Locke, limited in practice by human beings that have a vested self-interest and a 
lack of monitoring by an independent judge who has power to enforce a common standard of 
law. As a preferable alternative that would enhance human flourishing, he suggested that men 
necessarily levy unrestricted liberty to ensure protection for themselves and their property 
and submit to rules drafted by the state to facilitate normative standards of conduct (Locke 
[1689 Bk II Ch IX] 1970:124).  
 
Locke elaborated on the concept of liberty arguing that all human beings are entitled to certain 
rights derived from their own moral nature and considered one’s individual property. His novel 
contribution argued this property to include one’s own person, 
 Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has 
a “property” in his own “person”. This, nobody has any right to but himself (Locke 
[1689 Bk II Ch V] 1970:27).  
This argument raises an important point relevant to the end of life debate and policy. Through 
the notion of the body as personal property, Locke emphasises that individuals, and only these 
individuals, have a right to decide over their own bodies and this conviction could be applied 
to the understanding of liberty rights to self-determine where and when life should end. The 
contemporary argument by philosopher Alan Gewirth also proposed that a right includes 
individual entitlement to exert control over one’s own personal property, 
[A] right is an individual’s interest that ought to be respected and protected; and this 
“ought” involves, on the one side, that the interest in question is something that is due 
or owed to the subject or right-holder as her personal property, as what she is 
personally entitled to have and control for her own sake, and on the other side, that 
other persons, as respondents, have a mandatory duty at least not to infringe this 
property (Gewirth, 1996:9). 
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Locke traditionally argued from a divine perspective, but his sentiment expressed below 
indicated that there may be instances where man rather than God is sovereign over his own 
body. He suggested 
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man in that 
state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has 
not liberty to destroy himself or so much as any creature in his possession but where 
some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it (Locke [1689 Bk II Ch II] 1970:6). 
Initially, Locke appears to disapprove of unrestricted liberty, and this is consistent with his 
philosophy that supports an active role of the state in curtailing liberty in certain 
circumstances. He claims liberty does not extend to man destroying himself or others. On 
closer inspection, this perspective could be drawn upon to justify unbearable suffering as a 
reason to warrant requested death. Locke builds a notion of rights upon individual liberty, and, 
on this basis, a claim could be made to conceive assisted death as a human right. Where 
suffering is burdensome and there is a protracted period of distress, it may be especially 
acceptable to want to end life prematurely. The ending of suffering is of “nobler use” than 
preserving life that is only endured for the sake of remaining alive.  
 
At the heart of liberty is the right to determine one’s own concept of existence or non-
existence. A Kantian perspective views individual self-governance as living by one’s own values 
and beliefs informed by a voluntary, rational choice. In contrast to Locke, Kant argues that the 
right of autonomy is not necessarily intrinsic to human beings, but is dependent on their 
“rational nature”. In this regard, autonomy is an exercise of evaluative choice, requiring 
rationality on the part of individuals to appreciate the extent of possible options and their 
consequences. At the end of life, in relation to assisted dying, the consequences of this 
decision are final and non-reversible. Review of the literature suggests that existential 
suffering and distress at the end of life can disrupt self-embodiment and this could undermine 
the principle of autonomy (Campbell, 1996). In addition, priorities and values can fluctuate or 
be subject to influence during the course of a long-term or life limiting illness and on this basis, 
one could argue there is a need to demonstrate a higher level of rational thinking and mental 
capacity in end of life decision-making.  
 
From a contemporary perspective, Carel (2008:73) links the concept of individual liberty, 
articulated as personal choice, to human agency as a means to assert oneself and promote 
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one’s own goals. For Lawton (2000:81), this sense of self involves the “ability to act as the 
agents of their embodied actions”.  A right to die could be conceived through a foundational 
approach to rights by emphasising the scope of personal liberty, not only in life but in death, 
and extending this to include the right to make end of life choices23. A right to assisted death 
could also be a comforting possibility to the dying, knowing that if circumstances became 
unbearable, or suffering too great, then this option were available. In this way, respect for 
humans as thinking, intelligent beings in possession of reason and reflection is demonstrated. 
The right to self-determine end of life enables individuals to become “authors of their own 
self-transformation” (Spiers, 1997:29).  Positions on liberty and dignity vary depending on the 
beliefs, priorities and purposes of different social actors and are analysed through the data as 
it emerges. 
 
Human dignity 
Dignity as a concept is generally associated with a natural law perspective on human rights. As 
one particular example, the contribution of political scientist, Jack Donnelly (2003, 2007), 
grounded rights in respect for the inherent dignity of human beings. He also argued that rights 
ought to be enjoyed “simply because one is a human being” (Donnelly, 2003:10). Recent 
literature, including Rosen (2012) and Kateb (2011), notes that dignity is often perceived as the 
basis for human rights. However, there is a lack of philosophical interest in dignity as a concept 
and a lack of scholarly discussion on what human dignity is or why it matters for rights. Rosen 
(2012: 31) proposes that human beings are accorded dignity by virtue of the humanity in their 
persons, which may be due to an inherent sense of morality within us all that presumes 
individuals intrinsically valuable. Kateb (2011:10) links the notion of identity towards theorising 
innate dignity within a human rights discourse. He argues that the 
…idea of human dignity insists on recognising the proper identity of the individual or 
species, recognising what a person is in relation to all other persons and what the 
species is in relation to all other species. 
 
Immanuel Kant, as a key Western philosopher associated the concept of dignity with an innate 
human worth. In his Metaphysics of Morals he noted the inherent nature of dignity claiming 
“he possesses dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all 
                                                          
23
 It is important to note here that decisional autonomy in an end of life context could also involve the 
option of choosing not to avail oneself of a right to die. The knowledge that assistance to die was 
available, and deciding not to request this course of action, could be empowering for a dying person 
who makes a conscious decision to continue to live. 
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other beings in the world” (Kant [1797] 1990:434). For Kant, dignity has an unconditional 
value. In contrast to a divine perspective, he associated dignity as the basis for morality from a 
secular position that may better resonate with contemporary and humanist perceptions of 
dignity and rights. Conceptions of rights, dignity, respect and duty are central to Kant’s 
morality and underpin his condemnation of suicide. Kant’s position on suicide, presented in his 
lectures on ethics, is well-known. He states 
To preserve his person he has the right of disposal over his body. But in taking his life 
he does not preserve his person; he disposes of his person and not of its attendant 
circumstances; he robs himself of his person. This is contrary to the highest duty we 
have towards ourselves, for it annuls the condition of all other duties; it goes beyond 
the urn of its use of free will… (Kant [1775-80] 1963:147-154). 
 
This position argues that suicide violates the “highest duty” including concepts of duty to 
others and duties that rational beings owe to themselves, individuals being morally obliged to 
protect their lives based on their inner and alienable dignity. For Kant, the notion of duty is of 
primary importance. He elaborates on the performance of duties in relation to personal 
freedoms, 
 
Those who advocate suicide seek to give the widest interpretation to freedom. There 
is something flattering in the thought that we can take our own life if we are so 
minded; and so we find even right-thinking persons defining suicide in this respect. 
There are many circumstances under which life ought to be sacrificed. If I cannot 
preserve my life except by violating my duties towards myself, I am bound to sacrifice 
my life rather than violate these duties. But suicide is in no circumstances permissible 
(Kant [1775-80] 1963:147-154). 
 
Kant differentiates between the self-inflicted actions of suicide and sacrifice. Suicide is not 
deemed permissible in any circumstances. The violation of duties towards oneself and 
potential duties that are unable to be performed for the benefit of others when one’s owns life 
is ended are too great.  In contrast, Kant defends self-sacrifice on the basis of duty to oneself 
suggesting there are “many circumstances” under which this “ought” to take place, although 
he does not elaborate further. 
 
The concept of dignity did not inform the language of law and jurisprudence pre 20th century. 
There is no legal right to dignity per se, but it has increasingly featured in international legal 
documents since the UDHR 1948 (Schroeder, 2012:323). A foundational understanding of 
human dignity and rights is linked in the UDHR Preamble, which states 
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Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world (UDHR 1948). 
The inalienable nature of dignity is challenged by the fact that personal dignity may be lost or 
destroyed. This resonates with a social constructionist position (explored in section 3.2.2) that 
argues dignity is given content by a range of political, social and religious convictions (Rosen, 
2012:7). Even accepting that all human beings have an inner or unconditional dignity or value, 
the meaning of dignity will vary according to individual perspective and experience. Rosen 
(2012:46) argued that modern conceptions of human dignity include an ”amalgam of 
humanist, liberal, Christian, socialist and Kantian ideas”. Jacobsen (2007) attempted to 
reconcile a foundational and constructionist approach to dignity. She suggested categorisation 
into “human” and “social” dignity. Human dignity reflects an inherent, inalienable value by 
virtue of being human and social dignity as a contingent consequence of recognising human 
dignity in others which may then be bestowed, earned or diminished through interaction in a 
social setting (Jacobsen, 2007).  
 
Human dignity could offer a credible basis for the existence of human rights. Through the 
generally desirable notion of a dignified death, an understanding of dignity grounded in rights 
could offer a plausible basis for a right to die. However, the definition and phenomenology of 
dignity is ambiguous. It remains open to theorisation and interpretation by social actors and is 
criticised as a “vacuous concept” because it lacks legal and philosophical boundaries and 
cannot explain narrower interests.  Bagaric and Allan (2006:263) argued, 
For dignity to provide meaningful guidance to judges and lawmakers…regarding the 
scope, acceptance and development of concrete rights, a number of matters need to 
be resolved including the meaning and justification of dignity.   
Dignity as a concept grounded in human rights was identified through the literature as an 
interesting and relevant area to study in relation to the end of life. Dignity and the associated 
vocabulary of “choice”, “rights” and “respect” feature prominently in UK healthcare and end of 
life policies to be examined in Chapter 5. Maintaining human dignity is prioritised throughout 
healthcare policy and practice. Individuals working within health and social care or benefitting 
from the attentions of professionals working within these areas especially relate to the 
concept of dignity (Jacobsen, 2009). The complexity of the assisted dying debate is highlighted 
here; understandings of human dignity normally relate to dignity in life rather than death. 
Respect for human dignity that encompasses dignity in dying is used as an argument by some 
social actors who suggest a right to die can enhance human dignity through the avoidance of 
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an undignified death. The concept of dignity in dying is critical to this research and will be 
discussed through analysis of the data. 
 
 Vulnerability of the body 
Alongside concepts of liberty and dignity that underpin a foundational position on human 
rights, a novel approach was proposed by Bryan Turner through a sociological understanding 
grounded in the vulnerability of the body (Turner, 1993). His contribution outlined a theory of 
human rights through a foundational ontology of rights based upon human frailty as a 
universal feature of human existence. This “Frailty Theory of Human Rights” centred upon the 
idea that 
Human beings are frail, because their lives are finite, because they typically exist under 
conditions of scarcity, disease and danger and because they are constrained by the 
physical processes of ageing and decay (Turner, 1993:501).  
Turner argued that humans are frail. We are all mortal and constrained by ageing and illness 
that reduces our physical/mental ability and participation in social life. Especially in the dying 
process, the vulnerability of human beings is a convincing argument upon which rights could 
be validated. At the end of life, human beings are alone with their pain, confronted by their 
finite existence. Human vulnerability in the face of inevitable death is universal, irrespective of 
the historical, social or cultural context in which they exist. Despite scholars who contest this 
position,24 human frailty is evident in the experience and process of dying. 
  
Turner’s theory does however acknowledge the disparity over the universal characterisation of 
human frailty, the above quote continues, 
                                                          
24 In reply to Turner’s foundational ontology of human rights, Malcolm Waters contests an ontological 
grounding of human rights on the basis of frailty alone and argues that a sociological approach to rights 
is necessarily constructionist (Waters, 1996). Waters argues that the concept of human rights is itself an 
institution that reflects prevailing interests and thus by its nature is historically and culturally specific. He 
states 
 …human rights is an institution that is specific to cultural and historical context just like any 
other and its very universality is itself a human construction. The construction of human rights 
demonstrably transpires in the field of politics and its institutionalization is an emergent 
arrangement that reflects prevailing balances of political interests. Such a view is, one must 
insist, positivistic rather than foundationalist because it relies on locating the emergence of 
human rights within historical configurations of interest (Waters, 1996:594). 
Turner (1997: 566) later replies to Waters, suggesting that a sociology of rights can have a foundational 
ontology that centres upon human frailty, whilst also accepting that human rights are relative to 
historical and cultural contexts, and determined by political interests.  
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Against this characterisation of human ontology it can be argued that this condition of 
frailty is historically and culturally variable and that therefore it cannot function 
theoretically as a substitute for natural law (Turner, 1993:501). 
The literature in section 2.1 noted advances in modern medicine and technology that can 
prolong life and alleviate symptoms of suffering, perhaps disputing individuals as frail. Turner 
contends that technology and social modernity have changed the circumstances of human 
ontology, but not necessarily for the better. He implies that modern life is now subject to a 
range of diverse threats and challenges. These threats arise from the “precariousness of social 
institutions”. Furthermore, he claims the very institutions that are designed to protect human 
beings such as the state, law and church may abuse their power (Turner, 1993:502). Turner 
elaborates upon the vulnerability of the body as an entity that is subject to protection or 
exploitation by institutionalised rights and he insinuates that the human body is in a “dynamic 
relationship” with this precariousness of social institutions (Turner, 1993). These points are 
considered together with other contributions under a social constructionist approach in 
section 3.2.2. 
 
The notion of collective sympathy provides a platform for a subsequent and vital step in 
Turner’s argument that sympathy emerges as a consequence of, or a supplement to, his theory 
of human frailty (Turner, 1993:506). Collective sympathy arising from human frailty implicitly 
locates human rights within a common social act of recognition such that “the idea of frailty 
requires the support of a theory of sympathy to underpin the sociological nature of this 
argument about the connection between frailty and human rights” (Turner, 1993:506). The 
notion of collective sympathy arises historically from interpretations of the Golden Rule of 
Reciprocity that constitutes a fundamental human principle echoed in many religious 
doctrines. This is clearly defined in the Christian Bible as the command “do to others as you 
would have them do to you” (New International Version Bible, Luke ch6 v31). Turner develops 
this notion as being responsible for the formation of moral communities and claims this may 
propagate the institutionalisation of particular rights on the basis that  “[h]uman beings will 
want their rights to be recognised because they see in the plight of others their own (possible) 
misery” (Turner, 1993:489). Turner’s contribution is meaningful because it suggests a cross-
cultural ontological foundation for claims to rights. It also explains how support for rights is 
generated through evoking a common human sympathy reflecting compassionate man.25  
 
                                                          
25
Compassion as a concept is not generally grounded in a human rights approach. Turner’s theory 
broaches the idea that the capacity for compassion is part of a human identity and respect for human 
rights may be dependent upon shared compassion for our fellow beings.  
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Turner’s frailty theory of rights grounded in human vulnerability is an important tool for 
analysing the right to die. Particularly in the case of dying individuals, it can provide an 
ontological basis to explain why human beings have rights during, and at the end of, life and 
how these should be conceptualised and discussed. Human beings are vulnerable physically 
and mentally when facing an incurable or serious illness and in the dying process. This is 
recognised to an extent in the UK and available options at end of life are regulated by the legal 
system, the institutionalised medical model and current healthcare practice.  
 
3.2 Anti-foundational approaches  
An anti-foundational perspective views human rights as constructed and relative to a specific 
social context. This approach involves understanding rights without metaphysical grounding 
either on the basis of natural law relating to God, as in the tradition of Locke, or on the basis of 
reason and logic, as proposed by Kant. Human rights are neither inherent nor innate according 
to an anti-foundational perspective, but rather time and context dependent. This position can 
be useful to explain socio-cultural variation in the nature of human rights claims and the 
foundations of the human rights institutions designed to protect them. This section is divided 
into two parts. The first explores legal positivism as one basis for understanding legal rights. 
The second explores a social constructionist approach that grounds and analyses claims to 
rights through an emphasis on the social, rather than the legal context. 
 
3.2.1. Legal positivism 
A legal positivist position on rights assumes human rights and subsequent claims to rights as 
solely designated and legitimised through the action of a nation state enshrining and 
protecting them in law. Legal positivism, as an approach to rights, looks to the 
recommendations of the political and legal systems for guidance on permissible conduct in 
relation to complex social dilemmas. On this basis, UK law and policy has an important role in 
determining end of life issues. Analysis of the relationship between law and morals is not the 
priority for this thesis (see for example, Hart et al, 1958), but the law does have a normative 
function. Statutory and policy provision will define the options available at the end of life and 
shape how the public thinks about these options. UK law and politics has a traditional 
understanding of rights as legal entitlements. Individuals are part of civil state linked 
inextricably to institutions that customise standards of behaviour and this, according to 
Vincent, (2010:5) illustrates the “intrinsically political” nature of human rights. The role of the 
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nation state is critical to a legal positivist understanding of rights. The responsibilities of a 
liberal, democratic government, as law and policy makers, include defining and protecting 
human rights with regard for the safety and well-being of its citizens. Liberal political 
philosophy acknowledges individual human rights as interests of the state and recognises that 
the state has a duty to maintain personal security and limit harm to all its citizens.26 
 
 From a legal positivist perspective, realisation of a right to die would potentially involve 
amendment of statutory law, legislation of a new right or extending the boundaries of and 
appropriating existing rights in a new area. As a result of this the status of the dying person 
meeting the eligibility criteria27 would be classified as a “rights-holder”. Feinberg (1980:151) 
suggests that to think of oneself as a rights-holder is empowering, it involves elements of pride 
and self- esteem, being worthy of respect from others. Classifying the dying person as a rights-
holder positions the state and other actors, potentially including members of the community 
as duty-bearers who can be held responsible for discharging legal obligations or duties. For 
most human rights theorists, duties are not considered a precondition to human rights, but 
rights do often involve duties both to fulfil moral or social obligations and to respect the rights 
of others (Etzioni and Brodbeck 2012, Freeman 2011, Douzinas 2000 and Bobbio 1996). If 
dying individuals were granted a right to request assistance to die, the state would become 
responsible for discharging legal obligations that would include nominating a duty-bearer to 
assist a suicide in order to enable the right of the rights-holder to be fulfilled. There is some 
debate over the extent to which rights and duties are correlative, which prompts the question 
of whether concepts of rights can exist without a duty-bearer. O’Neill (1996:129) asserts that 
any principles defining a right also entail a duty or obligation that is assigned to others in order 
that rights-holders may claim or decide to waive the right, or can pursue a remedy for breach 
of this right. She suggests that if these duty-bearers are unidentified, then the right cannot be 
claimed, waived or enforced (O’ Neill, 1996:129). In light of continuing opposition from the 
medical professional bodies, and lack of suitable, alternative proposals, there is currently no 
agreed consensus upon whom has an obligation to act as a duty-bearer and it is undetermined 
where, or with whom, the claim would be lodged.  
                                                          
26
 This has traditionally raised an important question particularly within sociology on the nature and 
origins of citizenship as a concept (see Marshall 1950, Turner 1990, 1993). The pragmatic argument 
initially conceived by Arendt (1958) noted that human rights are only meaningful if the state recognizes 
its inhabitants as citizens and, thereby, bearers of human rights. She questioned whether individuals 
who are not recognised as citizens, that is, members of a nation state and are in effect stateless, are 
they also entitled to rights and protection by the state? (Arendt, 1958). 
27
Current proposals debated in the House of Lords specify eligibility/ safeguarding criteria as age, 
terminal illness and rational capacity as requirements, and therefore the right to die would not be 
equally or universally available to all.  
53 
 
 
Respect for the rights and freedoms of others is a key issue in the end of life debate which 
involves state responsibility to balance the rights of individuals against protecting the rights of 
the rest of society. On the extent of personal freedoms, the UDHR 1948, Art 29 suggests that 
individual liberty shall only be limited by the nation state in particular circumstances. These 
include; “securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and 
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare” (UDHR, 
1948). One of the main arguments against the legalisation of assisted death is the potential for 
abuse. Opponents claim that by initially permitting an assisted death for individuals meeting 
the criteria, the parameters for requested death may later shift.  If the proposed safeguards 
broaden, there is a concern that mentally incompetent, vulnerable or frail elderly adults may 
be subjected to an assisted death without request. This slippery slope28 may result in non- 
voluntary euthanasia of disadvantaged individuals and change the ways in which society 
regards the ending of life.   
 
A common critique of rights is highlighted here. Through their egocentric nature, rights focus 
on the individual as a basic moral unit serving to recognise and protect individual claims at the 
expense of consideration for the wider community (Campbell, 2006). Contesting this critique, 
Kateb (2012:67) argues that even if rights originate from egocentric self-interest, the 
recognition of a certain right may validate a claim that can potentially benefit all. In practice, 
an initial consideration is expanded upon to improve conditions for others. A legalised right to 
die could potentially benefit the whole community by extending choice at the end of life to 
some individuals, who for their own reasons, may desire an assisted death. Although a right to 
                                                          
28 Academic research by Battin et al as recently as 2007, disputes evidence of a slippery slope or any 
disproportionate impact of legalising assisted suicide. This study based on data from Oregon and the 
Netherlands uses subjects from 10 groups of potentially vulnerable patients. Data collected from 
Oregon included all annual and cumulative Department of Human Services reports in the period 1998–
2006 plus three independent studies. Data from the Netherlands comprised all four government-
commissioned nationwide studies of end-of-life decision making in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2005 plus 
specialized studies. Analysis of the data indicated the rate of assisted dying in Oregon and in the 
Netherlands showed no evidence of heightened risk for the following groups: elderly, women, people 
with low educational status, the poor, the physically disabled or chronically ill, minors, people with 
psychiatric illnesses including depression, or racial or ethnic minorities, compared with background 
populations. The sole group with a heightened risk was people diagnosed with AIDS (Battin et al, 2007). 
This research concluded that where assisted dying is already legal, there is no evidence currently 
indicating that legalized physician assisted suicide or euthanasia will have disproportionate impact on 
patients in vulnerable groups, and more notably those who did receive physician-assisted dying in the 
jurisdictions studied appeared to enjoy comparative social, economic, educational, professional and 
other privileges. 
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die would only be accessible to individuals meeting the safeguarding criteria, legal recognition 
could bring end of life issues more into focus as a topic for discussion and collectively identify 
the dying as a vulnerable group in need of further resources to protect their rights. 
 
Some rights-adherents do seek to institutionalise their claims, and normative principles of 
human rights may motivate actors towards legal entrenchment. On occasion, the fulfilment of 
one right may infringe upon the rights of other members of society or adversely affect or 
conflict with another already established right that highlights the difficultly in defining 
normative understandings of human rights principles (Freeman, 2011:6). Legal recognition of a 
right to die would directly conflict with, and challenge, an already established right to life (a 
non-derogable right protected under national and international human rights mechanisms that 
the UK has ratified). Kateb (2012:31) suggests “[t]endentious interpretation makes rights 
conflict”. Human rights are sometimes conflicting or contradictory in nature. Their boundaries 
are open to interpretation by actors and circumstances that may either further develop and 
extend existing rights or impede their recognition or legal implementation. This idea is 
demonstrated in the research through the legal appeals of Diane Pretty and Tony Nicklinson.  
 
The democratic process may increase the legitimacy of a right, but a legal positivist approach 
to human rights is criticised in the literature as inadequate to analyse the ethical, political, 
social and economic dimensions of human rights or measure validity or accountability (Wilson 
2007, Freeman 2002, Etzioni 1997). With issues as complex and personal as the dying process, 
the formal status of law may be rejected, as illustrated by the following comment 
law binds in conscience, yet this is because it is the law only if just and promulgated by 
legitimate authority, not because the majority or the law can be a standard of 
conscience…the law has an educational function and tends to develop moral 
virtues…[but] the state has not the authority to make me reform the judgement of my 
conscience any more than it has the power of imposing upon intellects its own 
judgement of good and evil (Maritain, 1971:77). 
This disregard for the law in preference for individual standards of conscience, often motivated 
by distressing personal circumstances and including unbearable suffering, could explain why 
assisted suicide, although illegal, does occur in a number of UK cases. These cases are routinely 
investigated by the police and yet, most are not prosecuted. This conundrum is discussed 
further in regard to analysis of current law and policy and arises as a topic for debate in focus 
group discussion. 
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3.2.2 Social constructionism 
In contrast to legal and foundational perspectives, a social constructionist theory of rights 
emphasises that rights are a product of their social environment. Bryman (2008:19) explains 
how a constructionist ontology implies that social phenomena are produced through social 
interaction and are in a constant state of revision. This perspective encourages investigation of 
how particular meaning is ascribed to the act of assisted death and the activities of social 
actors that are driving this. A social constructionist perspective can provide a way of 
understanding human rights and enables a focus on the role of social actors and their use of 
rights discourses. This could help explain how a notion of rights at the end of life, including a 
right to die, could arise and become embedded in a contemporary UK context.  
 
One powerful way in which attitudes towards death and dying are shaped is through 
discourse. A discursive approach to rights is part of a social constructionist position that 
regards rights as a linguistic expression, adopted by different actors, who, in a specific time 
and context, consider a rights frame to serve their purpose. Goodale, (2007:7) argued this 
approach to human rights, as discourse, is interesting because the “study of human rights as 
discourse reveals the way in which actors embrace the idea of human rights, in part because of 
its visionary capacity, the way it expresses both the normative and the aspirational”. Certain 
distinctions and individualised meanings are both evident and constructed through language. 
Merry, (2006) suggested the adoption and understanding of rights discourses varies according 
to the purposes of social actors,  
Whether local actors develop a human rights approach depends on their perceptions 
of its success. Human rights discourse may be rejected by local actors; it may merely 
decorate local practices; it may combine with local discourses in a hybrid; or it may 
subvert and displace prior discourses (Merry, 2006 cited in Freeman, 2011:110).  
Merry’s (2006) observation that a rights discourse “may subvert and displace prior discourses” 
may be useful to analyse the data from the House of Lords debates and the case study on 
Dignity in Dying.  
 
Critical theorists develop a social constructionist paradigm further through the basic 
assumption that all thoughts are socially and historically constructed, but, in addition, they are 
fundamentally mediated by power relations and the role of language that is central to the 
formation of subjectivity (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002). Power relations, discourse and the 
construction of knowledge are particularly relevant to the debate on assisted death. Malcolm 
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Waters (1996:595) writing from a social constructionist position argued that rights become 
recognised and institutionalised when social actors exert pressure on political authorities who 
then perceive that the institutionalisation of rights would be as much to their advantage as it is 
to those pursuing a claim. He claimed that the “institutionalization of rights is a product of the 
balance of power between political interests” (Waters, 1996:595). Power relations and 
institutional practices in contemporary society are influenced by a range of social actors and 
organisations who, through their activities (and campaigns), can raise awareness of an issue, 
mobilise public support and bring forward the issue on the political agenda by utilising 
particular discourses that resonate with target audiences.  
 
In contemporary society, rights discourses are becoming increasingly salient to the extent that 
they could inflate and sustain a challenge to medical practice and political institutions that 
determine permissible frameworks for end of life. Social actors use techniques that include 
framing and foregrounding of texts and relate this to prior knowledge and societal attitudes as 
a strategic method to challenge the prevailing status and impact social practice (Paltridge, 
2006: 185).  Human rights discourses have, in regard to specific issues,29 been instrumental in 
extending the scope and boundaries of existing rights and gaining protection for these both in 
national and international mechanisms. Framing human rights as claims to something, for 
example, a right to die does appear to increase their validity and they become less politically 
negotiable so that framing processes are a central dynamic in understanding the character and 
course of social movements alongside resource mobilisation and political opportunity (Benford 
and Snow, 2000: 611). Framing techniques can function as a powerful means of accessing 
social advantage without always having to provide a “matching contributory performance” and 
this may explain why there is an increase in the prevalence of social issues being expressed 
through human rights discourses (Waters, 1996:595).  
 
A significant contribution was made by Miller (2010) who used a broad social constructionist 
conception of rights to analyse what had commonly been referred to as “rights-based 
approaches”. Miller’s (2010) analysis in the context of non-governmental organisations 
(NGO’s) campaigning for development goals, took issue with the overarching concept of rights-
based approaches. Rights-based approaches traditionally use rights to define the ideological 
base of the organisation. Strategic priorities are grounded in international human rights 
                                                          
29
 Anti-discrimination rights that now afford protection on the grounds of disability and sexuality, and 
provision for women’s rights, which encompass a right to choose in the case of permitted abortion are 
suggested as contemporary examples. 
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standards or refer to these. The NGO campaign goals are commonly motivated by the power 
of the idea of universal human rights. Miller’s (2010:915) critique argued that rights-based 
approaches (hereinafter RBA) can be “expansive in their reach and diverse in practice”. 
Instead, she proposed “rights-framed approaches” as a framework incorporated by certain 
NGO’s (Miller, 2010). In contrast, rights-framed approaches tend to make less reference to 
international human rights mechanisms. “Rights talk” is incorporated strategically through a 
human rights frame, and usually only at an operational level. Rights-framed approaches 
(hereinafter RFA), are driven by ideological underpinning and rights discourses are frequently 
adopted as a campaign tool that utilises this frame to interpret and transform an issue (Miller, 
2010:923). In this way 
Rights-framed approaches do not start from nor are defined by a normative 
understanding of human rights frameworks…but instead they are defined by the 
ideological foundation of the NGO (Miller, 2010:925). 
This approach is used as a way to serve the ideology of the organisation by repackaging ideas 
and beliefs for the purpose of promoting and advancing the campaign objectives so that RFA’s 
are used as a “tool to serve the NGO’s official approach” (Miller, 2010:925). There are choices 
to be made in regards to how rights talk should be incorporated and this inevitably means that 
there will be a variety of voices within the organisation that will interpret the strategic value of 
rights talk in different ways (Miller, 2010:260).  
 
Miller (2010) proposed a RFA in regard to development and argued that campaigning 
organisations often adopt human rights frames for tactical purposes. These purposes, 
consistent with wider trends within existing social movement theory, suggest that RFA’s have 
the potential to: 1) motivate and mobilise collective actions; 2) legitimate action; 3) advance 
own beliefs and aspirations; 4) demobilize antagonists; 5) transform the terms and nature of 
the debate, and 6) fit with favourable institutional venues (Miller, 2010). Rights-framed 
approaches are proposed on six key dimensions and these contribute a new framework, 
revealing the ways in which campaigns can be framed through human rights discourse and 
practice, whilst remaining “outside” of RBAs (Miller, 2010:1). This framework may also be 
applicable in a different context, more specifically, to develop the case study analysis of the 
campaign for Dignity in Dying in a new and, as yet unexplored, area. Assessing the 
incorporation of a RFA as a strategy employed by an organisation that campaigns for legal 
change on assisted death, would be a response to Miller’s call to take advantage of her 
research findings and advance these through further case studies. The table below presents 
58 
 
Miller’s 2010 research findings that contrast rights-based and rights-framed approaches.  This 
systematic format has been adapted and reproduced with her permission.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Contrasting rights-based and rights-framed approaches in development 
campaigning  
(Miller, 2010:924) 
 
Rights-based approaches  Rights-framed approaches  
The official approach Used as a tool to serve the official approach 
Drives NGO policy Is driven by NGO policy 
Starts from and makes reference to 
human rights 
Starts from ideological base, then strategically 
repackages beliefs and ideas through a human 
rights frame to potentially: motivate/mobilise 
collective action, demobilise antagonists, 
legitimate action, advance own beliefs, 
transform terms of the debate and ‘fit’ 
institutional venues 
Commonly motivated by the power/ idea 
of universal human rights and will use 
this to motivate others (activists and 
campaign targets) 
Will strategically utilise the power of the idea 
of universal human rights to motivate others 
(activists and campaign targets) 
Strategic priorities are either based on Strategic priorities may make references to 
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and defined by international standards, 
or make reference to these through the 
language of rights 
ideas of human rights but this is not required 
Frequently appeals to rights across all 
campaign contexts 
Only appeals to ideas of rights when 
considered to be strategically advantageous to 
specific campaign contexts 
Frequently cites specific human rights 
language, covenants or agreements 
Only on occasion and when beneficial will cite 
specific human rights language, covenants or 
agreements 
Concept of universal human rights is used 
as the basis for legitimacy in most 
contexts 
Concept of universal human rights is used as 
the basis for legitimacy in precise contexts 
when strategically advantageous 
 
 
 
3.3 Alternative Approaches 
This chapter has examined different positions on rights including foundational and anti-
foundational perspectives to suggest how a right to die could be envisaged. It is critical at this 
point to acknowledge that what was commonly termed as rights-based theories are not the 
only means through which the end of life debate and policy on assisted death may be 
approached. As an alternative, there are goal or duty-based theories30 that do not necessarily 
involve rights and are generally propagated by a desire to further whole community interests 
(Freeman, 2014: 501). Utilitarianism is one goal-based method of distributing social justice. It is 
the traditional basis for law and policy making in the UK, and for this reason, is considered 
here. Utilitarianism, as a school of liberal thought, presents a contrast to theories of rights and 
                                                          
30 Examples include a Rawlsian theory of political justice that promotes justice as fairness and very 
broadly rests on ideals of maximum personal liberty, equality, and elimination of inequalities of 
opportunity based on birth or wealth (Rawls, 1971:13). Another goal-based theory of social justice is 
based on human needs that include physical/ mental health, personal security, understanding and social 
relations, and these basic human needs are important enough to generate moral obligations requiring 
protection by the nation state (Mieth 2014, Brock 2005, 2009). Human capability has also been argued 
as a theory for social justice. Core capabilities include bodily health, integrity, reason including critical 
reflection on planning life and control over one’s environment and these should be respected by 
government as a requirement for human dignity (Nussbaum and Sen, 1993).  
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as the research findings emerge, the principle of utility may be revealed as important to some 
social actors in their approach and attitude to the end of life debate and policy.   
 
A utilitarian approach rejects rights in general. Bentham’s historical critique dismissed natural 
rights as “nonsense upon stilts” and claimed that “[a] right without a law is an effect without a 
cause” (cited in Belden Fields, 2003:28). The limited utilitarian understanding of rights is “the 
beneficiary of a duty…one benefits from another’s performance of an action required of her” 
(Bentham cited in Waldron, 1987: 35). The utilitarian perspective developed by Bentham and 
Mill states that human beings acting as free and rational creatures will naturally pursue their 
own interests, thereby creating a social order that results in “the greatest good for the 
greatest number” (Sjoberg et al, 2001: 15). This approach assumes government responsibility 
to provide a normative framework to facilitate optimal circumstances for all citizens to achieve 
happiness. However, measuring individual interpretations of happiness is particularly 
subjective. Bentham’s theory of utilitarianism is concerned with institutionalising the 
happiness principle to enable the law to determine optimum social policy. He proposes this is 
determined by balancing the amount of pleasure or pain one may suffer in any action against 
any future or resulting pleasure or pain, and that this criterion is the only rational foundation 
for law and utility (Bentham, cited in Waldron, 1987: 30).  
 
A utilitarian framework based on the happiness principle, arising from the concepts of pain and 
pleasure, is inadequate when making end of life decisions. It is impossible to predict a future 
degree of unhappiness or pain an individual will experience in conjunction with a terminal, 
progressive or debilitating illness or make generalised value judgements about how individuals 
should, could or would cope with this. Kateb (2011:86) argued that the pain versus pleasure 
notion is flawed because pain can result in serious infringement upon human dignity whereas 
pleasure only brings incremental material advantages. In addition, a utilitarian perspective can 
be criticised for neglecting individual freedoms, promoting instead the common purposes of 
society and revolving around majority preferences to arrive at legally binding decisions. On a 
utilitarian basis, one could argue that current laws prohibiting assisted suicide prevent abuse, 
and are therefore beneficial to the wider good and protection of society as a whole. 
Opponents of assisted death often adopt a utilitarian argument to challenge legalisation of a 
right to die amid fears that it could threaten the well-being of the vulnerable and elderly in 
wider society. However, this approach ignores heartfelt, rational requests for assistance to die 
in the face of unbearable suffering. One could consider current legislation, and end of life 
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practice, to be lacking compassion in balancing the intolerable pain of dying individuals who 
request help to die against the common good. This in itself poses a dilemma with regard to the 
balancing of harms. How do legislators decide whose interest to protect when a right to die 
could upset those affected by the death of the individual, with potential repercussions in wider 
society, but where prohibition causes harm to those who are suffering unbearably and request 
assistance to die?  
  
Conclusion 
Different frameworks of human rights have been explored in this chapter to illuminate the 
ways in which rights may be understood and given meaning by social actors in an end of life 
context and how, as a result of this, a right to die might be conceived. Three main positions on 
rights were examined and these may be recognised in the subsequent research data. A 
foundational approach was defined initially. This was useful to ground concepts of individual 
liberty and human dignity from a historical and philosophical perspective. Freedom to 
determine the manner and timing of one’s own death is supported by a foundational approach 
to rights that emphasises personal liberty and dignity in the dying process and underpins a 
right to die on the basis of man as a rational, freely choosing individual. Turner’s (1993) 
contemporary “Frailty theory of human rights” grounds a foundational ontology of the body in 
a human vulnerability. This proposal is particularly poignant in relation to the end of life. Dying 
individuals are frail, they are at the mercy of death as an unknown entity and the 
precariousness of social institutions that provide and dictate standards of care at the end of 
life. From a foundational perspective, human rights discourses are characterised by 
understanding concepts of individual liberty, human dignity and vulnerability as inalienable 
and inherent. However, the selected vocabulary, that is used to interpret and articulate liberty 
and dignity, may vary depending on the different social actors. For example, notions of choice 
or control may be expressed, or the relief of suffering highlighted, in order to achieve a 
dignified death. The main limitations with this approach are the prioritising of individual liberty 
rights over respect for the welfare and values of the wider community and the advancement of 
a constructionist conception of human rights that disputes a notion of their pre-social 
grounding, instead emphasising the necessity of analysing rights in a social context. 
 
Anti-foundational approaches to human rights that include legal positivism and social 
constructionism argue that rights are a product of their environment and subject to social, 
political, legal and cultural influences. Legal positivism argues that claims articulated as rights 
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are realised and legitimised through the action of a nation state enshrining and protecting 
them in law. Rights arise as a product of political and legal institutions that customise 
normative standards of behaviour and guide social conduct. Within this framework, it is the 
responsibility of the nation state to protect the rights or entitlements of citizens and, where 
indicated, this includes nominating a duty-bearer to enable the rights of a rights holder to be 
fulfilled.  Democratic processes may increase the legitimacy of a right and there are a number 
of actors who adopt this position. However, a legal positivist approach may be inadequate to 
analyse the ethical, political, social and economic dimensions of human rights issues that are 
as complex and personal as dying.  
 
A social constructionist approach that analyses human rights in a social context can help 
explain how new human rights claims arise and become embedded in practice. Human rights 
discourses can be used selectively and interchangeably so that new claims, articulated as 
rights, can be applied to a range of domains, in this case, at the end of life. A number of social 
actors and organisations have incorporated rights discourses to appropriate and proliferate 
new sets of rights claims and to successfully facilitate institutional change. This could, in future, 
potentially include right to die organisations. In the context of development NGO’s, the work 
of Miller (2010) has advanced an understanding of the strategies that may be employed in a 
campaign context outside of traditionally labelled rights-based approaches. This forms the 
basis for analysing the 2014 campaign for Dignity in Dying in Chapter 7. Social constructionism 
provides a framework to enable a focus on how rights discourses are adopted by different 
actors. This approach was taken up in order to analyse the research data as it emerged. The 
following chapter describes in detail the research methods used to study the centrality of 
human rights discourses in relation to UK end of life policy and debate on assisted death. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Research methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain in detail the research methods undertaken to test the 
hypothesis that rights discourses have become salient in an end of life context. Each part of 
the research design examined how, when, for what purposes, and to what extent, selected 
social actors used human rights discourses across written and spoken texts. This chapter is 
divided into three sections. The first section clarifies the approach to conducting the research 
and refreshes the research objectives. The second section examines the research design 
including the rationale for selection, the process of data collection and analysis, and critical 
reflection of the chosen method. Due to the sensitive nature of the research and contact with 
human subjects, especially in focus group discussions, there were ethical implications. These 
are considered in the third and final section. 
 
4.1 Conducting the research 
A broad social constructionist approach using a qualitative strategy was employed throughout 
this research. In comparison to quantitative approaches, qualitative interaction with research 
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subjects can explain in more depth how human rights issues are understood, and their 
meanings interpreted. A number of social science researchers argue qualitative analysis can 
identify underlying social values and processes, and more thoroughly illuminate the perception 
of a situation at a given point in time (Tonkiss 2008, Dickson- Swift et al 2008, Seale 2004, 
Denzin and Lincoln 1998). Discourse analysis is one way of questioning the basic assumptions 
of qualitative research. This was selected as a method to study how issues at the end of life 
were being expressed in the public and political domain, and to reveal what different actors 
understood by having a right to die. Discourse analysis can reveal how social actors, 
institutions and policy are implicated in constructing and sustaining a “system of beliefs” 
through their use of language strategies which reflect, and can influence, social, political and 
cultural practice (Hastings, 1998:193).  
 
Rapley (2007:128) suggests that “[f]or those analysing discourse, the primary interest is how 
language is used in certain contexts”. This research examined patterns of human rights 
language across written and spoken texts, in relation to end of life. Closer examination of this 
language and the actors using it could provide an explanation of how and to what extent 
particular discourses are becoming central to UK end of life policy and the debate on assisted 
death. Discourses used to define death and dying are especially important because they are 
interpreted and understood by individuals who will, at the end of their lives, be confronted by 
an irremediable, unfamiliar and sometimes desperate situation.  The dying are identified 
through the literature as frail. Death is an unknown entity and individuals who are vulnerable 
at the end of their lives could be influenced by the ways in which death and dying are spoken 
about, especially when compounded by the experience of pain and suffering. The original 
contribution made towards understanding this multi-faceted debate on assisted death is 
examining the centrality of human rights discourses with regard to who is using it and asking 
how it is used. What do different actors mean when, and with what intentions do they 
articulate options at the end of life as a “right to die”? 
 
In order to answer the overarching research question, “[a] right to die? Examining the 
centrality of human rights discourses to end of life policy and debate in the UK”, the objectives 
defined in the introductory chapter are refreshed before the research process undertaken to 
meet these objectives is discussed. These include to: 
 examine evidence of rights discourses in UK law and policy; 
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 explore the prevalence of rights discourses in the historical and contemporary debates 
on assisted dying; 
 analyse how and why an organisation which campaigns to legalise assisted death use 
rights discourses;  
 assess the extent to which public perceptions on death and dying invoke rights 
discourses. 
 
4.2 Research design 
The research design included analysis of a range of both current and historical texts, for 
example, texts produced by powerful or influential actors, texts interpreted by a large number 
of recipients, and spoken language to hear the public voice (Philips and Hardy, 2002:75). This 
section sets out, in-depth, the stages of the research design in chronological order of the 
research process to meet the four objectives stated above. 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Examine evidence of rights discourses in UK law and policy  
 
Rationale for selection 
Document research accessing primary data sources to analyse official UK31 law and policy was 
selected to provide a clear picture of current end of life provision and investigate where 
regulations and standards in these mechanisms are being grounded in, or articulated through, 
human rights discourses. Law and policy play a critical role in the determining of attitudes and 
behaviours on end of life. However, analysis of the impact of these was largely absent in the 
literature.  
 
At the outset of this research in 2012, and continuing into 2013, document analysis was 
prioritised to clarify what is, and is not permitted in law and to evaluate aspects of law and 
policy that refers to assisted death or assisted suicide. Analysis of UK law and policy illustrated 
                                                          
31
 Characteristics of the Scots law and Northern Ireland legislation are similar to those in England and 
Wales, but there are variations between the jurisdictions. Chapter 5 clarifies where law and policy are 
specific to England and Wales. 
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the language used to define end of life care and available options for dying individuals, their 
families and carers. During the period of data collection 2012-13, end of life provision in UK 
statutory law included the Suicide Act 1961 and Homicide Act 1957, and these remain un-
amended to date. Relevant healthcare policies at the time of study included the NHS 
Constitution 2013, and Department of Health End of Life Care Strategy 200832. These were 
selected for analysis. Examination of both statutory law and policy revealed areas that were 
defined through rights discourses or respect for human rights principles. It also exposed areas 
in policy that challenged aspects of the current legal status of assisted dying as inadequate or 
with scope for amendment.   
 
Legal petitions by seriously or progressively ill individuals who request assistance to die have 
been covered extensively and brought to my attention by the UK media and, on this basis, two 
cases were selected to assess their contribution to developing the notion of a “right to die”. 
Analysing the legal petitions and resulting judgements in the cases of high profile individuals, 
termed “right to die celebrities” by Richards (2014), demonstrates how rights discourses are 
being appropriated in a new context and used to challenge the scope and nature of existing 
rights. The legal appeals of Diane Pretty in 2001 and Tony Nicklinson in 2012 to the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court were chosen as two of the most prominent cases; Diane Pretty 
on the grounds that hers was the first case to use the provision in the HRA 1998 to petition the 
court for assistance to die, and Tony Nicklinson as a later contrast to illustrate the extent to 
which human rights claims have developed and are currently being used to advance the 
argument for a right to die.  
 
UK law and policy determines normative standards for the United Kingdom (except in some 
circumstances where provisions can vary between Scotland and England and Wales) but the 
UK also exists in a global context and, as such, can be influenced by international standards. An 
overview of assisted dying in other Western countries was indicated to demonstrate how 
                                                          
32 The End of Life Care Strategy 2008 is no longer in effect. Envisioned as a 10 year plan, the Strategy 
generated significant momentum and energy, which led to great improvements in end of life care. 
However population demographics and statistics about access to high quality end of life care revealed 
that more needed to be done. Currently, the 2008 Strategy is being refreshed to align it with the needs 
of the population and the changing health and social care landscape. NHS England are working in 
partnership with individuals and organisations, both statutory and voluntary, with professionals and the 
public, to develop a five year vision and plans for end of life care beyond 2015. The “Actions for End of 
Life Care: 2014-16” as an interim document sets out NHS England’s commitments to end of life care for 
adults and children (NHS England, 2014).  
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assisted dying had been incorporated into end of life provision and whether this may have 
implications for the UK. The Netherlands and the jurisdiction of Oregon in the United States 
were selected for closer analysis on the basis that assisted dying has been permitted here since 
the 1990s and there was readily available data, giving an indication of patterns and trends on 
assisted death.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
Law and policy documents were readily accessed on line and available for download. These 
included the Suicide Act 1961, Homicide Act 1957, Mental Capacity Act 2005, the NHS Constitution 
2013 and End of Life Care Strategy 2008. Textual analysis of these documents and transcripts of 
the Pretty and Nicklinson statements of claim and judgements was carried out by reading the texts 
to examine where and how human rights discourses featured and had been used to determine or 
define end of life provision. In the legal cases of Diane Pretty and Tony Nicklinson, the focus was 
on how specific human rights principles had been used to challenge the existing status quo in 
order to achieve the right to an assisted death. As primary data, these documents were valuable 
sources that were largely untainted by perspective. Scott (1990 cited in Bryman 2008:516) 
presents a rigorous set of criteria against which the quality of documents might be gauged, these 
include “authenticity”, “credibility”, “representativeness”, and “meaning”. Document analysis of 
law and policy, and legal judgements, which form an official record, achieve these standards. The 
texts are genuine, free from distortion, recorded professionally and therefore representative and 
comprehensible.  
 
4.2.2 Explore the prevalence of rights discourses in the historical and contemporary debates 
on assisted dying  
 
Rationale for selection 
The findings from analysis of UK law and policy documents prompted the next stage of the 
research process to explore more deeply how legal rights at the end of life were conferred in 
political institutions from the perspective of the law-makers. The House of Lords was chosen as 
a forum through which to examine historical and contemporary debates on assisted dying. This 
was primarily on the basis that, as part of the UK’s political institutions, the House of Lords has 
a key role in influencing legislation and their opinions can impact law and policy.  In general, 
they are less politicised than the House of Commons and there are a range of political 
allegiances. Complex, moral and ethical issues are debated in an arena of “independent 
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expertise” (House of Lords, 2011a). Members have both time, inclination and ability to 
critically examine the issue of assisted dying in depth. Many are from legal, medical, and 
clerical professions that contribute a well-considered and enlightened perspective on this 
sensitive topic. Analysis of members’ comments in the debates illustrated their varied 
backgrounds. 
 
The House of Lords first considered assisted dying, or voluntary euthanasia as it was termed 
then, in 1936 when they debated the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill. Since then the 
issue has been debated in the Lords in 1950, 1967, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2014. The House of 
Lords debates were also selected for analysis on the basis that these debates could be 
instrumental in mapping the discourses of dying over time and in illuminating how a concept 
of rights at the end of life may develop and operate within a changing social context. In this 
way, the historical and contemporary debates were identified as a potential source that could  
…map specific discourses, especially as they document past and forthcoming (or 
foreshadow potential) changes in the legislation and/or the organisation of society and 
social institutions (Rapley, 2007:13) 
The debates did “map specific discourses”. Analysis of the language used in the initial 
Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936 and debate was selected to provide an insight 
into how early arguments on assisted dying were presented and discussed. These findings 
acted as a basis from which to identify and explore the use and development of rights 
discourses over time in comparison with later Bills and debates.  
 
Parliamentary debates on assisted death in the House of Lords selected for analysis included 
the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1936, Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill 2003 and the Assisted Dying Bill 
2014. The issue was also debated in 1950, 1969, 2004 and 2006. The reasons these debates 
were not chosen for in-depth study are briefly mentioned here. Following defeat of the 1936 
Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill, the issue surfaced again on the political agenda in 
November 1950. The 1950s were not generally seen as a decade for moral reform in the 
aftermath of WWII. At this time there were pragmatic hindrances, including vociferous 
opposition, to the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill which was then withdrawn to avoid dividing the 
House (Kemp, 2002). The 1960s, by way of contrast, marked an era of personal freedoms 
including the decriminalisation of homosexuality and abortion in 1967 and changes to the 
Suicide Act in 1961. Lord Raglan took the opportunity to introduce a new Bill to legalise 
voluntary euthanasia in 1969 with the suggestion that public opinion was changing and there 
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was an increasing desire for “freedom of the individual” (House of Lords, 1969). His argument 
in this Bill was framed to extend provisions in the Suicide Act 1961 to permit requests for 
assistance to commit suicide (House of Lords 1969, col 1145). This Bill was defeated at Second 
Reading. It was not selected for analysis on the basis that the arguments primarily centred 
upon medical ethics and practice.  
 
The issue then remained dormant on the House of Lords agenda until 2003 when Lord Joffe 
introduced a new Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill that mirrored the proposal by Lord Raglan to 
extend the liberty of dying or seriously ill individuals at the end of life. The arguments set forth 
in the 2003 debate were discussed extensively and had a significantly different focus to the 
1936 debate, so for this reason were selected as part of the research design. On 10 March 
2004, Lord Joffe introduced a second Bill (Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill), the provisions 
of which were limited to terminally ill patients and included a requirement that all requests for 
assisted death must involve discussion of palliative care options. The Bill was given a Second 
Reading, and was then referred to the House of Lords Select Committee for examination but 
did not pass this stage (House of Lords, 2005). 
 
Lord Joffe then proposed a third Bill on the issue in 2006. The Assisted Dying for the Terminally 
Ill Bill (ADTI) was similar to his earlier 2003 and 2004 Bills, but was modelled on the Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act 1997. It was also grounded significantly in empirical research following 
a nine-month enquiry by a House of Lords Select Committee to consider and report on the 
earlier Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004. In comparison with earlier Bills, the 2006 
ADTI Bill was narrower in scope and safeguarding mechanisms had been extended. Provision 
was solely for individuals with a terminal illness and the 2006 ADTI Bill in contrast to previous 
bills explicitly did not sanction any form of euthanasia, voluntary or otherwise. The emphasis 
on self-administration of lethal medication to end one’s own life shifted the balance from 
earlier proposals that saw medication administered by the attending doctor, to one that more 
closely represented individual agency. The 2006 debate was not selected for analysis on the 
grounds that it occurred only relatively shortly after the 2003 and 2004 debates and largely 
focused on similar issues. The main issue that dominated this debate and set it aside from the 
others included in the research, was the focus on the need for better and wider provision of 
palliative care. This debate was intended to reduce opposition from those who saw assisted 
death as a challenge that would affect government funding for palliative care services. Many 
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members’ contributions praised the work of palliative care and expressed the desire for 
improved resources at the end of life. 
 
Proposing three separate Bills for debate in the House of Lords within three years 
corroborated assisted death as a pressing and controversial issue. Pressure was mounting to 
accomplish a solution to this complex puzzle and this was fuelled by the efforts of Lord Joffe 
and others to maintain the issue on the political agenda. The Assisted Dying Bill 2014 proposed 
by Lord Falconer facilitated the most recent33 debate in the House of Lords. This debate was 
selected for analysis because it was the one that reflected most closely the current sentiment 
on death and dying in UK society. I was also privileged to attend this 2014 debate in person 
and hear first-hand, the passionate contributions of proponents and opponents to the Assisted 
Dying Bill. Examining and comparing the transcripts of these debates has offered an important 
sociological insight into assisted dying, illustrating the prevalence of specific discourses 
through the contributions of members, a number of whom articulated and supported their 
arguments using language grounded in human rights. 
Data collection and analysis 
The proposal for the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936 was located in Dr Charles 
Killick Millard’s 1931 publication Euthanasia: A plea for the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia 
under certain conditions. Transcripts of the Official Parliamentary Reports on the House of 
Lords debates in 1936 and 2003 were sourced through the British Library and the 2014 debate 
was accessed through Hansard. All debates were read and manual coding was chosen as a 
method to analyse the research data. Tonkiss (2004) highlights the benefit of coding to 
discover less obvious data, such as which ideas or representations cluster around key themes 
and how different concepts are spoken of and positioned within the text.  Manual coding was 
preferred over computer coding at this stage of the research design on the basis that a 
substantial amount of extraneous ceremonial and polite language featured in members’ 
contributions. A large proportion of text focused on acknowledging comments from other 
members rather than advancing their own arguments. This text could easily be identified, and 
disregarded, using manual coding without skewing the data and, at the same time, retain the 
                                                          
33
 In the 2016-17 House of Lords Private Members Bills ballot, a new Assisted Dying Bill proposed by 
Lord Hayward was introduced on Thursday 9
th
 June 2016, no date as yet for second reading. This Bill 
proposes that requests for assisted dying are determined through the High Court (Family Division) and 
that lethal medication may be administered by registered nurses. “Assisted Dying Bill” Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2016-2017/0042/17042.pdf (Accessed 16.11.2016) 
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arguments and language used to express these in context. The texts were analysed to explore 
key themes and arguments with focus on the language used to express these.  
 
The advantage of coding manually was that it provided a clear visual comparison of the 
arguments and language that defined each debate and how these have changed over time. 
The coding scheme arose from reading the data itself but was also influenced prior to this 
through the literature review and activities in the field. The literature illustrated how the end 
of life debate and policy had come to be defined primarily through concepts involving 
individual liberty and human dignity, but encompassing notions of suffering and vulnerability 
that could also be understood as human rights discourses. These were identified as important 
themes.  
 
Themes and arguments for and against the legalisation of assisted death arose initially in the 
literature review and were confirmed through attendance in person at a number of planned 
events throughout 2013, 2014 and 2015. These included conferences and annual general 
meetings of both UK organisations that support assisted dying (Friends At The End and Dignity 
in Dying), Dignity in Dying affiliates (Healthcare Professionals for Assisted Dying and Inter-faith 
Leaders for Dignity in Dying) and their opponents (Care Not Killing). I attended two lobby days 
in Westminster in June 2013, one organised by Dignity in Dying and one the following day by 
the Care Not Killing Alliance. I attended a debate on medical ethics at the Royal College of 
Physicians organised by University College Medical Society in November 2013 titled “This 
house would legalise assisted dying” that attracted eminent speakers on both sides of the 
argument. Identifying themes and arguments in this way has supported my attempt at 
neutrality. It has ensured the coding remains grounded in the data and arises from the 
research itself. 
 
4.2.3 Analyse how and why an organisation that campaigns to legalise assisted death use 
rights discourses  
 
Rationale for selection 
As a political forum, the House of Lords does not operate in a legal vacuum independent of 
outside influence. In each of the debates, there was a close collaboration between political 
figures and Dignity in Dying (DiD) as a national organisation that campaigns to change the law 
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on assisted dying. The vision of Dignity in Dying promotes “choice, access and control” at the 
end of life and their campaign efforts may have shaped perceptions of both the public and the 
law-makers on death and dying. Through collaboration with members of the House of Lords, 
DiD informed the content of proposed Bills and through the use of discursive strategies they 
may have influenced the terms of these debates. In this regard, the organisation were a 
natural focus for the next stage of the research. 
 
Dignity in Dying is the larger of the two main UK organisations that actively campaign for the 
legalisation of assisted death with over 25,000 active supporting members. DiD were selected 
as the focus for a case study because they represent the loudest voice on assisted death, they 
are well- funded, have strategic allies and a prominent campaign presence that could shape 
the end of life debate. In addition, they are an historic organisation, founded in 1935. This 
grounds a social constructionist approach to the research in the same way as exploring the 
historic House of Lords debates; it provides an interesting analysis of how specific discourses 
have been used to define assisted death as the social context has shifted over time. The 
campaign activities of DiD have gained momentum and reach. They have collaborated with 
political and high profile figures, held regular meetings and events for their members, 
published campaign leaflets, newsletters and posters that were distributed in person and 
online, and held public demonstrations outside Westminster. Dignity in Dying was chosen to 
provide an intense and original case study that could “probe deeply and analyse intensely” 
(Cohen and Manion 1995:106). This case study method evaluated how, for what purposes, and 
to what extent human rights discourses were used by one progressive organisation in a new 
context. These findings could be helpful to illuminate how and why issues at the end of life are 
being defined and debated using rights discourses at this specific moment in time.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
Throughout the research period 2012-2016, I have written extensive field notes34 on all 
meetings with Dignity in Dying and their affiliates. In relation to conducting the case study on 
DiD, I attended their Annual General Meetings on 21st May, 2013, 3rd June, 2014 and 9th June, 
2015. I also attended meetings of their affiliated organisations including Healthcare 
                                                          
34 These notes recorded the main points discussed at all events that I attended. There was usually one 
or more (guest) speakers and here I took lecture style notes. In addition to my notes, I included sections 
on my personal reflections, questions arising and actions to be taken together with recommendations 
for further reading or points of contact to advance my study. 
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Professionals for Assisted Dying (HPAD) conferences on 6th November, 2013 and 29th October, 
2014, and the first InterFaith Leaders for Dignity in Dying (IFDiD) meeting on 20th May, 2013. I 
used these meetings as networking opportunities and to collect copies of their resources 
including newsletters, campaign publications and information booklets. The resources have 
slightly shifted focus over time but the content of the newsletters follows a fairly consistent 
pattern. Newsletter 2014, Issue 3 of 3 was considered to be a representative example and was 
selected for more detailed analysis during the period of conducting the case study. This 
resource also proved conducive to exploring the work by Miller (2010) in relation to rights-
framed approaches in the context of a campaigning organisation, being particularly timely in 
the wake of the Assisted Dying Bill 2014 that DiD had been closely involved with.  
 
As part of the case study, I also visited the Dignity in Dying offices in London and conducted 
informal interviews35 with their Director of Campaigns and Communications on 15th January, 
2014 and their Public Affairs Manager on 9th September, 2016 to discuss the approach, 
activities and planned campaign tactics of DiD. Following personal contact with the leaders of 
affiliated organisations, I conducted one to one interviews with Professor Ray Tallis, HPAD 
Chairman 26th April, 2013 and Rabbi Dr Jonathan Romain, IFDiD leader 2nd May, 2013 by 
telephone with informed verbal and written consent given. Each telephone interview lasted 
approximately 40 minutes, they were recorded and transcribed immediately following the 
interviews. These early interviews were intended to explore individual motivation and 
experiences to gain a better understanding of how the affiliated organisations support the 
work of DiD and to assess whether the rhetoric to support the affiliates’ objectives was 
underpinned by a human rights discourse or reflected their own areas of interest.36  
                                                          
35
 I had been made aware of the reluctance of Dignity in Dying employees to speak on record with the 
UK media and social researchers and for this reason these two interviews were approached as informal 
and used indirectly to inform my analysis. Verbal consent was given to reference their views in general 
rather than specific terms. These interviews were not recorded, instead jotted notes were taken during 
the interviews and written up afterwards. 
  
36 Healthcare Professionals for Assisted Dying (HPAD) chaired by Professor Ray Tallis and Inter-Faith 
leaders for Dignity in Dying (IFDiD) led by Rabbi Dr Jonathan Romain were both founded in 2012. In 
2014, Disabled Activists for Dignity in Dying (DADiD) was launched to represent the voice of disabled 
people led by disability rights campaigner, Greg Judge. The establishment of these organisations was an 
attempt to extend the reach and introduce the objectives of DiD to a wider audience and reduce 
longstanding opposition to assisted death, particularly on faith and medical grounds. HPAD and IfDiD 
aim to recruit new members specifically within these areas and, in doing so, strengthen the key 
arguments of Dignity in Dying. The telephone interview with Rabbi Romain revealed that he expressed 
his arguments for legalising assisted death, not through rights discourses, but through faith–based and 
compassionate discourses. His contribution to the campaign for Dignity in Dying, as an influential 
religious leader, argued that religion and an assisted death could be compatible. The interview with 
Professor Tallis demonstrated how he prioritised a discourse of compassion and acting in the best 
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In addition, independent examination of the DiD website as mediated communication 
(available at dignityindying.org.uk) has provided extensive and rich data. The DiD home page 
currently lists subsections “About us/ News/ Your rights/ Assisted dying/ Resources/Personal 
stories/Support us” (DiD, 2016). Personal stories are narratives written by individuals who are 
dying, or close family members writing after the death of a loved one. These were selected for 
analysis to provide a powerful and emotive insight to the research question. Smith and 
Schaffer (2004:1) claim that “over the last 20 years, life narratives have become one of the 
most potent vehicles for advancing human rights claims”. The discourses with which 
vulnerable, dying members of the public and their families articulated their lived experiences 
were identified as important and indicative of how one “right to die” organisation strategically 
used these voices to frame and further their campaign objectives.  
 
The personal stories on the DiD website are divided into different regions. Stories from London 
and the South regions were selected for analysis primarily to reflect the geographical location 
of the study and correlate with the area within which focus group participants lived. This 
provided a degree of consistency and while the data gathered may be less transferable or 
replicable due to it being geographically representative, it did contribute a rich analysis that 
may be useful for a comparative study at a later date. In June 2016, the DiD website issued a 
disclaimer stating that the personal stories “reflect the views of the authors. The views of 
Dignity in Dying may differ” (DiD, 2016). Meeting with the Director for Public Affairs, he 
confirmed that the personal stories had not been edited by staff at Dignity in Dying and were 
based on individual experiences. The personal stories may not have been edited, but it is 
important to acknowledge that they have been curated for a purpose, namely to reflect the 
ethos and objectives of DiD. In total, 36 personal stories from London, the South- East, and 
South-West were available and selected for analysis at 
http://www.dignityindying.org.uk/personal-stories/ (Last accessed 13.05.14). These were 
referenced by the name of the contributor for identification purposes.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
interests of the patient that reflect the guidelines for medical treatment. In this way, he argued that 
medicine and assisted death could be compatible. Analysis of the data from these interviews was not 
included in the case study write-up because the nature and extent of the relationship between DiD and 
IfDiD/HPAD was not easily determined and could only provide an indication rather than true 
representation of how these affiliated organisations supported the objectives of DiD.  
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In order to analyse the data rigorously, Gibbs (2007:42) recommends both reading a printed 
version of text and using a computer software program, 
…paper allows me the kind of creativity, flexibility and ease of access that is important 
at the early stage of analysis. I then transfer the coding ideas into the electronic 
version of the project in order to continue the analysis. 
Intensive reading then computer coding facilitated a more detailed and diverse analysis than 
purely description. Firstly reading the text of the personal stories lent continuity to individual 
narratives, allowed time to appreciate the perspective of who was telling the story, put into 
context the background history together with the illness trajectory, and to better appreciate 
the lived experience. The computer software program NVivo10 was then used to identify the 
most frequently used words and analyse the context in which they appeared.37 A word 
frequency query was conducted initially to identify key words that predominantly featured in 
the personal narratives and to consider the extent to which they were representative of 
human rights discourses. These words and themes were subsequently used to organise the 
coding scheme. The associated text was coded at nodes and these were then analysed in order 
of the most frequently occurring first.38 This reduced bias in classifying the nodes and also 
supported the advice for qualitative researchers that “coding should remain grounded in the 
data in the transcript” (Gibbs, 2007:52).   
Critical reflection 
Tonkiss, (2004) argues the benefit of coding is to discover less obvious data, for example, 
which ideas or representations cluster around key themes and how different concepts are 
spoken of and positioned within text. Critical reflection of using NVivo10, in addition to reading 
the printed text and using manual coding, concluded that it was a beneficial tool to help 
analyse discourse and provide a “multi-layered interpretation of the data” (Gibbs, 2007:140). 
Practical advantages of the NVivo10 programme included the ability to overview and represent 
data visually in easily accessed and stored format such as a Tag Cloud and coding information 
at nodes enabled data to be found efficiently under organised lists. Generic critique of 
computer coding is that the context of what is said may be lost; fragmenting data loses the 
narrative analysis (Bryman 2008, Seale, 2004). The quality of discourse analysis is also 
                                                          
37
 NVivo analysis was used extensively to query related themes and examine correlative factors to 
specific themes that included age, gender, and relationship. However word frequency most 
comprehensively illustrated the ways in which members of the public articulated their end of life 
experiences, and therefore this featured in the write-up.  
 
38
 Respectively “death”, “dying” and “assisted” were the most frequently occurring words after “life”, 
but they all occurred in context and were purely descriptive so were not written up as an independent 
section for analysis. References to the Swiss clinic “Dignitas” occurred as the 7
th
 most frequent word 
but, for similar reasons was not included. 
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dependent upon the quality of the coding scheme that may be tainted by researcher bias. 
Gibbs (2007:52) warns the “dangers of coding…is importing your own motives, values and 
preoccupations into the codes and analytic schemes you construct”. Personal or emotional 
bias in this case study involved selecting and interpreting the words assigned to each coded 
node. This could have been minimised by two researchers coding at nodes and comparing 
their results.  
 
4.2.4 Assess the extent to which public perceptions on death and dying invoke rights 
discourses 
Rationale for selection 
Death and dying are deeply personal topics grounded in human experience, values and beliefs. 
Focus group discussion was selected as part of a qualitative approach to the research to 
contrast with polling data, survey responses and clinical studies on the basis that it can provide 
richer data for analysis.39 Participants spent time defining, discussing and articulating their 
perspectives. They used examples to support these and drew on personal experiences using 
familiar language which demonstrated how central human rights discourses were to shaping 
their own perceptions of death and dying. Through this form of social interaction, focus groups 
allowed space for participants to reflect on the contribution of others, develop their own 
thoughts and return to concepts discussed in their own time. The use of focus groups in the 
research design was grounded in a social constructionist approach and used to illustrate how 
opinions, attitudes and accounts are socially produced and, to an extent, shaped by interaction 
with others. The ways in which participants articulated and justified ideas in relation to others 
reflected the interactive and communicative nature of social action and meaning (Tonkiss, 
2004).  
 
Members of the public associated with Death Café Hampstead were selected to participate in 
focus group discussions on the grounds that these participants were an unexplored subject 
                                                          
39 Focus groups, were preferred over personal interviews as prior personal experience of discussing 
sensitive issues had shown that comments were more likely to be tainted by the values of the 
researcher in an intense one to one proximity. Group discussion better enabled people to express their 
views in a way that was not encouraged, inferred or pre-judged by the researcher. In comparison to 
personal interviews, they seemed less intimidating, primarily because the larger group situation relieved 
the intensity upon one individual when discussing emotive issues and the emphasis on a direct response 
that could have been suggested by the intimacy of a one to one interview. 
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group that complemented the novelty of the research design and were both accessible and 
available as research subjects. Prior to conducting the first focus group for the purpose of this 
study I had facilitated monthly small group discussion at Death Cafes held at the Café Rouge in 
Hampstead, London over a period of 12 months and, as Silverman (2013:215) notes, 
…if you are contemplating fieldwork it simplifies access if you draw upon your existing 
circle of contacts. Trying to enter a new field is likely to involve time-consuming 
negotiations and may end in failure, particularly if you want to research an ethically 
sensitive area. 
The other advantage of conducting research on this accessible and “existing circle of contacts” 
was that individuals connected with Death Café had voluntarily registered an interest in 
speaking about the sensitive issue of dying and had met to discuss this in a group environment. 
On this basis, they may have been familiar and more comfortable with articulating deep or 
intimate feelings and experiences on a subject that is intensely personal and this minimised 
the ethical implications, considered below. The existence of social initiatives, that include 
Death Café are indicative of how issues associated with end of life have come to be discussed 
more openly in the public domain and are facilitating opportunities for research into an area 
that has, until recent years, been “hidden” or “taboo”. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
To recruit focus group participants, a list of Death Café attendees of approximately 400 
individuals were emailed in September 2014 with an invitation to participate in the study, a 
letter of information and consent forms (see Appendix Two). Individuals responded via email 
or telephone to register their interest and suitable times were suggested. Three group 
discussions were held at the usual Death Café venue on evenings in September and October 
2014, and February 2015. The format for each session was the same. On arrival participants 
were greeted, offered drinks and light meals from the Café Rouge menu and any incurred 
travel expenses were reimbursed. Participant demographics across the three groups are 
displayed in the table below. 
 
Figure 4.4 Focus group demographics 
Discussion 
date 
Females Males Profession Age 
range 
Serious 
Illness 
September 6 1 1 psychotherapist, 1 30-64 1 person, 
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2014 property manager, 1 
program manager, 1 
healer, 1 artist, 1 teacher 
(retired) 1 not recorded 
wheelchair 
user 
October 
2014 
1 1 1 IT manager (retired), 1 
counsellor, 
60-65 None 
February 
2015 
5 2 2 academics (1 retired), 3 
psychotherapists, I 
teacher (retired), 1 
screenwriter 
32-75 1 person, in 
remission 
 
 
Questions and prompts were standardised to enhance reliability and replicability of the study 
and improve comparability across the groups (Morgan, 1996). A schedule of questions is found 
in Appendix Two. A funnel approach was used, beginning with an open ended question “What 
does dignity mean to you?” that allowed time for participants to become familiar with each 
other and tease out some key concepts40 (Morgan, 1998). Key topics included concepts of 
personal liberty, human dignity, suffering and their understanding of a right to die that were 
structured around specific phrases, such as “Do you think people should have a right to ask for 
assistance to die?” The questions chosen were identified as important through the data as it 
arose in the previous stages of the study and then worded following a small pilot study. Few 
questions and minimal prompts were used to allow adequate time for all participants to be 
heard without undue interference. It was intended that by reducing my personal input, less 
bias would be detected (Morgan 1998, Krueger 1998a).  
 
Critical reflection 
Critical reflection on using focus groups as a research method in this study accepts that there 
were limitations to the generation of theory when analysing a small sample group (16 
                                                          
40 There are very few available courses or literature designed to teach moderating skills. Much depends 
on the personality and experience of the researcher and recommendations were found in Krueger 
(1998a, b) Morgan (1998), Langer (1978, cited in Stewart and Shamdasani 1990:78) and Barbar and 
Kitzinger (1999:13). 
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participants in total41 excluding myself) but these preliminary findings could be used as the 
basis for conducting focus group discussion on end of life issues with other samples of 
participants. Having experience of attending Death Café Hampstead suggests that at some 
level all participants were comfortable with, or interested in, speaking about death and dying. 
In this way focus group participants were not considered to be representative of the public and 
the findings of the data cannot be assumed as indicative of wider opinion. However, it does 
inform the centrality of human rights discourses from a limited public perspective. The 
outcomes of group discussions based on how they engaged with the topic may have varied if 
the sample of participants were selected differently. For example, focus groups conducted in a 
different geographical location, with particular groups of individuals, or solely with male or 
female participants.  
 
Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) criticize the usefulness and validity of focus groups in general 
claiming that participants can be influenced by one another and by the moderator. Group 
cohesiveness and compatibility depends on how individuals feel about communicating their 
views, and intrapersonal variables and personality or behavioural disposition also influences 
this (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). In a group of people, particularly in relation to emotive 
issues, one cannot predetermine the personal backgrounds of participants, their willingness to 
speak in a group situation or how they interact with others. Walter and Murray-Parkes (2015) 
argue that in group discussion there remain conversational norms around death and dying and 
there may be more or less acceptable images and metaphors that can be used to discuss 
death. Ways to overcome this are discussed below in relation to ethical sensitivity.  
 
4.3 Ethical considerations 
Research on death and dying in general is a sensitive, individual, emotionally laden and 
sometimes unfamiliar topic. The issue of assisted death in particular is controversial. In 
                                                          
41 On a practical note, one disadvantage of holding focus groups, especially with unpaid volunteers, is 
that attendance cannot always be predetermined. The first and third groups both had 8 participants 
including myself. The second focus group should have comprised six participants and myself, seven in 
total, but I received four cancellations on the night by email and text message due to emergencies that 
included hospitalisation, death of a close friend, cancellation of childcare agreement, and flooding due 
to a plumbing leak. This unexpectedly left only two participants other than myself but at their request 
we decided to continue the discussion, which was interesting and covered a wide range of topics. Both 
participants were able to speak in depth about their own experiences, in particular the deaths of their 
parents. During this discussion I was also more involved as participant, it was a conscious decision pre-
empted by feeling that it was “the right thing to do”.  
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complex dilemmas such as these, it can be difficult to appear impartial. The opinions of the 
researcher may be influenced by personal experiences, cultural backgrounds, values or beliefs 
and the findings of the data as it emerges during the research process. At the outset of the 
research period, I attended lobby days and engaged in conversation with the leaders of 
organisations that campaigned both for and against the legalisation of assisted death, before 
selecting Dignity in Dying for analysis. In writing up telephone interviews with Dignity in Dying 
affiliates, the House of Lords debates and focus group discussions, I have sought to accurately 
and fairly record their views which are considered representative. In addition, I have no 
declaration of interest. I am not affiliated with any organisations that campaign for or against 
assisted death and I have not experienced any requests to assist a death personally nor known 
any family members or friends who have died in this manner prior to completing this study. 
 
Definitions of sensitive research vary according to age, culture and situation. Renzetti and Lee 
(1993) argue that sensitive involves “intimate, discreditable or incriminating” topics that delve 
into deeply personal experience and may be emotionally demanding, and on this basis warrant 
specific ethical considerations. In particular, the part of the research design involving focus 
group discussions was both intimate, personal and had the potential to be emotionally 
demanding or upsetting. Therefore due ethical procedures were followed in order to minimise 
harm to both participants and the researcher during the study. This initially involved gaining 
ethical approval for conducting focus group discussions through the Kingston University 
Faculty Ethics Committee prior to emailing potential participants. Considering that focus group 
participants were familiar with Death Café, some may have had recent bereavement 
experiences or personal crisis that may prove distressing to speak about in a group 
environment, a brief telephone conversation was undertaken with all participants who 
contacted me to register their interest in the study. This served as a first point of personal 
contact to familiarise participants with the study, explain the format of the evening and 
provide them with an opportunity to raise questions or discuss any potential issues 
beforehand.42 Prior to this, participants had been sent an invitation and letter of information 
that detailed the procedure and intention of the study, proposed dissemination and contact 
details of my supervisor in case of further questions or complaints. On arrival at the Café 
Rouge, it was a priority that all participants felt comfortable. Everyone was greeted personally, 
provided with a menu to peruse plus travel expense and consent forms to fill out allowing 
                                                          
42
 For example, I agreed with one wheelchair bound participant to arrange an access ramp at the Café 
Rouge entrance and conduct the discussion downstairs rather than the usual upstairs meeting venue. 
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them time to familiarise themselves with their surroundings and other participants before the 
discussion began. This was conducted in a professional, but relaxed atmosphere which 
encouraged sharing their thoughts and experiences in a safe, respectful environment.  
 
The British Sociological Association Statement of Ethical Practice (2002) suggests researchers 
of sensitive topics should “consider carefully the possibility that the research experience may 
be a disturbing one” and this applies both to themselves and research subjects. Individuals 
participating in focus group discussions were informed at the time of the study that should 
they wish to speak further on any issues arising or causing them distress from participation in 
the group discussion then I could arrange this with a registered psychotherapist (known to 
myself and procured through prior verbal agreement). For my own purposes, and on the 
advice of the Ethics Committee Chair, I had contacted and spoken with the University Faith 
Advisor regarding pastoral support during the study if needed. Quite surprisingly, over the 
research period, five individuals (including one focus group participant) revealed to me in 
detail their involvement in a partner, or loved ones suicide43. These individuals did not fully 
disclose their names or personal contact details. In each case it was interesting to note they 
were confident that their assistance was given solely out of compassion and at the request of 
the dying individual who was suffering unbearably. In these five cases, two were subject to a 
routine police investigation, but no charges were bought and the assistance described by the 
focus group participant took place in another country. 
 
Guidelines on obtaining informed consent are suggested in the literature and these include 
advice by the General Medical Council (GMC, 2002) to “seek permission to make the recording 
and get consent for any use or disclosure” and to “give participants adequate information 
about the purpose of the recording when seeking their permission” together with ensuring 
that “participants are under no pressure for the recording to be made”. These guidelines were 
duly followed. At the time of sending the invitation and letter of information, recipients on the 
Death Café mailing list also received a consent form to allow time for them to read this before 
attending the discussion. Consent forms were signed as they arrived for the discussion group 
and they were asked if they had any questions or would like further clarification regarding this 
procedure. 
 
                                                          
43
 I have sought guidance from both a Deputy District Judge (Magistrates Court) and the Kingston 
University Faculty Ethics Committee on the ethical and legal obligations resulting from these disclosures. 
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Maintaining confidentiality and securing data is also important when researching sensitive 
issues to reduce potential harm to participants. Lee (1993:164) argues that “[r]obust 
techniques for preserving confidentiality are indispensable”. When contacted initially by 
interested participants for the study, only their first names and a telephone number to use in 
case of emergency were recorded and on attending the discussion they were then asked to 
provide the additional demographic information tabled above. The group discussions were 
recorded using a digital audio recording device and transcription of each discussion recorded 
the words used by participants ad verbatim. In writing up the data, quotes were referenced by 
participants’ sex and age to provide an indication of whom they were but to maintain 
confidentiality, for example “Female, aged 60”. Another aspect of confidentiality includes 
regulation through the Data Protection Act (1998), which lays down guidelines for the 
processing of personal information. The digital recordings of each focus group discussion were 
not copied. Each transcribed discussion was stored on my home computer and used only for 
the purposes of this research that will be deleted on completion of the thesis. The audio 
recorder was returned to Kingston University Loans Department with the assurance that all 
material is immediately deleted as standard procedure. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed account of the different stages of the research 
undertaken throughout 2012-2015. Premised on a broad social constructionist approach, a 
qualitative research strategy was adopted using discourse analysis to explore the centrality of 
human rights discourses to the UK end of life debate and policy on assisted death. In 
qualitative research, the emphasis is upon the validity, reliability and replicability of the 
research design (Bryman, 2008). An important aspect of validity rests on claims of neutrality of 
the researcher, but in complex dilemmas it can be difficult to appear non-biased. Neutrality 
was attempted in this study by way of selecting a range of different texts from a variety of 
sources to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research question and relating the findings 
specifically to human rights frameworks.  
 
At each stage of the research design, the rationale for selection and the process of data 
collection and analysis has been discussed to demonstrate reliability and replicability. 
Document analysis of law and policy and coding of the transcripts of the historical House of 
Lords debates is easily replicable, notwithstanding a degree of variation in the coding scheme 
of the latter that could be minimised by more than one researcher undertaking the same 
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study. This could also be said for NVivo coding of the personal narratives used in the case study 
analysis of Dignity in Dying. With regard to focus group discussions, the contributions of 
participants is liable to variation dependent upon personal backgrounds and the nature of 
interaction with other participants. Group dynamics can also be influenced by the personality 
and approach of the researcher. However, the practical process of recruitment, questioning 
format and information given was, in this research, consistent to enhance reliability and 
replicability of this study.  
 
The thesis now turns to the data chapters where each of the four objectives are addressed 
through the research. The first of these data chapters provides an insight into law and policy 
provision for options at the end of life in the UK to set the legal context for the debate. 
Analysis of these documents and the legal petitions of high profile right to die cases illustrates 
the ways in which human rights principles are currently featuring in the debate and policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Law and policy 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the current legal provision for assisted death and to 
illuminate where and how human rights discourses feature in UK end of life law and policy. The 
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law has a regulatory function. Customary law and human rights principles determine common 
practice and thereby influence normative standards whilst Government healthcare policy 
strategically defines and shapes the delivery of services and care at the end of life. This 
chapter, in keeping with the rest of the thesis, refers to a UK context and provides a broad 
understanding of UK law. Where law or policy in relation to that of England or England and 
Wales differs, this will be specified. Both European Union law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights 1950 applies to both Scotland and Northern Ireland as it does to England and 
Wales by virtue of their position as UK constituents.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. It begins with an overview of UK law considering 
statutory provision for assisting a suicide as defined by the Homicide Act 1957 and Suicide Act 
1961. The role of the law in common and medical practice is questioned and the ambiguity of 
exercising discretion in hard cases is noted. This section also considers the implications of the 
relatively recent HRA 1998 with regard to its impact upon legal process and institutional 
practice. The second part of this chapter examines the cases of Diane Pretty and Tony 
Nicklinson to assess their use of key human rights principles in supporting their legal appeals 
for assistance to die. It considers the extent to which their arguments have challenged the 
interpretation and application of legal rights. The involvement of the European Court of 
Human Rights in these prominent cases highlights that the UK exists within a wider context 
before the third section of this chapter provides an overview of other jurisdictions where 
assisted dying is legal.  High profile cases are important in that they can set legal precedent 
and provoke statutory changes, but Government policy on end of life care shapes practical 
provision for the dying. Policy discourses are explored in the fourth section through the NHS 
Constitution 2013 and the Department of Health End of Life Care Strategy 2008. 
 
 
5.1 UK Law 
This section illustrates the mechanisms of law in relation to the current legal status of assisted 
death through statutory provision in the Homicide Act 1957 and the Suicide Act 1961. 
Examination of these instruments reveals three areas of controversy in the law: the lack of 
partial defence to murder; the ambiguity of applying discretion in hard cases; and the dubious 
differentiation between killing/letting die under a medicalised model of care. This section also 
explores the role of the HRA 1998 and ECHR 1950 as applied in the UK.  
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5.1.1 Homicide Act 1957 and Suicide Act 1961 
There is no provision for the figurative terms “right to die” or “assisted dying” in statutory legal 
instruments which explains their absence in this section. In law, assisted death can include 
voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide. The former involves a third party ending the 
person’s life and the latter, a third party providing the person with assistance to end their own 
life. Both actions necessitate that assistance is requested and consent given. Voluntary active 
euthanasia is killing classified as intentional killing under the Homicide Act 1957 and this 
carries a mandatory life sentence on conviction. 
Under the Homicide Act 1957,44 any person assisting a death could be accused of committing 
the crimes of murder, manslaughter or complicity in suicide. Section 4(1) and 4(2) of the 
Homicide Act 1957 relate to the offence of aiding and abetting suicide by stating 
It shall be manslaughter, and shall not be murder, for a person acting in pursuance of a 
suicide pact between him and another to kill the other or be a party to the other being 
killed by a third person (Homicide Act 1957, S4(1)).  
Where it is shown that a person charged with the murder of another killed the other 
or was a party to his . . . being killed, it shall be for the defence to prove that the 
person charged was acting in pursuance of a suicide pact between him and the other 
(Homicide Act 1957, S4 (2)). 
 
The 1961 Suicide Act in England and Wales decriminalised the act of suicide but retained 
punishment of up to 14 years’ imprisonment for the aiding, encouraging or counselling of 
suicide under section 2. According to this law, any individual (including close family) involved in 
the act of assisting a suicide even if this was at the repeated request of a competent individual 
with a clear and intentioned wish to die would breach the Suicide Act 1961. Section 2(1) of the 
Suicide Act 1961 implies criminal liability for complicity in assisting a suicide when a person 
aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another and this is defined when 
          (a)D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted    
suicide of another person, and  
          (b)D's act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide. 
 
                                                          
44
 Section 1 of the Scotland Act 1998 established a range of devolved powers so that the Homicide Act 
1957 is not consistently applied in Scotland and the Suicide Act 1961 specifically only amended the law 
in England and Wales (Scotland Act 1998).   
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In 2009, the Coroners and Justice Act amended these provisions with the addition that the 
person assisting may not necessarily be known to, or identified by, the individual wishing to 
commit suicide, and on the condition that “[N]o proceedings shall be instituted for an offence 
under this section except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions” 
(Coroners and Justice Act 2009). The role of the Director of Public Prosecutions in clarifying the 
law on assisted suicide is considered below. 
 
Analysis of the law revealed a stark contrast between the acts of assisting suicide and killing as 
manslaughter or murder. Under section 4(2) of the Homicide Act 1957, persons involved in a 
suicide pact or assisting the suicide of another, in the context of a suicide pact, may be charged 
with the offence of manslaughter carrying a lesser criminal sentence than murder. Keating 
(2016) critiques this discrepancy in law to argue that a new partial defence to murder is 
needed that focuses on the motive for killing. Keating (2016) claims the law as it stands is 
failing individuals. Her proposal would make allowance for a “caring, relational response” 
grounded in compassion and a desire to end human suffering. The late Margo MacDonald MSP 
also suggested amendments to the current law, proposing in the Assisted Suicide (Scotland) 
Bill 2013 to remove criminal and civil liability for assisting suicide and intending to “make it 
lawful, in certain circumstances, to assist another to commit suicide” (Assisted Suicide 
(Scotland) Bill 2013). 
 
The police, as UK law enforcement officers, have a duty to investigate all allegations or 
suspected cases of assisted suicide. From 1 April 2009 until 1 October 2014, there were 101 
cases referred to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) by the police which had been recorded 
as assisted suicide or euthanasia. Of these 101 cases, the CPS decided not to proceed with 69, 
and, in 16 cases, no further action was taken by the police (CPS 2014). Five cases were referred 
onwards for prosecution for murder or serious assault and there are currently 10 ongoing 
cases (CPS 2014).45 Only one case of attempted assisted suicide, where the individual survived, 
was successfully prosecuted in October 2013, that of Kevin James Howe. Mr. Howe received a 
custodial sentence from Durham Crown Court of 12 years imprisonment for “doing an act 
intended to assist someone to commit or attempt to commit suicide”. In this case, the 
                                                          
45
 For a comprehensive list of published decisions see CPS (2014) “Assisted suicide” Available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide.html (Accessed 01.12.14) 
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assistance involved supplying petrol to a friend who suffered 90% burns on setting himself 
alight (Law Pages, 2015). His sentence was later reduced on appeal in February, 2014 to 10 
years’ imprisonment (Law Pages, 2015). 
 
Investigation of friends or relatives assisting or encouraging a suicide are often considered 
“hard cases”, especially if they arise from compassion or the desire to alleviate suffering in the 
context of serious or life-limiting illness. If, under a particular rule of law a prosecution cannot 
be pursued, then it becomes the responsibility of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to 
exercise discretion and reach a decision on whether to prosecute or not. Hard cases, 
particularly those where individuals make heartfelt requests for assistance to die to relieve 
intolerable suffering, expose the law as a blunt instrument. They require the DPP to consider 
whether a prosecution is necessary in the public interest. This discretionary decision, taken in 
accordance with the code for Crown Prosecutors may involve a range of acceptable answers 
that necessitates the otherwise strict application of law to be interpreted by applying 
tolerance and common sense. In this way, the application of discretion especially in relation to 
hard cases is a relative concept. This critique was highlighted in 2009 through the petition of 
Debbie Purdy. Her application to the High Court helped to clarify the law on assisted suicide. 
This appeal was then heard in the House of Lords. It was based upon the 
…absence of a crime-specific policy, identifying the facts and circumstances that the 
Director of Public Prosecutions would take into account when deciding whether to 
prosecute an individual for assisting another person to commit suicide (R (on the 
application of Debbie Purdy) v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45). 
In response to this appeal the Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer, acknowledged that 
the degree of consent and assistance between the deceased and the person accused of 
assisting or encouraging a suicide was particularly difficult to ascertain and formulated a Policy 
for Prosecutors in Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (2010).  
The Policy for Prosecutors in Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (2010) aims to reduce 
the ambiguity of individual discretion in hard cases by listing 16 factors in favour of 
prosecution and 13 factors militating against. Circumstances in which prosecution is more 
likely include: if the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a medical doctor, nurse, other 
healthcare professional or a professional carer (whether receiving payment or not); if the 
suspect has assisted more than one victim; or received payment for the action (Policy for 
Prosecutors in Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, 2010). Individuals providing only 
“minor encouragement or assistance” or attempting to dissuade the person from suicide, 
acting wholly out of compassion and not for financial gain, and where the deceased has made 
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known their wish to die are less likely to face prosecution if assisting a person to die (Policy for 
Prosecutors in Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, 2010). One could argue that degrees 
of ambiguity still exist in this policy and the clause that denotes more likely prosecution of 
healthcare professionals assisting a suicide may increase the pressure upon non-qualified 
individuals to provide amateur assistance.46 Alternatively, the policy could be regarded as 
adequately rigorous and sympathetic in acknowledging that there are some complex cases 
involving human suffering and indignity where genuine compassion provides the motive for 
assisting a suicide. More importantly, this policy embodies a discretion in the current law as 
there appear to be circumstances under which individuals can avoid prosecution for 
encouraging or assisting suicide, evidenced by CPS statistics.  The Policy for Prosecutors in 
Cases of Assisting or Encouraging Suicide 2010 through lack of prosecution tolerates assisted 
suicide by guarding the exercise of discretion. 
 
5.1.2 Killing or letting die 
Examining the distinction between killing and letting die draws attention to another area of 
contestation in the law. Methods of letting patients die include the withholding or 
withdrawing of medical treatment and this action is both legally and professionally 
permissible. Where treatment is withheld or withdrawn, decisions likely to lead to death are 
taken by the attending doctor when the risks or burdens would outweigh the benefits of 
treatment, or under medically hopeless conditions, for example, when withdrawing respiratory 
support from a patient who is unlikely to recover and unable to breathe on their own (see 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]1 All ER 821 HL, for the first England and Wales case or 
Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v A and others [2015] 
EWHC2828 (Fam) for a more recent judgement). Where the patient is allowed to die through 
withholding or withdrawing of artificial ventilation, fundamental organ failure is usually 
registered as the primary cause of death. In such cases as these, death is accelerated and 
knowingly allowed to happen by withholding medical treatment or nutrition at the discretion 
of the attending doctor. Based on their medical knowledge and clinical assessment, decisions 
are made in what is deemed to be the best interests of the patient.  
 
                                                          
46
 In October 2014, the DPP issued a policy update to guide the exercise of discretion and clarify the role 
of healthcare professionals. A footnote at paragraph 43 highlights that prosecution is more likely if the 
suspect was acting in “his or her capacity as a medical doctor, nurse or other healthcare 
professional…and the victim was in his or her care” (Policy for Prosecutors in Cases of Assisting or 
Encouraging Suicide, 2010). 
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The medical professional bodies issue good practice guidelines for doctors and guidance for 
decision-making in critical cases (see BMA 2001, GMC 2002).47 However, the practice of 
withholding or withdrawal of treatment raises questions on both the legal and ethical 
distinction between letting die and killing. It highlights, from a Foucauldian perspective, the 
superimposition of knowledge and power relations under a medicalised model of care and 
intensifies the debate over who is sovereign over life and who controls our bodies. Specifically 
with regard to assisted dying, it incites discussion on the extent to which withholding and 
withdrawing treatment is comparable to death being actively encouraged, for example by 
prescribing a higher than usual, and subsequently lethal dose of morphine or barbiturates. 
 
Acts of ending life which involve letting die following medical evaluation, do not usually involve 
criminal investigation and thus are effectively legalised in a similar manner to the act of killing 
through the doctrine of “double effect”. The double effect principle is enshrined in both 
criminal law and medical ethics and practice, where in legal terms there is a differentiation 
between “intention” and “foresight”. A typical example to illustrate this involves the physician 
prescribing, or administering morphine, or other opiates, with the aim to alleviate pain and 
control symptoms at the end of life. However, the high doses needed in cases of serious illness 
can, on occasion, induce coma and result in death, the consequences of which are classified as 
either intended or foreseen (Jeffrey, 2009: 43). This legal differentiation respects the 
professionalism and experience of the prescribing physician but critics highlight this distinction 
between intention and foresight as arbitrary. They argue that medical training adequately 
teaches the inevitable consequences of action and when death is an almost certain 
consequence of action it must be regarded by the law as criminal intent (Magnusson 2006, 
Williams 1958). Studies by Seale in 2006 reveal that 30% of all UK deaths witnessed by a 
medical doctor are preceded by the withdrawal of treatment, and 33% of deaths from double 
effect of the administration of medicine, suggesting this practice is not uncommon (Seale 
2006:653-9).  
 
A court or jury has the responsibility to determine whether an offence has been committed 
with intention or foresight through the Criminal Justice Act 1967, section 8. If the primary 
intention of the physician was to cause death, criminal prosecution is likely. However, if the 
                                                          
47 More specifically, GMC guidance on decision-making for doctors can be found in Treatment and care 
towards the end of life: good practice in decision-making, in place since May 2010. Available at: 
www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/end_of_life_care.asp (Accessed 13.11.16) 
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physician foresaw death as a natural and probable cause of his actions and this was in line with 
his professional judgement, then the requisite of criminal intent is absent, and punishment by 
law is unlikely (Criminal Justice Act 1967). In effect, doctors do assist patients to die through 
both their acts and omissions that are sanctioned through section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act. 
Letting die and the doctrine of double effect permits the ending of life under medical authority 
on the basis of paternal decision-making where these actions and omissions are deemed to be 
in the patients’ best interests. Contributions by Foucault (1973, 1977) and Turner (1995) 
discussed briefly in section 2.1.1 resonate here. The medicalised model of care currently 
practised in the UK allows the medical profession and healthcare law and policy to dictate 
behavioural norms articulated through specialised discourses. However, the increasingly liberal 
shift towards independent rational choice and the maintenance of human dignity underpinned 
by the salience of rights in an end of life context are issuing a significant challenge to medical 
authority on a number of levels.  
 
5.1.3 Human Rights Act 1998  
In November 1998 the Human Rights Act (HRA) received Royal Assent. It enshrined the 
principles of the 1950 ECHR within UK law. Article 6 enacts a requirement that all public 
authorities in the UK must take the provisions of the 1950 ECHR into account when formulating 
policies and procedures and provide effective remedies before national authorities for breach of 
these provisions (De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 1999:12). This includes the NHS as a public 
authority, which has legal duties and responsibilities to act in a manner compatible with the 
Convention rights. The HRA 1998 has constitutional significance with regard to end of life 
decision-making because it embraces fundamental rights and freedoms that are generally 
deemed to reflect a democratic society. These include: rights to basic dignity; to participate in 
decisions affecting liberty; rights of expression, and equality rights (De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 
1999:14). In addition, section 6(1) of the HRA provides a method for which individuals in 
complex cases, including requests for assistance to die, also have the option to petition a court 
to challenge a decision already made through the process of judicial review as illustrated by the 
cases of Diane Pretty and Tony Nicklinson discussed below.  
 
The process of judicial review in the UK law courts functions to ensure the reasonable exercise 
of power and to regulate democratic accountability. The judicial decision-making process can 
also further define or explain human rights principles and determine whether states’ legislation 
is compliant with these principles. Cases on assisted dying heard in the European Court of 
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Human Rights in Strasbourg can provide a narrow analysis of whether UK legislation is compliant 
with European human rights law and these set UK government policies in a wider context. The 
function of the law is to determine acceptable or punishable behaviour, supposedly to reflect 
the values of society, but in certain or exceptional circumstances it may be necessary to rely on 
the judiciary as a filter to interpret European and UK laws according to individual social and 
cultural merit on a case by case basis. In these instances, the judiciary apply “principles of 
statutory interpretation”, which are based on a generally accepted notion “that gaps in the 
statute may be filled by analogical reasoning, on the footing that legislature might be presumed 
to have desired to cover such cases if it had had these in contemplation” (Freeman, 2014:1572). 
In addition, where statutory law conflicts with the ECHR 1950, the judiciary can issue a written 
directive or make a “Declaration of Incompatibility” and pursue their own constitutional 
guidelines (De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 1999:14). This possibility is enhanced by the European 
Court of Human Rights operating with a “margin of appreciation” to allow a degree of state 
autonomy in interpreting human rights standards (Freeman, 2011:123). 
 
5.2 Case examples 
This section examines two of the most high profile cases, those of Diane Pretty and Tony 
Nicklinson, who took their legal appeals for assistance to die to the Court of Appeal, the 
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. Review of their petitions explores 
how key human rights arguments have been invoked to challenge the current law and to 
extend the scope of existing rights in an end of life context. Prior to this, the case of Tony 
Bland, which pre-dates the HRA 1998, is outlined as significant in so far as this was the first 
time legality of the acts of killing and letting die were questioned and the issue of ending life 
was deliberated as an ethical dilemma in the courts. 
 
5.2.1 Case of Tony Bland (1993) 
Legal interest in the end of life debate was initiated by the landmark case of Tony Bland, a 17 
year old male victim of the Hillsborough tragedy. Following his injuries, Tony Bland was in a 
persistent vegetative state. He had suffered brain stem death and was unable to move or 
communicate but was kept alive through artificial ventilation and nutrition. After a longer 
period with no prospect of recovery, his parents sought consent to withhold treatment and 
nutrition, and allow him to die (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]1 All ER 821 HL).  A great deal 
of attention has been given to this benchmark case on the grounds that it this was the first 
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example in England and Wales to debate the circumstances under which a doctor can lawfully 
terminate life (Wicks, 2007). This case raised issues of best interests and was deliberated from 
the perspective of a patriarchal medical model of care that sought to preserve life, even 
against the wishes of the patient, which were expressed through the sentiments of his family. 
Although rights were not deliberated explicitly as such, the case of Tony Bland did implicitly 
suggest a right to respect individual dignity where there was no hope of recovery. By allowing 
Tony to die, his being subject to inhuman or degrading treatment would be limited.  
 
In the case of Bland, all presiding judges defined artificial nutrition as medical treatment that 
could legally be (and subsequently was) withheld. They also deliberated the relationship 
between a doctor’s duty of care and acts/ omissions, killing/ letting die and the doctrine of 
double effect. Lord Browne-Wilkinson argued in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, at 
paragraph 885, “the doing of a positive act with the intention of ending life is and remains 
murder”. Nonetheless, it was held that a doctor commits no offence when treating a patient in 
a way which hastens death, if the purpose of the treatment is to relieve pain and suffering (the 
so-called “double effect”). The House of Lords opinion was that no offence was involved in 
refusing or withdrawing medical treatment or assistance, ultimately because this involved an 
omission rather than a positive act, and held that it was lawful for doctors to discontinue 
treatment of a person who was in, what was then called, a persistent vegetative state 
(Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789).  
 
Delivering the judgement on Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, Lords Goff, Browne-Wilkinson and 
Mustill expressed concern about the artificiality of such a sharp legal distinction between acts 
and omissions in this context. They also saw the need for the law in this sensitive area to be 
clear. Interestingly, Lord Justice Hoffmann situated the debate in a social context. He 
attributed the complexity of the Tony Bland case as due to “[m]odern medicine…[it] faces us 
with fundamental and painful decisions about life and death which cannot be answered on the 
basis of normal everyday assumptions” (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, paragraph 
825).  Advances in medical technology have influenced and shaped the late modern dying 
trajectory and this has led to some complex cases that challenge legal provision and expose 
the law as a blunt instrument.  
 
5.2.2 Case of Diane Pretty (2001) 
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Diane Pretty suffered from motor neurone disease, an incurable, progressive and degenerative 
illness that rendered her physically incapacitated but did not affect her mental competence. 
This distressing condition “gradually destroyed her muscles, making it hard for her to 
communicate with her family. It left her in a wheelchair, catheterised and fed through a tube” 
(Dignity in Dying, 2013). Pretty wanted to end her life with the help of her husband before 
reaching the stage of, what she considered, unbearable suffering. She sought prior immunity 
from prosecution if her husband assisted in her death (Pretty v DPP [2001] UKHL 61). Diane 
Pretty grounded her motion on the basis of their marital status, her physical inability to end 
her own life due to disability, and the right to privacy in regard to her own decision-making 
ability on this matter. Pretty was the first individual to challenge the current legislation by 
suggesting that section 2 of the 1961 Suicide Act, if it prohibits this help and prevents the DPP 
undertaking not to prosecute if he does, is incompatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights recently enshrined in UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (Pretty v DPP [2001] 
UKHL 61). Citing violation of the Convention rights soon after the HRA 1998 entered into force 
and petitioning an application for assistance to die positions the case of Diane Pretty as an 
important legal landmark. 
 
The case of Pretty principally invoked respect for the right to self-determination at the end of 
life as a reflection of individual liberty and an attempt to maintain human dignity. Her appeal 
cited violation of the ECHR 1950 including: Article 2 the right to life; Article 3 prohibition of 
torture; Article 8 the right to respect for private and family life; Article 9 freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, and Article 14 prohibition of discrimination.48 The right to life is 
central to the debate on assisted dying. Its inviolable nature has been challenged in a number 
of ways. Pretty’s case began by questioning the inalienable status of the right to life and 
suggested that individuals who are suffering or dying, may rationally choose not to avail 
themselves of this rightful entitlement. Counsel for Pretty argued that Article 2 protects the 
right to life rather than life itself, and, on this basis, it is for the individual to choose whether or 
not to claim this right. In this way it was proposed that interpreting the scope of a right to life 
should include being able to waive the right to life.  
 
                                                          
48
 No violation was found of ECHR 1950 Art 14 and it was not discussed in depth. However, the case of 
Pretty could reasonably be argued on anti-discrimination grounds as she was physically unable to take 
her own life and on this basis requested the right to receive assistance. Not offering assistance to 
individuals who are physically unable to end their own lives impacts upon the rights of the disabled and 
in light of the increasing emphasis and prevalence of legal instruments that protect disability rights, such 
as the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, this raises the question of why more 
appeals do not petition on this basis. 
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Especially in the face of unbearable suffering under medically hopeless conditions, it could be 
argued that individuals who may be aware the inevitable outcome is death should be able to 
waive their right to life in pursuit of their perception of a more dignified death. The case of 
Pretty highlights another of the difficult issues posed in the end of life debate on the 
boundaries of a right to life with regard to normative understandings and measuring quality of 
life. Despite its importance, the right to life is ambiguous in content. There is no widely 
accepted standard that measures life quality or defines a right to a decent quality of life. Life 
quality, which for many encompasses a notion of human dignity, can only be determined by 
the dying individual. Respect for this subjective assessment of life quality has implications that 
support human agency. Personal evaluations of life quality, within the lived experience, 
involves respect for individual liberty, even in circumstances where the person may choose not 
to act in what may appear to others to be in their best interests. One could argue that the right 
to life is incomplete if a rational person cannot decide to end their life on the basis that 
continuing to live would contravene their inherent dignity.  
 
Counsel for Pretty challenged the juridical framework for end of life decision-making by 
suggesting a new concept, namely the right not to live as a conjunction of the right to life and 
the right to self-determination. A right not to live, in effect a right to die, would be applied in 
practice in the same manner that individuals may refuse life-saving or life-prolonging medical 
treatment, or may lawfully choose to commit suicide if they are physically able. Pretty argued 
further that the right to die is not the antithesis of the right to life but the corollary of it, and 
that the state has a positive obligation to protect both (Pretty v DPP [2001] UKHL 61). The 
Secretary of State replied with a number of objections to this interpretation of the right to life, 
which were upheld by the Court. He argued 
The article protects the right to life and prevents the deliberate taking of life save in 
very narrowly defined circumstances. An article with that effect cannot be interpreted 
as conferring a right to die or to enlist the aid of another in bringing about one's own 
death (Pretty v DPP [2001] UKHL 61, paragraph 5). 
This response was grounded in the sanctity of life and current legal enactment that prioritises 
protection of human life, but the response at this time illustrated a distinct lack of engagement 
with human rights and interest in debating the scope of rights that may be indicative of the 
unfamiliar nature of this initial case. 
 
Article 3 of the ECHR 1950 confers respect for physical integrity and human dignity. It states 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
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The argument made by Diane Pretty for the right to die was grounded in the indignity and 
frustration of human suffering associated with not physically being able to end her own life 
and being refused assistance to do this. Counsel argued 
In denying Mrs Pretty the opportunity to bring her suffering to an end the United 
Kingdom (by the Director) will subject her to the proscribed treatment. The state can 
spare Mrs Pretty the suffering which she will otherwise endure since, if the Director 
undertakes not to give his consent to prosecution, Mr Pretty will assist his wife to 
commit suicide and so she will be spared much suffering (Pretty v DPP [2001] UKHL 61, 
paragraph 11). 
The chronic and debilitating nature of the dying process that characterised Ms Pretty’s 
condition, prolonging the actual or anticipated undignified conditions under which Mrs Pretty 
must remain alive, could constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. Not allowing the option 
for assisted death may exacerbate suffering and result in an undignified and degrading 
experience. The appeal by Diane Pretty is significant in that it associates the phenomenon of 
suffering, traditionally grounded in a compassionate discourse, with human rights discourses 
through Article 3 where the relief or avoidance of unnecessary suffering as inhuman or 
degrading treatment is associated with a dignified death. Review of the literature in Chapter 2 
suggested that, in a number of areas, a connection was evolving between understandings of 
human suffering and human rights. Classifying Ms Pretty’s circumstances as a violation of 
Article 3 was, however, dismissed by Lord Bingham who decreed 
An analogy might be found in the present case if a public official had forbidden the 
provision to Mrs Pretty of pain-killing or palliative drugs. But here the proscribed 
treatment is said to be the Director's refusal of proleptic immunity from prosecution to 
Mr Pretty if he commits a crime. By no legitimate process of interpretation can that 
refusal be held to fall within the negative prohibition of Article 3 (Pretty v DPP [2001] 
UKHL 61, paragraph 14). 
 
Diane Pretty also cited ECHR, Art 8(1) the right to respect for private and family life, as a means 
to sanction an assisted death. This is a key argument in the debate but one that only appears 
to surface in relation to these individual appeals. A right to privacy highlights and protects 
individual liberty through sanctioning the right of individuals to self-determine their own 
actions within their private, family and home environment. Despite this, the right to privacy 
has been under-theorised both historically and philosophically and in relation to the end of 
life. Counsel for Pretty suggested extending the boundaries and context of this right to a 
private life to include a right to determine one’s own death on the basis that 
This right embraces a right to choose when and how to die so that suffering and 
indignity can be avoided. Section 2(1) of the 1961 Act interferes with this right of self-
determination: it is therefore for the United Kingdom to show that the interference 
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meets the convention tests of legality, necessity, responsiveness to pressing social 
need and proportionality (Pretty v DPP [2001] UKHL 61, paragraph 17). 
At the end of life, individuals prioritise their own values and beliefs, aspiring to die in a way 
that reflects these values. Curtailing certain actions by limiting privacy rights may challenge 
fundamental civil liberty and impact upon freedom to express personal values and beliefs. The 
right to privacy is categorised as a qualified right and interference with the enjoyment of this 
right is permissible only if the interference has a legal basis and is considered necessary in a 
democratic society to protect citizens from harm (ECHR 1950). Article 8(2) of the ECHR 1950 
decrees that state interference in private life and circumstances permitting public authorities 
to intervene are only lawful when acting  
…in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The boundaries of privacy rights are particularly ambiguous and subject to interpretation. It is 
not always clear where and when legally valid expectations of privacy exist nor how they fare 
in relation to other legally recognised interests including public morality and national security. 
Privacy rights also vary depending upon the acceptability and nature of the social context. Any 
action, even if in private and between consenting adults, that results in serious harm or death 
as would occur in the case of assisting suicide are generally qualified under Article 8.  
 
To further her claim to privacy rights, Counsel highlighted certain features of Mrs Pretty's case 
including; “her mental competence…her willingness to commit suicide if she were able… the 
absence of harm to anyone else, the absence of far-reaching implications if her application 
were granted” (Pretty v DPP [2001] UKHL 61). Citing violation of privacy rights which disallows 
rational human agency and limits individual liberty in determining one’s own death issues a 
poignant challenge to a democratic government that has an obligation to respect the integrity 
of a dying person. Permitting the assisted death of a suffering person at the end of their life at 
their own reasonable request may confer, as Pretty suggests, minimal harm and implications 
for other members of society who must also be considered when legislating complex issues. 
However, at this time, the Secretary of State was quickly dismissive of the right to privacy as a 
basis for the right to die and claimed this informed living rather than dying. He also noted the 
conflicting nature of rights in relation to assisted death,  
…the right to private life under Article 8 relates to the manner in which a person 
conducts his life, not the manner in which he departs from it. Any attempt to base a 
right to die on Article 8 founders on exactly the same objection as the attempt based 
on Article 2, namely, that the alleged right would extinguish the very benefit on which 
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it is supposedly based. Article 8 protects the physical, moral and psychological integrity 
of the individual, including rights over the individual's own body, but there is nothing 
to suggest that it confers a right to decide when or how to die (Pretty v DPP [2001] 
UKHL 61, paragraph 18). 
 
Diane Pretty then applied to the European Court of Human Rights in 2002 where she was 
partially successful, in that it was held that her desire to end her life did engage Article 8.1 
(Case of Pretty v. United Kingdom Application no. 2346/02). The European Court noted that 
member states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation on the issue of assisted dying and the 
concept of “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition49 (Case of 
Pretty v. United Kingdom Application no. 2346/02, paragraph 61). Disagreeing the opinion of 
the Secretary of State that private life refers to “the manner in which a person conducts his 
life” (Pretty v DPP [2001] UKHL 61 at para 18), the European Court observed 
…that the ability to conduct one's life in a manner of one's own choosing may also 
include the opportunity to pursue activities perceived to be of a physically or morally 
harmful or dangerous nature for the individual concerned. The extent to which a State 
can use compulsory powers or the criminal law to protect people from the 
consequences of their chosen lifestyle has long been a topic of moral and 
jurisprudential discussion, the fact that the interference is often viewed as trespassing 
on the private and personal sphere adding to the vigour of the debate. However, even 
where the conduct poses a danger to health or, arguably, where it is of a life 
threatening nature, the case-law of the Convention institutions has regarded the 
State's imposition of compulsory or criminal measures as impinging on the private life 
of the applicant within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 and requiring justification in terms 
of the second paragraph (Case of Pretty v. United Kingdom Application no. 2346/02, 
paragraph 62). 
 
Analysis of the Pretty judgement reveals the difficulty in deliberating human rights principles 
especially in hard cases that necessitate close scrutiny and a degree of interpretation. At the 
time of the Pretty case in 2001, the judiciary demonstrated an inexperience and reluctance 
towards exploring and appropriating the nature and boundaries of rights in an end of life 
context. When Ms Pretty’s petition was heard at the European Court they found that Article 
8.1 was engaged suggesting that the UK legislation on assisting suicide was not compliant with 
European human rights law. The case of Pretty suggests that attempts to expand human rights 
principles in relation to assisted death, are most persuasive through the right to privacy that 
                                                          
49 In three subsequent decisions, the European Court has stated in clear terms that Article 8.1 
encompasses the right to decide how and when to die, and in particular the right to avoid a distressing 
and undignified end to life provided that the decision is made freely (see Haas v Switzerland (2011) 53 
EHRR 33, para 51, Koch v Germany (2013) 56 EHRR 6, paras 46 and 51, and Gross v Switzerland (2014) 58 
EHRR 7, para 60). 
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promotes a sense of self. Autonomous individuals are demanding respect for decisions they 
make in private over their own bodily integrity. 
 
5.2.3 Case of Tony Nicklinson (2012) 
Reviewing the more recent case of Tony Nicklinson illustrates the extent to which rights 
discourses have developed within a legal environment and become more familiar terrain upon 
which to advance the case for a right to die. Tony Nicklinson suffered a stroke at the age of 51 
years that left him completely paralysed. His case received in-depth coverage in national 
newspapers and television interviews (see BBC News, 2012, The Guardian, 16th September, 
2012).  In a statement from his first application for judicial review as it was heard at the High 
Court, he communicated with the aid of computer software to explain the nature of his 
suffering, 
My life can be summed up as dull, miserable, demeaning, undignified and intolerable. 
…it is misery created by the accumulation of lots of things which are minor in 
themselves but, taken together, ruin what’s left of my life. Things like…constant 
dribbling; having to be hoisted everywhere; loss of independence…particularly 
toileting and washing, in fact all bodily functions (cited in Nicklinson v Ministry of 
Justice [2012] EWHC 2381). 
Tony Nicklinson’s petition contested the blanket nature of the prohibition of killing in the law 
of murder, in so far as it applies to cases of genuine consensual killing. His appeal was 
grounded in the right to privacy. Nicklinson applied to the High Court for a Declaration that it 
would be lawful for a doctor to kill him, or to assist him in terminating his life, and for a 
Declaration that the law, as currently drafted, was incompatible with his Convention rights 
under Article 8 (Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381).  
 
Nicklinson’s case primarily cited respect for the right to privacy declaring a breach of Article 8 
of the Convention. His application acknowledged that there was a risk of abuse in legalising 
assisted death but claimed this did not justify the government in failing to provide a solution 
(Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381). In comparison to the earlier case of Pretty, 
who briefly argued that the right to a private and family life included a right to choose how and 
when to die (but was disregarded on the grounds that privacy rights did not relate to how a 
person ends their life), there was extensive deliberation over the boundaries and context of 
privacy. Rights discourses involving concepts of autonomy and dignity underpin the right to 
private life and these have been developed and foregrounded in the 2012 petition. Autonomy 
and dignity, grounded in human rights principles, are used to support the existing right to 
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privacy. The following argument highlights how central human rights discourses have become 
to the end of life debate, 
...respect for human dignity is an integral part of the general legal tenets of 
Community law… This is a particularly important factor of the present case… Tony’s 
stroke has condemned him to living in conditions in which he is deprived of all usual 
dignity and the law has deprived him of the right to say that enough is enough. For 
Tony, autonomy and dignity, humanity and justice require that he should be permitted 
to end his life; and it is submitted that Article 8 gives him the right to do so (Nicklinson 
v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381, paragraph 88). 
 
Counsel for Tony Nicklinson drew upon international human rights provision to challenge the 
lawfulness of the actions of the UK government. Similar to the observation discussed above by 
Keating (2016) that a new partial defence to murder is needed, Mr Nicklinson petitioned the 
court to “declare that the legislation under which murder carries a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment is incompatible with the European Convention in a case of genuinely 
compassionate voluntary active euthanasia” (Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 
2381, paragraph 22). Attempting to determine the issue under human rights law, Lord Justice 
Toulson argued in support of a new partial defence to murder through the defence of 
necessity. He stated 
…whether or not Tony has what I will refer to as the right to die (using that expression 
as shorthand for a right not to be prevented by the state from undergoing voluntary 
euthanasia) under that article, the time has come when the common law should give 
respect to his autonomy and dignity by recognising that voluntary euthanasia can 
provide a defence to murder by way of the defence of necessity (Nicklinson v Ministry 
of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381, paragraph 50). 
This comment illustrates firstly how the term “a right to die” has become a familiar expression 
within the legal arena and, secondly, demonstrates that judicial decision-making on the issue 
of assisting death has shifted and is now being debated under human rights law with respect 
for human rights principles in contrast to the common law which was utilised to determine the 
1993 case of Tony Bland. The right to die is understood from the perspective of Lord Justice 
Toulson to have a basis in individual liberty whereby recognition and protection of personal 
autonomy and human dignity justify consideration when determining the common law 
position. Toulson, LJ, however, was in the minority as his arguments were dismissed by other 
members of the court on the basis that “current law does not recognise the ‘best interests of 
the victim’ as a justification or excuse for killing”, although this statement ignored the example 
of withholding or withdrawing treatment within a medical context as discussed above. The 
judgement also failed to take account of “the compassionate motives of the ‘mercy’ killer” 
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claiming these motives “are in themselves never capable of providing a basis for a partial 
excuse” (Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381). 
 
After his legal petition failed, Tony Nicklinson as permitted under the Mental Capacity Act 
2005, refused all food, water and medication, and he died of pneumonia on 22nd August, 2012. 
His case was taken up by his wife Jane who petitioned the Court of Appeal. This was dismissed 
on similar grounds to the 2012 application and for this reason is not analysed here ([2013] 
EWCA Civ 961). The case was then heard posthumously in the Supreme Court (Nicklinson and 
another v Ministry of Justice [2014] UK SC 38), where the appeal was underpinned by the 
values of liberty and dignity. It can be summarized as follows  
The appellants’ case is that the Article 8 rights of Applicants should be accommodated 
by their being able to seek the assistance of third parties to enable them to kill 
themselves in a dignified and private manner, at a time of their choosing, in the United 
Kingdom, subject to some appropriate form of control so as to ensure that their 
decision to commit suicide is indeed voluntary, clear, settled and informed (Nicklinson 
and another v Ministry of Justice [2014] UK SC 38, paragraph 56). 
 
In this most recent judgement, the right to privacy was once again discussed in great depth 
and reference was also made to other judgements in relation to section 2 of the Suicide Act 
1961 being incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention. Despite respect for the apparent 
and unbearable suffering in the tragic case of Nicklinson, the principle justification advanced 
by Lord Reed for maintaining an absolute prohibition on assisting suicide was based on a 
utilitarian consideration. He argued there was a 
…perceived risk to the lives of other, vulnerable individuals who might feel themselves 
a burden to their family, friends or society and might, if assisted suicide were 
permitted, be persuaded or convince themselves that they should undertake it, when 
they would not otherwise do so (Nicklinson and another v Ministry of Justice [2014] UK 
SC 38, paragraph 171). 
 
The Nicklinson appeal was refused by a majority of seven to two, chiefly with due respect by 
the judiciary for the role of the law in democratic society to protect its citizens. Following this 
judgement, quite compellingly, three members of the Supreme Court indicated broad support 
for possible legal change, observing that the current law is becoming unfit for purpose. Once 
again, recommendations to Parliament were made pushing for legislation on this matter. 
President of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, in his conclusion, implored Parliament to 
consider the human rights implications of the Suicide Act 1961 to avoid a future declaration of 
101 
 
incompatibility with ECHR 1950 Art 8, suggesting continuing with a blanket ban on assisted 
suicide was not justified as it amounted to an interference with privacy. Once the issue of 
assisted death is located in Article 8, as it is increasingly so, the burden of proof rests with the 
UK government to justify their decision to interfere with this right and prove that interference 
is proportionate. Lord Neuberger held that 
…the arguments raised by the Secretary of State do not justify this Court ruling out the 
possibility that it could make a declaration of incompatibility in relation to section 2. 
The interference with Applicants’ article 8 rights is grave, the arguments in favour of 
the current law are by no means overwhelming, the present official attitude to 
assisted suicide seems in practice to come close to tolerating it in certain situations, 
the appeal raises issues similar to those which the courts have determined under the 
common law, the rational connection between the aim and effect of section 2 is fairly 
weak…(Nicklinson and another v Ministry of Justice [2014] UK SC 38, paragraph 111). 
 
The appeals of Diane Pretty and Tony Nicklinson are significant because they demonstrate how 
the use and development of human rights arguments in the end of life debate has shifted the 
issue from a purely medical dilemma into the legal and consequently political arena, where 
there is a potential for change in UK law and policy. The case of Pretty in 2001 invoked human 
rights principles and applied them to the issue of assisted death through the newly enshrined 
HRA 1998.  Ms Pretty’s case was pivotal in that it initiated deliberation on the boundaries of 
human rights arguing that concepts of rights were fluid, open to interpretation and could be 
appropriated in a new context, namely in relation to claims supporting an assisted death. 
Judicial response at this time was limited. Assisted death contravened current UK legal 
provision and there was little suggestion that the application of human rights principles could 
or should be deliberated in an end of life context.  
 
The case of Nicklinson in 2012 interrogated the boundaries of human rights principles, 
particularly the right to privacy, in greater depth. At this time, rights arguments were gaining 
traction to the extent that they challenged government accountability suggesting that the 
state was acting disproportionately and UK law was incompatible with the human rights 
protected by the European Convention.  The cases of Tony Nicklinson and Diane Pretty heard 
in High Court and their appeals to the European Court uncover division on two fundamental 
legal issues. First, that of appropriate legal response to assisting or encouraging a suicide and, 
second, the respective roles of Parliament, the domestic courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights in protecting and interpreting human rights. Despite compelling appeals by UK 
individuals requesting an assisted suicide through utilising existing human rights mechanisms 
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in the HRA 1998 and ECHR 1950, and an indication that rights arguments are an increasingly 
valid basis for the right to die, no cases to date have succeeded. However, the courts cite 
increasing discomfort with delivering judgements on the issue. The prevailing legal narrative is 
now being challenged through rights that protect the decision-making ability of competent 
individuals to determine their own death and the law needs more solid justification to 
maintain prohibition of assisted death.  
 
5.3 Global perspectives 
Rights-driven arguments have facilitated legal change in a number of other, primarily Western 
states. It is worth considering briefly this influence upon the legal status quo in the UK. Law 
and policy debates on end of life take place within a global frame of reference and on this 
basis, UK provision for the dying may be impacted by normative standards in other countries.  
This section introduces assisted dying in a global context to provide an indication of trends, 
then reviews the situation in the US state of Oregon and the Netherlands as examples of 
where legal provision for assisted dying is well-established.  
 
At the time of writing, there was legal provision for assisted dying in the following European 
countries: Switzerland (1941); Holland (2002); Belgium (2002); Luxembourg (2008); and the 
American states of Oregon (1994), Washington (2009), Vermont (2013) and California (2015). 
Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg permit medically sanctioned voluntary euthanasia, while 
the Death with Dignity laws in Oregon, Washington, Vermont, and the End of Life Options Act 
2015 in California allow mentally competent, terminally-ill adults to voluntarily request, and 
receive, a prescription for self-ingestion of lethal medication to hasten their death (Death with 
Dignity National Centre, 2014). The safeguarding criteria common to all countries where 
assisted death is legal, stipulate that requests must come from the patient themselves and in 
this way assisted death is underpinned by respect for the values of personal liberty and 
freedom of choice.  
Most recently in February, 2015, the Canadian Supreme Court amended their Federal Criminal 
Code provision against assisted suicide which had been based upon a longstanding blanket 
prohibition (Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) [2015] SCC 5). Legal amendment that will be 
effected one year from this date states that physician assisted suicide is permitted if the 
“person affected clearly consents to the termination of life” and is considered to be suffering 
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from a grievous and irremediable medical condition. The Supreme Court in Canada justified 
this decision using the language of rights, which emphasised 
 An individual’s response to a grievous and irremediable medical condition is a matter 
critical to their dignity and autonomy. The prohibition denies people in this situation 
the right to make decisions concerning their bodily integrity and medical care and thus 
trenches on their liberty. And by leaving them to endure intolerable suffering, it 
impinges on their security of the person. The prohibition on physician-assisted dying 
infringes the right to life, liberty and security of the person in a manner that is not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice (Carter v. Canada (Attorney 
General) [2015] SCC 5). 
Changes in global legislation on assisted death evidence a (primarily Western) shift in priorities 
at the end of life, which is increasingly grounded in human rights discourses involving respect 
for personal autonomy and human dignity. The above judgement also argues “intolerable 
suffering” as a valid reason to justify lifting the prohibition on assisted death that amounts to 
an impingement on personal “security”.  
 
5.3.1 Oregon 
Voters first approved a change in the law on assisted dying in the US state of Oregon in 1994. 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (DWDA) entered into force in 1997 followed by effect in 
Washington, Vermont, and California (Death with Dignity National Centre, 2014). The US laws50 
specify that a person requesting assisted death must be at least 18 years old, a state resident, 
certified by two physicians as capable of making and communicating health care decisions for 
him/herself, and diagnosed with a terminal illness that is likely to lead to death within six 
months (Oregon DWDA, 2013). As part of the monitoring process, the Oregon Public Health 
Division is required by the DWDA 1994 to collect data and issue an annual report detailing the 
circumstances of deaths that were assisted. These statistics could help assess the potential 
implications of legalising assisted death in the UK. Statistics show that over a 10 year period 
the number of recipients of a prescription for lethal medication in the state of Oregon did 
increase from 68 in 2003 to 122 in 2013 suggesting that more people are requesting assisted 
death51 (Public Health Oregon 2014). However, the number of deaths from ingestion of the 
                                                          
50
 Interestingly, the DWDA 1994 states explicitly that assisted deaths in this manner do not “constitute 
suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide”. 
 
51
 For a comprehensive list of characteristics and motivations of the 752 patients who have died from 
ingesting lethal medication under the Oregon DWDA in the period 1998-2013: 
http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/D
ocuments/year16.pdf (Accessed 02.12.14).   
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lethal medication did not correlatively increase: 42 in 2003 compared to 71 in 2013 (Public 
Health Oregon 2014). 
 
Figure 5.1 Oregon DWDA Prescription Recipients and Deaths 1998-2013 (Public Health Oregon 
2014).
 
 
Notably, although 68 and 122 individuals received a prescription for lethal medication in the 
respective years 2003 and 2013 this figure did not equal the number of deaths. This indicates 
that death through the ingestion of barbiturates does not occur in a number of cases even 
though the medication has been prescribed. The Chair of the World Federation of Right to Die 
Societies, medical doctor Rob Jonquiere from the Netherlands, provided one explanation for 
this discrepancy during his guest address at a conference held by Friends at the End (FATE) in 
2013. In his professional experience, not all patients who requested and received a 
prescription for lethal medication, chose to die by this method. He suggested “the knowledge 
that you have the choice may be more important than ingesting the choice” (Jonquiere, 2013). 
This resonates particularly in relation to clinical studies discussed in section 2.1.2 where it was 
highlighted how requests for assisted suicide were driven primarily by fear of dying and a 
desire to maintain individual liberty expressed as control over the process of dying. 
 
5.3.2 The Netherlands 
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Dutch law is much broader in comparison, allowing both assisted suicide and voluntary 
euthanasia for individuals over the age of 16 without the criteria of mental competence. In the 
Netherlands, requests for assistance to die must be initiated by the patient or individual 
themselves, but mental capacity is not a pre-condition to permitting assisted death. 
Amendments currently proposed in the Netherlands include extending dying assistance to the 
elderly without a diagnosed terminal or serious illness (Jonquiere, 2013). Old age per se would 
not constitute a case for an assisted death, but the criteria of “completed life” combined with 
“minor age related illnesses” has been suggested by the Dutch NVVE.52  Dutch law specifies 
that the attending physician must, after consulting with another independent physician, 
comply with the due care criteria referred to in the Dutch Criminal Code art. 293, paragraph 2. 
This states the attending physician must be satisfied that the patient has made a voluntary and 
carefully considered request, that suffering was unbearable and that there was no prospect of 
improvement after having informed the patient about his situation and his prospects (Dutch 
Law, 2012). He must come to the conclusion together with the patient that there is no 
reasonable alternative in the light of the patient’s situation (Dutch Law, 2012). The use of with 
reflects personal autonomy in the decision-making process based on the earlier interpretation 
by Thorns (2013) rather than a notion of choice expressed as mere personal preference. 
International trends provide some indication that Western understandings of rights discourses 
are defining end of life provision and driving legal change. These findings are relevant 
considering the role and status of the UK in a global context. This motivates further 
examination of how, and to what extent, rights discourses could impact end of life law and 
policy in the UK. 
 
5.4 End of life policy 
High profile cases are important in that they can set legal precedent and provoke statutory 
changes. While the law typically defines normative standards in a democratic society, policy is 
also indicative of what is ethical and legally permissible at the end of life. Government 
healthcare policy strategically defines and shapes the delivery of services and care at the end 
of life through practical provision for the dying. The Department of Health (DOH) states that 
current policy provision is based upon “making sure people have the support, care and 
treatment they need, with the compassion, respect and dignity they deserve” (DOH, 2016). 
This section explores the centrality of human rights discourses apparent in government policy 
                                                          
52
 NVVE provides information, consultation and education about euthanasia and assisted suicide in the 
Netherlands. This Amsterdam based organisation lobbies, supports and facilitates research and other 
initiatives related to the “self-chosen” death. 
106 
 
as it applies in England. The devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
are responsible for developing their own health policies. The NHS Constitution 2013, is 
discussed with reference to the Handbook to the NHS Constitution for England (2013), which 
explains and elaborates upon the rights and pledges in the policy. The End of Life Care Strategy 
was published by the Department of Health in July 2008 for England (similar strategies for the 
end of life have also been developed in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) and was 
reported on annually. Advanced Care Planning including Advance Directives, and formation of 
the Dying Matters Coalition feature as part of, or derive from, the End of Life Care Strategy 
2008 and for this reason are briefly included here. 
 
5.4.1 NHS Constitution 2013 
Before the start of each financial year, the Secretary of State prepares, lays before Parliament 
and publishes the Government’s Mandate to NHS England according to guidelines for setting 
out the objectives and duties detailed in the NHS Act 2006 (NHS England Framework 
Agreement, 2014). The Department of Health works in partnership with NHS England to serve 
patients, the public and taxpayers. The policy formulated on end of life has implications for the 
UK government, which has a responsibility to discharge these duties effectively. The NHS 
Constitution for England dated 26th March, 2013 details patient “rights” and healthcare 
professionals’ “duties” (NHS Constitution 2013). The NHS Constitution 2013 sets out the 
character of the NHS as a comprehensive and equitable health service. It claims to empower 
patients, staff and the public to know and exercise their rights in order to help drive 
improvements in quality, efficiency and responsiveness throughout the NHS (NHS Constitution 
(Handbook) 2013). It specifically states 
The aim of the Constitution is to safeguard the enduring principles and values of the 
NHS. The Constitution also sets out clear expectations about the behaviours of both 
staff and patients. It is intended to empower the public, patients and staff by setting 
out existing legal rights and pledges in one place and in clear and simple language. By 
knowing and exercising their rights, the public, patients (their carers and families) and 
staff can help the NHS improve the care it provides (NHS Constitution (Handbook) 
2013:3). 
The aims of the NHS Constitution are largely grounded in these “legal rights” where it is 
claimed that through “knowing and exercising” these rights, individuals can improve the 
quality of care that the NHS provides. This illustrates how central human rights discourses have 
become in developing and defining quality end of life care and suggests that this language has 
the potential not only to influence options at the end of life, but also the direction of the NHS.   
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The NHS Constitution Handbook 2013 offers a novel differentiation between rights defined as 
“legal entitlement protected in law” and “pledges”. The concept of rights as legal entitlements, 
supports a legal positivist perspective, while “pledges” are more aspirational. These pledges 
were considered “not legally binding and cannot be guaranteed for everyone all of the time, 
because they express an ambition to improve, going above and beyond legal rights” (NHS 
Constitution (Handbook) 2013:4). This lack of clarity and understanding on the nature and 
content of rights is broadly indicative of government end of life policy. The list of rights 
documented under section 3a on page 6 of the NHS Constitution 2013 are a peculiar amalgam 
of rights, collectively termed “legal rights” which include, among others, the right to access 
NHS services free of charge and the right not to be subject to unlawful discrimination. The 
Handbook, in each case, refers to the source of the stated rights and these are, for the most 
part, grounded in statutory provision. In the case of free NHS services, the source cited is the 
NHS Act 2006, section 1 which sets out the primary duty of the Secretary of State to promote a 
comprehensive health service and to exercise the Secretary of State’s functions as to secure 
the services for that purpose. The right not to be discriminated against is protected by 
provisions in the Equality Act 2010. Other rights, including access to appropriate healthcare, 
are also grounded in the NHS Act 2006, while the right to nationally approved treatments, 
drugs, and programmes falls under the remit of NICE, and the right to vaccinations is provided 
through the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (NHS Constitution, 2013:7). 
 
Following this rather miscellaneous assortment of rights, the NHS Constitution subsequently 
attempts to differentiate between the idea of legal rights and human rights locating the source 
of human rights in international mechanisms (although these are poorly referenced as such). 
Section 3a of the NHS Constitution (2013:8) claims “the right to be treated with dignity and 
respect in accordance with your human rights”. The Handbook to the NHS Constitution 2013 
acknowledges the broad and relative scope for interpretation of dignity and respect but, in 
contrast to other rights protected in the Constitution, it relates these to international 
mechanisms. In this way, the policy discourse attempts to validate concepts of dignity and 
respect for privacy through association with the human rights recognised in the ECHR 1950 
suggesting, “the right to dignity includes a right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading 
treatment. The right to respect includes the right to respect for private and family life” (NHS 
Constitution (Handbook) 2013:53). The source of the right to be treated with dignity and 
respect, including respect for private and family life, is stated as derived from the rights 
conferred by the ECHR 1950. These rights are protected by Articles 3 and 8 but are not 
referenced as Article 3: the right not to be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
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Article 8: the right to respect for private and family life. It is noted however, in the same 
section, that these rights are given effect in UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998, correctly 
highlighting that it is unlawful for a public body to act incompatibly with those ECHR rights 
according to section 6 of the Human Rights Act (NHS Constitution (Handbook) 2013:53).  
 
5.4.2 End of Life Care Strategy 2008 
The foundations and aims of the strategy are explained by the following statement, 
In the past, the profile of end of life care within the NHS and social services has been 
relatively low. Reflecting this, the quality of care delivered has been very variable. The 
aim of this strategy is to bring about a steep change in access to high quality care for all 
people approaching the end of life. This should be irrespective of age, gender, ethnicity, 
religious belief, disability, sexual orientation, diagnosis or socioeconomic status. High 
quality care should be available wherever the person may be: at home, in a care home, 
in hospital, in a hospice or elsewhere. Implementation of this strategy should enhance 
choice, quality, equality and value for money (End of Life Care Strategy 2008:33). 
The objectives of the End of Life Care Strategy 2008,53 in contrast to the NHS Constitution 2013 
do not explicitly discuss rights. However, an understanding of rights is evident through the aim 
to enhance dignity for the dying person based upon personal choice, respect for human beings 
and access to high quality care. The intention behind this policy appears to permit individuals 
“more choice” and “enhance choice” but, despite an implied right to choose, there are still limits 
that are determined by the current law. Provisions that support patient decision-making in this 
policy includes a Preferred Priorities for Care (PPC) document that individuals hold themselves 
and take with them if they receive care in different places. It records individual thoughts about 
personal care and future choices at the end of life including a “Preferred Place to Die” option54 
(End of Life Care Strategy 2008:54). Information about choices, and who might be involved in 
their care or present at their death can also be noted, enabling care staff to be aware of 
individual preferences, thereby ensuring continuity of care (End of Life Care Strategy 2008:54).  
 
                                                          
53
 This strategy has now been replaced by a document drawn up by the Leadership Alliance for the Care 
of Dying People (LACDP), titled One chance to get it right. It details five new Priorities of Care for setting 
out standards of care for the dying in 2014-2016 (NHS England, 2014). Interestingly, this document 
focuses on the “wishes” and “preferences” of the dying person and although it details “duties” and 
“responsibilities” of healthcare professionals, there is no explicit mention of rights. 
54
Despite this option to die at home, a survey conducted by the Royal College of Nursing involving 7,700 
community palliative care nurses in 2014 reported 7/10 nurses had witnessed dying patients being 
admitted to hospital due to insufficient resources for them to die at home. Only 36% of community 
nurses declared they had team resources available to deliver 24 hour care at home (Royal College of 
Nursing, 2014). 
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One of the key areas addressed in the End of Life Care Strategy 2008 was that 
At a national level, the Department of Health will work with the National Council for 
Palliative Care to develop a national coalition to raise the profile of end of life care and 
to change attitudes to death and dying in society (End of Life Care Strategy, 2008:11). 
This coalition was named Dying Matters. They have a detailed and comprehensive website and 
their community outreach programmes and organized events encourage openness in speaking 
about dying in the public sphere. Examining their website, www.dyingmatters.org, the dominant 
rhetoric is that of personal choice and autonomy in the decision-making process at the end of 
life. But, as with the End of Life Care Strategy 2008, there is no explicit use of the term “rights”. 
Although Dying Matters emphasise respect for individual autonomy, it is clearly stated that they 
have no official position in relation to euthanasia or assisted dying (Dying Matters, 2015). This 
clause may be necessary to ensure there is no direct conflict of interest with the law as it stands. 
 
In contrast to statutory law, the scope for a right to die is substantially enhanced by 
Government policy on health and end of life care that promotes patients’ rights through an 
emphasis on personal choice and human dignity. Both the NHS Constitution 2013 and the 
Department of Health End of Life Care Strategy 2008 refer to the rights of individuals who are 
considered mentally competent by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to request, withdraw from or 
refuse potentially life sustaining treatment. These policies are supported by guidelines from 
the General Medical Council (GMC), which also sanctions mentally competent adults being 
able to communicate an intention to end their own life through their right to refuse medical 
and surgical treatment. This includes refusing life-sustaining treatment such as intubation for 
ventilation purposes or amputation to avoid sepsis (GMC a, 2014). Patients who do not wish 
to, or are unable to, feed themselves or ingest food and water due to illness or incapacity also 
have the right to refuse help with this or artificial nutrition and hydration at any stage of their 
illness (GMCa, 2014). These rights enable and protect autonomous decision-making in the 
dying process, but are limited in that the individual must have certified mental capacity and 
not require outside assistance. There is then to this extent, already a presumptive right to die 
through the right to refuse nutrition, medical aid and life-sustaining treatments or to end one’s 
own life. However, this does not extend to being able to request death involving assistance 
from a third party. 
 
To reflect individual choice, Advance Directives or Advance Decisions, formerly known as Living 
Wills are referenced in both the Department of Health End of Life Care Strategy 2008 and the 
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NHS Constitution 2013. This is a statement in which mentally competent adults can pre-record 
their individual wishes in the event of future serious illness or disability based on their own 
values and beliefs. Advance Directives mirror legal and medical guidelines in that they allow 
refusal of medical intervention such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation or discontinuance of 
treatment, including antibiotics and artificial nutrition or hydration, but they do not permit 
individuals to request assistance to die. Advance Directives do not have to be drawn up by a 
solicitor. The forms are freely available online or can be downloaded from the National End of 
Life Care Programme or Compassion in Dying (a sister organisation to Dignity in Dying). This 
document does, however, need to be signed, dated and witnessed in order for it to be 
recognized as a legal document. Individuals are advised to inform their families, general 
practitioners and healthcare professionals if they have an Advance Directive, but there is 
currently no national electronic database or visible method of recording and making clear 
whether a person has filled out an Advance Directive. Medical professionals would have to be 
aware that this provision exists before they could act upon it. Advance Directives are generally 
considered binding in England and Wales, but the force of their legal status is open to 
interpretation under section 25 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This clause states that Advance 
Directives are not applicable if circumstances change in a way that the patient could not have 
foreseen (Mental Capacity Act, 2005, s25). Given the varied and imprecise trajectory of illness, 
and medical uncertainty especially during long term ill-health and unforeseen complications, an 
Advance Directive that respects individual choices may not be legally valid.  
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined where, and how, rights discourses have been articulated at the end 
of life in UK law and policy documents and included a brief overview of assisted death in a 
global context. Legal provision regarding assisting death includes the Homicide Act 1957 and 
Suicide Act 1961. These legal instruments have remained constant to date as has the Criminal 
Justice Act 1967, which has relevance for the role of doctors in permitting the ending of life at 
their own medical discretion where actions taken are deemed to be in the patients’ best 
interests. Analysis of the current law has highlighted areas of inadequacy that are ambiguous 
in relation to the end of life: the questionable ability to apply discretion in hard cases; the 
differentiation between killing and letting die, and the lack of partial defence to murder. In 
2010, the DPP published his Policy for Prosecutors in Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide 
following the 2009 appeal of Debbie Purdy to clarify the circumstances under which criminal 
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prosecution for assisting suicide was more or less likely. Although not incompatible with the 
Suicide Act 1961, this policy, in effect, sanctions assisting suicide as a compassionate response. 
 
The findings of this chapter suggest the HRA 1998 has been influential in transforming the 
issue of requested death from an ethical dilemma, initiated by changes in the dying trajectory 
and perpetuated by advances in medical technology, to a human rights dilemma where rights 
arguments are now being invoked in individual petitions to courts of appeal. The limitations of 
statutory law are increasingly confronted by claims articulated through human rights principles 
and a rising human rights rhetoric that has been applied to challenge the boundaries of 
existing rights and interrogate legal authority in governing end of life decisions. The historic 
case of Tony Bland raised the end of life as an ethical dilemma in the courts, challenging the 
law to clarify their position on withdrawing treatment and letting die. In the period since, the 
cases of Diane Pretty and Tony Nicklinson, as high profile examples, have used rights that 
emphasise personal liberty, respect for privacy and human dignity as the basis for advancing 
their arguments for assisted death. Both of these recent legal petitions put forward arguments 
that are supported by the provisions in the HRA 1998.  
 
In practice, legalisation of assisted suicide in the UK would necessitate statutory amendments 
to both the Suicide Act 1961 and the Homicide Act 1957 either to decriminalise the act of 
assisting a suicide or, as suggested above, to introduce a new partial defence to the crime of 
murder. As the scope of existing legal rights is interrogated, some discrepancy with current UK 
law arises. In 2002, when the case of Pretty proceeded to the European Court, it was ruled that 
Article 8: the right to respect for private and family life was engaged suggesting that the UK 
legislation on assisting suicide was not compliant with European human rights law. Analysis of 
the above cases founded on violation of established legal rights, indicates that the nature and 
understanding of human rights principles are open to further deliberation and interpretation. 
An alternative route to legalise assisted death is possible if the judiciary stress the 
incompatibility of the law and ECHR obligations sufficiently forcefully for Parliament to debate 
and introduce a new law. 
 
Human rights discourses are used prominently in healthcare policy that defines end of life 
standards of care and healthcare professionals’ duties in England. Analysis of Government end 
of life policy through the NHS Constitution 2013 and End of Life Care Strategy 2008 revealed 
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that rights discourses grounded in individual liberty dominate current provision. This is 
evidenced through emphasising the values of choice and dignity in end of life decision-making 
which resonate with popular, accessible and contemporary public discourses. Choice is 
provided in some aspects of end of life care, expressed loosely as a “right to choose,” including 
preference over place and who is present at time of death, plus the ability to refuse medical 
treatment that knowingly will lead to death. Ultimately, this right to choose articulated in end 
of life policy is not legally binding and specifically does not extend to requesting assistance to 
die, even when the request is rational and persistent, or generated by a state of unbearable 
suffering.   
 
An incompatibility with policy discourse, supplemented by consumerist demand, reveals an 
area of emerging dissatisfaction upon which the current law is being challenged. Individual 
legal petitions have shifted the onus of responsibility upon the Government to defend their 
prohibition on assisted dying or risk the European Court issuing a declaration of 
incompatibility. The Supreme Court has urged Parliament to consider the issue as a matter of 
urgency. These factors suggest that in a contemporary social context, and driven by the rising 
persuasion of rights arguments, statutory amendment may be necessary, if not imminent.  
 
The House of Lords, as a major UK political institution, has the potential to influence legislation 
on the issue and assisted death has been debated in this forum on a number of occasions. 
Members of the Lords have time and experience to scrutinise proposed Bills to change the law 
on assisted dying and examine the ethical and practical implications of a legalised right to 
assisted death. In this way they can provide a well-informed analysis of issues in the debate. 
The following chapter examines in-depth particular aspects of the dilemma as they emerge 
through the historical and contemporary House of Lords debates to explore the prevalence 
and development of rights discourses in an end of life context. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
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 Historical and contemporary debates in the House of 
Lords  
 
The role of the House of Lords is to deliberate government legislation which includes the 
possibility of drafting or amending Parliamentary Bills. There is a range of political allegiances 
in the House of Lords. Figures in 2016 reveal 255 Conservative Members, 209 Labour, 105 
Liberal Democrats and 177 Crossbenchers plus 26 Bishops (House of Lords 2016). These 
eligible Lords may “scrutinise bills, investigate government activity through committee work, 
and question government through oral questions and debates” (House of Lords 2016). Analysis 
of the discourses used by Members as they advance their arguments for or against the 
legalisation of assisted dying was selected for this research on the basis that the Lords are part 
of a major UK political institution and have the time, professional experience and inclination to 
debate complex issues in-depth, “giving intense and detailed attention to the minutiae of 
legislation so as to test its real scope and consequences” (House of Lords, 2003 col 1233). Their 
competence was praised by Lord Haskel commenting on the role of the House of Lords in 
comparison to the House of Commons, 
We consider Bills in detail. Generally we have more time and we often have more 
relevant experience-and, yes we are less politicised-whereas in the other place, 
sometimes large chunks of legislation are not even considered in the Committee 
(House of Lords, 2014 col 891). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the centrality of human rights discourses through the 
historical and contemporary debates on assisted dying. It examines the ways in which 
members of the House of Lords articulated their views and overall positions on end of life and 
the ways in which conceptions of rights featured in advancing both sides of the argument 
throughout the debates. This chapter is divided into three sections that focus on the Bills and 
ensuing debates from 1936, 2003 and 2014 in chronological order. By way of introduction, an 
outline of the Bills and main features of each debate are provided in the table below.  
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Figure 6.1 Overview of the 1936, 2003, and 2014 House of Lords Bills and debates  
Year 1936 2003 2014 
 
 
 
 
Bill proposal 
“To enable persons 
suffering from 
incurable, fatal and 
painful disease to 
receive Euthanasia 
under certain 
conditions” 
“To enable a 
competent adult who 
is suffering 
unbearably as a result 
of a terminal or a 
serious and 
progressive physical 
illness to receive 
medical help to die at 
his own considered 
and persistent 
request” 
“To enable 
competent adults 
who are terminally ill 
to be provided at 
their request with 
specified assistance 
to end their own life” 
 
 
Debate focus 
Compassionate 
(medical) response 
versus sanctity of life 
Individual liberty 
rights versus state 
responsibility to 
protect the 
vulnerable 
Rights arguments 
used explicitly and 
implicitly on both 
sides of the debate 
 
 
Serves to advance 
Ethical debate on 
euthanasia as a 
political issue 
Arguments for self-
determination in an 
end of life context 
Deliberation of 
human rights 
principles and power 
of rights discourses at 
end of life 
 
 
 
Outcome 
Majority of 35 
against, 14 in favour 
Majority of 148 
against, 100 in 
favour. Bill proceeded 
to Second Reading 
but ran out of time at 
this stage 
Numbers equally 
divided at Second 
Reading, unanimous 
move to proceed to 
Committee Stage but 
the Bill ran out of 
time at this stage 
 
The first part of this chapter presents the initial Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936 
and explores the subsequent debate to illustrate the historical context and language used to 
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express arguments at this time. The later House of Lords Bills and debates from 2003 and 
2014, are addressed in sections 6.2 and 6.3 respectively. Each of the sections provide an 
overview of the Bill before outlining the debates and raising any arguments that are especially 
prominent or differ greatly from other debates. Specific issues in the debates are then 
discussed in detail.  
 
6.1 Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936 
Lord Ponsonby first introduced a Bill for debate in the House of Lords on voluntary euthanasia 
in 1936 with the support of The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Society (VES).55 The 
Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936 proposed “[T]o enable persons56 suffering from 
incurable, fatal and painful disease to receive Euthanasia under certain conditions”. Prior to 
the timetabled Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936, Killick Millard delivered his 1931 
Presidential Address to the Society of Medical Officers for Health on the topic of Euthanasia. 
He observed that 
In spite of all the advances which preventive and curative medicine have made and all 
that modern science has achieved in the alleviation of human suffering, the fact 
remains that vast numbers of human beings are doomed to end their earthly existence 
by a lingering, painful and often agonising form of death (Millard, 1931:11). 
The motivation behind this first Bill was primarily a compassionate response to alleviate the 
suffering of incurables. It was prompted by these arguments of Killick Millard. The wording of 
the Bill invoked the notion of a fundamental right to decide one’s own end but analysis of the 
subsequent 1936 Parliamentary debate reveals very limited mention of rights or references to 
concepts of rights.  
 
The procedure for requesting euthanasia was clarified in section 3(1), 
The person desiring to receive euthanasia shall make an application…stating that he is 
suffering from an incurable, fatal and painful disease; that his near relatives have been 
informed; that his affairs are in order; that he desires to anticipate death by 
euthanasia and that he knows of no valid reason why a permit should not be granted 
(Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936). 
This application, supported by two independent medical certificates, was intended to be heard 
in a Court of Summary Jurisdiction where, if satisfied, the court would issue a permit to the 
                                                          
55
This was launched in December 1935 by Dr Charles Killick Millard, Medical Officer for Health. 
   
56
 Persons eligible are adults over the age of 21 years. Later Bills make provision for adults as those over 
18 years, reflecting other legislation that recognises a lowering of age for capacity in decision-making on 
personal issues. 
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applicant and the medical practitioner who must hold a license to euthanise. Although this Bill 
is historically the first of its kind that permits a doctor to legally end the life of a dying person 
at their request, involvement with independent assessors demonstrates well considered 
safeguards. This is the only Bill that proposes to use the law courts to assess requests for 
assisted death. This option is not discussed in later Bills and only surfaces once in the 2014 
debate, briefly mentioned in the contribution from Lord Carlisle. 
 
6.1.1 The 1936 debate 
In 1936, the main body of the debate centred upon the value of compassion in the face of 
unbearable human suffering. Members of the Lords who supported the legalisation of assisted 
death in this debate drew upon a compassionate discourse that focused on the relief of 
suffering associated with dying from an incurable or serious illness as their primary motivation 
for a change in law. Typical contributions in this debate summarised assisted death as “to 
substitute for a slow and painful death, a quick and painless one” (col 475) and “an easy 
release for the dying” (col 499). Early arguments for the legalisation of assisted death were 
typified by a compassionate discourse grounded in the desire to spare painful “incurables” 
further or unnecessary suffering. This is a different approach to that of rights, and one that 
was historically specific. 
 
Assisted death argued as a merciful act was contested by religious-based arguments citing the 
sanctity of human life as of value in itself and important to the attending doctor, duty-bound 
to preserve life. The Archbishop of Canterbury emphasised any taking of human life as 
contrary to a natural law approach that regards God as sovereign over matters of life and 
death. He located the moral aspects of the debate within wider society, concerned that if the 
law permitted man to end a life no longer deemed valuable it would place additional 
responsibility on the person to determine when they cease to exist as a valuable individual (col 
487). These views are reflective of Christian teaching and a closer adherence to a religious 
framework at this time, demonstrating great respect for the authority of the Church on 
matters of life and death. One contribution expressed emphatic opposition to the Bill beyond 
religion  
…it is not opposed only on Christian and moral grounds, it is opposed because it is 
contrary to the law of nature. We do not oppose it because the Church condemns it 
but because the law of nature brands it as evil and a cowardly act (col 479).  
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In contrast, some of the Lords at this time supported proposals to legalise assisted death 
despite their religious convictions. They argued that this support did not diminish their respect 
for the sanctity of life. This argument was revealed as common to all debates where religious 
members justify their support for assisted death on a compassionate basis in order to relieve 
unbearable or protracted suffering. In 1936, these contributions chiefly stated that the pity 
and compassion driving the Bill was in harmony with Christian tradition. The Earl of Listowel in 
support of the Bill concisely argued 
…the cardinal point of Christian ethic has been the exercise of charity. Any Bill that 
would extend this principle of charity, of pity and compassion is surely one that is in 
harmony with the main body of the Christian tradition (col 501).  
 
The 1936 Bill did acknowledge the responsibility of “[t]he person desiring to receive 
euthanasia” in making the initial application and this suggested a notion of individuals acting 
with agency and on the basis of their own rational free will. However, concepts of individual 
liberty, personal autonomy and human dignity to determine end of life decision-making were 
not discussed explicitly in the debate. Reflecting the social context at this time, the relationship 
between the doctor and incurable patient was typically authoritarian. The patient was subject 
to medical authority and a passive recipient of the wisdom of the attending doctor. There was 
only a singular reference to a conception of personal liberty in support of progress where it 
was suggested that  
[r]esulting from our natural habit of freedom of thought and discussion, considerable 
changes in standards of conduct, in the evaluation of morals and manners will evolve 
without prior or corresponding alterations in legal Statutes. I say this is all to the good 
(col 472). 
 
Taking into consideration that this debate was on a much smaller scale than later debates, (the 
transcript only spanned 50 columns) two comments directly made reference to rights. These 
contributions demonstrated some evidence of a traditional assumption of individual rights as 
legal entitlements. Proponents of the 1936 Bill articulated their aims from a legal positivist 
perspective on rights. The “right to demand” state assistance to die was justified through a 
compassionate and just desire to relieve suffering in the case of serious, incurable illness. This 
contribution sought   
…to obtain legal recognition for the principle that in case of advanced and inevitably 
fatal disease, attended by agony which reaches, or oversteps the boundaries of human 
endurance, the sufferer, after legal inquiry and after due observance of all safeguards, 
shall have the right to demand and be entitled to receive release (col 468). 
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There was no further elaboration or comment upon this articulation of rights suggesting that 
at this time the Lords were not familiar with rights discourses, or applying an understanding of 
rights, to debate complex ethical issues. The legalisation of voluntary euthanasia was also a 
new topic for debate.  
 
The second comment on rights was from the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury who expressed his 
concern that legal change may reduce the value accorded to all human life and encourage 
other individuals than those who are dying, to request a right to die, 
…if this Bill passed might a man not say: “The law has now expressly recognised that if 
a man finds the continuance of life intolerable and of no sort of value to him he may 
take steps to bring it to an end. I find that this shame or this sorrow which has come to 
me would make my life henceforth intolerable, deprive it of any sense of value, and 
therefore I claim the right to bring it to an end?” (col 487). 
This comment demonstrated respect for the law as an indicator of moral and normative 
standards. It also adopted a position on rights as legal claims, a perspective that is also 
identified through the arguments in the later debates.  
 
Critical summary 
With the exception of the two contributions above, the 1936 debate did not invoke rights 
discourses. Assisted death was grounded in compassion, and the relief of suffering regarded as 
an act of mercy. Opposition to the legalisation of assisting death was primarily from a religious 
perspective and a notion that the duty of doctors was to “cure not kill”. However, it was also 
shaped by the social context. At this time, the act or intention to commit suicide was illegal 
and had traditionally been associated with states of insanity or depravity. On this basis, 
suicides were denied a Church of England burial and their life insurance policy was declared 
void (Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936). This historic debate was the first time that 
assisting in the suicide or death of another, albeit incurable individuals, had arisen as a topic 
on the political agenda. 
 
Early in the 1936 debate, Lord Ponsonby suggested motivation for requesting an assisted 
death may be propagated by 
…the consciousness of being a burden, the despairing view that you yourself are no 
longer of any use, the prolonged anxiety of others of which the patient is aware,[this] 
may be as poignant as the suffering itself (col 469).  
119 
 
Ending life at a person’s own request as a well-contemplated, rational response to a state of 
incapacity or suffering based on a desire to relieve the burden of care on others was received 
at this time as a peculiar and original idea. The Suicide Act 1961 has since decriminalised the 
act of suicide, and this, in conjunction with social and cultural changes, has impacted attitudes 
towards dying so that attitudes and the discourses with which these attitudes are expressed, 
have shifted to define arguments differently in the more recent debates. 
 
Following defeat of the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill in 1936, the issue remained 
dormant on the political agenda. The Great British Government were occupied with the war in 
Europe and, in the post Second World War (WWII) period of austerity, their efforts were 
channelled into rebuilding the social and economic infrastructure and developing the welfare 
state. Voluntary euthanasia surfaced as an issue for debate in 1950, but the Bill was withdrawn 
before dividing the House. The 1950s were not a decade for moral reform, but after the 
Suicide Act was amended in 1961 and the law relaxed in regard to other personal liberties, 
including decriminalising homosexuality and permitting abortion in 1967, a new Bill was 
introduced to extend the remit of the Suicide Act 1961. This Voluntary Euthanasia Bill and 
debate in 1967 was unsuccessful. It largely centred upon medical practice and ethical 
arguments rather than rights discourses, and for this reason was not selected for analysis. 
 
6.2 Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill 2003 
The 2003 Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill was proposed as a Private Members Bill by Lord Joel 
Joffe, a former human rights lawyer and Labour peer. The Bill endeavoured to 
Enable a competent adult who is suffering unbearably as a result of a terminal or a 
serious and progressive physical illness to receive medical help to die at his own 
considered and persistent request (Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill 2003). 
These intentions mirror the 1936 Bill whereby medical help in one form or another is provided 
to end the life of a seriously ill person at their own request. Proposing similar criteria, the 
request for assisted death must be made by an individual who is incurable and suffering from, 
what is termed in this Bill, as an “irremediable condition” to include “a terminal or a serious 
physical illness” (Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill 2003). This Bill, in common with the 1936 Bill 
specifically sanctioned voluntary euthanasia under section 1(2) where it defined “’assisted 
dying’ means the attending physician, at the patient’s request either providing the patient with 
the means to end his life, or ending the patient’s life” [italics added] (Patient (Assisted Dying) 
Bill 2003). 
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This Bill also specified safeguarding procedures for requesting assisted death to include a 
written declaration witnessed by a solicitor and non-family member, who shall not inherit the 
person’s estate (Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill, section 3, 2003). All Bills support the requirement 
of mental competence in order to make an “informed decision” at the end of life. However, 
this is the only Bill that has highlighted the need to establish a monitoring commission. In the 
2003 Bill, the components of an informed decision were defined. These included time to 
reflect and reach carefully considered choices based on interaction with “the attending 
physician” and sharing of information. Although the choices available were still defined within 
a medical model of care, this indicated the emergence of a concept of personal liberty with the 
dying person making an autonomous decision on the end of life rather than making choices 
based solely on preference. It was necessarily 
…based on an appreciation of the relevant facts and after being fully informed by the 
attending physician of (a) his medical diagnosis; (b) his prognosis; (c) the process and 
probable consequences of being allowed assistance to die; (d) the alternatives, 
including but not limited to, palliative care, care in a hospice and the control of pain 
(section 1(2) Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill 2003). 
 
6.2.1 The 2003 debate 
The wording of the 1936 and 2003 Bills is not too dissimilar. They were motivated by the same 
intentions, but analysis of the debates reveals a very different picture. Historically, the concept 
of individual liberty, and dignity understood from a human rights perspective, did not feature 
in an end of life context. The timing of death was determined by a sovereign God subject to 
nature or the dictates of the medical profession which determined the best interests of the 
patient. By 2003, the terms of the debate had demonstrably shifted and the issue of assisted 
death was developing from a medicalised dilemma that balanced compassion with the role of 
doctors, to a politicised dilemma. This politicised perspective was defined through concepts of 
rights articulated implicitly and, on occasion, explicitly to advance arguments for self-
determination in an end of life context. In the 2003 debate, arguments in support of a right to 
die prioritised autonomous decision-making, citing respect for individual liberty rights, not only 
in life, but also in death. However, this was weighed against the responsibility of the state to 
protect the rights of wider society. In this section, key arguments both for and against assisted 
death in the 2003 debate are discussed. The prevalence of arguments that invoke rights 
discourses intentionally, or otherwise, is greatly increased compared to the minimal incidence 
in 1936 suggesting that this was the terrain upon which the issue was beginning to be debated. 
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Liberty 
Lord Joffe introduced this Bill for debate by foregrounding a conception of individual liberty as 
a basis to determine the timing of death. He argued  
The Bill seeks to achieve that purpose by changing the law so as to add to the freedom 
that patients already have to commit suicide or to refuse medical treatment which 
could save their lives, the freedom to ask a doctor to bring their suffering to an end by 
assisting them to die at a time of their choosing (col 1586). 
Lord Joffe’s attempt to expand the remit of fundamental freedoms was closely aligned with 
the current provision in law and healthcare policy that permits suicide and allows refusal of 
treatment or medical intervention by rational adults. This tactical move highlighted that law 
and policy already respects personal freedoms suggesting that the proposals in this Bill would 
only serve to extend the existing provision.  
 
Lord Joffe, as a former human rights lawyer, used familiar language when he summarised the 
case for a change in law as “based on personal autonomy-the right of each individual to decide 
for himself or herself how best he or she should lead their lives” (col 1587). In the 2003 
debate, an understanding of human rights underpinned by a concept of individual liberty starts 
to emerge. A fundamental right for individuals to decide matters of life and death in 
accordance with their bodily integrity is reflective of a natural law position on rights that 
grounds an inherent notion of human freedom. This is illustrated by way of the contribution 
from Baroness Jay, “issues of human rights and the role of individual autonomy in making 
decisions is fundamental. My view today is that the individual human right to choose should be 
paramount” (col 1604). The importance of individual liberty in regard to establishing human 
rights is emphasised. The “right to choose”, however, is not a legally recognised term. Instead 
it is derived from contemporary interpretations of individual liberty that promote human 
agency and in an end of life context, the right to choose is applied to making decisions that 
reflect one’s own values and convictions.   
 
Lord Gray (col 1649) acknowledged the constructed nature of a right to choose “[t]he right to 
choose” is an expression used loosely in many campaigns, but surely the right to choose to end 
the suffering caused by terminal illness is the greatest of all rights”. This argument initially 
appeared derogatory and less valued on the basis that a right to choose was utilised solely for 
the purposes of campaign rhetoric, and only “loosely” at that. However, his support for a right 
to choose was lent gravitas by emphasising the potential suffering and finality of the dying 
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process. The enormity and distress of suffering in dying elevated the importance of personal 
choice to “the greatest of all rights”. 
 
An understanding of rights grounded in personal liberty was at the forefront of arguments that 
supported legalising an assisted death. However, not all members prioritised, or accepted, a 
concept of personal liberty or the possibility of extending the boundaries of existing liberty 
rights to determine the dying process. Typical contributions that articulated this sentiment, 
and in doing so used an understanding of rights to negate or dispute assisted death, included 
the following: 
…autonomy is one of the buzz words of the pro-euthanasia lobby…[H]owever, 
autonomy is not an absolute right that each of us, as individuals can exercise while 
living in our own little bubbles (col 1617). 
I do not doubt that personal autonomy is a moral good, but that it is not the only 
determinant of what constitutes our human meaning and purpose. My human 
meaning and purpose consists not only in exercising individual choice-but like all 
human beings I have to do that in a social context (col 1652). 
Autonomy is not an absolute right, liberty rights are qualified in national and international law 
by reference to public health, safety, and morals as discussed in section 3.2.1. In addition, 
these comments noted the relational aspect of autonomy that necessitates consideration of 
other members of a community and should not be detrimental to others.  The state has a duty 
to balance individual liberty against a responsibility to safeguard the well-being of all its 
citizens and, on this basis, the right to an assisted death could be rejected.  
 
Some members of the Lords were aware that autonomous action in cases of requesting an 
assisted death is complicated by the necessity of a third party to carry out the procedure. Lord 
Brennan, as one example, observed the limitations of the 2003 Bill, “the Bill, while proclaiming 
personal autonomy is able to achieve its objective only by involving a third party-a doctor-to 
enable that personal autonomy to achieve the effect of its holder” (col 1610). The notion that 
individuals have a right to seek assistance from a third party to help determine the manner 
and timing of their death, extends the boundaries of personal liberty in end of life decision-
making, but the absence of a third party acting in their capacity as a duty bearer could impede 
the possibility of an assisted death. The role of doctors was not the focus for this debate but 
their reluctance to act as duty bearers was commented upon,  
…[t]he most recent poll of doctors, carried out on 13th May this year, established that 
almost three out of four doctors-some 74 per cent- would refuse to perform assisted 
suicide if it were legalised (col 1615).  
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State responsibility 
Many of the Lords have legal backgrounds or long experience of sitting as representatives of 
one of the UK political institutions. On this basis, it is naturally expected that they would 
prioritise and sanction state responsibility to protect the interests of UK citizens and provide a 
normative framework to facilitate their well-being. Lord Plant’s contribution illustrated a 
contemporary understanding of legal rights, 
In the western tradition of legal and political thought, rights are usually thought to be 
assigned in terms of either protecting the choice or autonomy of the right-holder or 
protecting the vital interest of such a person (col 1620). 
Opponents to the Bill also referred to the role of the state as in this typical example, 
…the House has a duty to uphold the principle that the state has a duty to protect all 
of its citizens. There should be no concession from this House or indeed from any 
other place to those who advocate removing the right to life or the state’s duty to 
protect human life (col 1629). 
These comments highlighted state responsibility that reflects a utilitarian perspective of law-
making and prioritises protecting citizens from harm.  One of the key dilemmas in the debate 
refers to the role of the state in balancing the liberty rights of individuals as the right-holder 
against protecting the rights of the rest of society. There is great discussion in the 2003 debate 
over whose vital interests to protect. Maintaining prohibition on assisted death causes harm to 
those who are suffering unbearably and are denied assistance to die but a change in law could 
cause potential repercussions in wider society. The argument of Lord McColl against the Bill is 
indicative of the general concerns, 
It is the job of government to protect the weak, the vulnerable, the elderly and the 
dying…no matter how carefully the bill was worded, it would prove impossible to 
prevent intolerable pressure, either real or believed to be real, being put on elderly 
people to embrace euthanasia to reduce a family, financial or nursing problem (col 
1679). 
This perspective was echoed by supporting sentiments from other members concerned with 
“family pressures of one kind or another to be exerted on the vulnerable” (col 1658) and the 
idea that “[m]any disabled people throughout the country feel threatened by the Bill” (col 
1634). The role of government is to protect citizens, especially “the vulnerable, the elderly and 
the dying”, but this could apply equally to both sides of the argument when the best interests 
of a dying patient are considered. 
 
A UK approach to law-making promotes the common good of society revolving around 
majority preferences to arrive at legally binding decisions at the expense of individual liberty. 
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One of the main concerns expressed in opposition to the legalisation of assisted death that 
features in all debates and is articulated above, centres on the potential for abuse.  Opponents 
to assisted death argue that mentally incompetent individuals or vulnerable/ frail elderly 
adults would be disadvantaged and subjected to assisted death without consent. This slippery 
slope would result in non-voluntary euthanasia extended to other members of society other 
than those proposed in the initial Bill. Members’ opposition to the Bill that speculates on the 
views of disabled, vulnerable and elderly people suggest concern for infringement upon their 
liberty and decision-making ability. However, against this concern, safeguarding criteria 
proposed in the 2003, and indeed all Bills, cite the requirement of mental competence 
evaluated by two independent assessors and it would be derogatory to suggest that particular 
groups of individuals, namely the elderly and physically disabled, may be less mentally 
competent. 
 
Right to life 
Approximately half of the contributions in the 2003 debate are underpinned or associated with 
rights discourses, primarily through the notion of individual liberty but also including human 
dignity. This gives some indication that a utilitarian approach to law-making is being impacted 
by emphasis on, and use of, rights discourses. However, this has gone largely unremarked. 
Explicit reference to rights as in a right to something occurred seldom and there was minimal 
expression of assisted death specifically articulated as a right to die suggesting that this had 
not yet become a commonplace term used in the Lords, or a term chosen by members to 
define the debate. Where rights were discussed explicitly, they focused on a right to choose or 
on the scope and nature of human rights principles, primarily the nature of the right to life. 
The right to life is central to the debate on assisted dying. It defines state responsibility and, as 
a positive liberty right, denotes an obligation towards all citizens on behalf of the state. In a 
liberal, democratic society the right to life is presumed to extend to the right not to be killed 
unlawfully and to include steps to safeguard the lives of citizens including the vulnerable who 
may potentially be affected by a change in law. The following comment noted the conflicting 
role of rights,  
 …rights protect basic interests, and one of these is life. The issue then arises of who is 
to determine these basic interests. Is it the person who has the interest or are they to 
be defined by others? (col 1620). 
Ambiguity over who should determine “these basic interests” questions the extent of personal 
liberty, human agency and capacity for autonomous decision-making. The right to an assisted 
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death is based on rational, self-assessment of the quality and value of one’s own life and the 
freely made request to end it.  
Lord Lester (col 1596) noted the discordance between current law, policy and medical practice 
in his call for clarity over the scope of the right to life. He approached the notion of rights from 
a legal perspective and critiqued the absence of reasonable legal certainty, 
Patients have the right to life. They also have the right to personal autonomy and to 
live and die with dignity. They and their doctors need to know what exception there is 
to the law of homicide, enabling a doctor, acting in accordance with the patients’ 
wishes and the doctor’s judgement as to the appropriate medical treatment, to 
administer that treatment even though it is virtually certain that it will hasten the 
patients’ death. Unless the criminal law and good medical practice are clear, 
conscientious doctors, seeking to act in the best interests of their patients, are left in a 
state of uncertainty, as are their patients (col 1596).  
The right to life was identified here as separate from the right to personal autonomy and the 
right to die with dignity. The reason for these distinctions may be purely emphatic effect, but 
distinguishing between these concepts, each expressed as rights, presents a contrast to the 
legal appeals of Pretty and Nicklinson considered in the previous chapter. In common, rights 
discourses emphasising autonomy and dignity, are applied for the purpose of extending the 
scope of an existing right to life. But in this case, the intent is to gain clarity over how, with 
respect for autonomy and dignity, the doctor may avoid breaching the right to life compared 
to the case of Pretty that used a notion of autonomy to propose that individuals could decide 
to waive the right to life. 
 
Human dignity 
Rights discourses were used in the 2003 Bill as a basis to critique the current law. It was 
suggested that maintaining prohibition on assisted suicide 
…results in grievous, prolonged and unnecessary suffering to a significant number of 
patients who are denied the right to remain in control of their lives until their death, 
and the right as they see it to die with dignity (col 1586). 
The experience of a dignified death was first suggested and articulated in the 2003 debate as a 
right to die with dignity. This is a significant finding. It has implications for the terms of the 
debate both within legal, political, social and medical spheres where the concept of dying with 
dignity is prioritised as desirable. The following contributions expressed the universal and 
aspirational nature of dignity  
Few people would argue against the view that they want to be able to die in a humane 
and dignified manner and above all free from pain (col 1636). 
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Dignity in death is something to which everyone is entitled, but there is precious little 
dignity in having to continue to suffer the pain, mental agony and the indignity of the 
loss of control of one’s bodily function, sometimes for a period of months or even 
years (col 1649). 
And the example from Lord Laing when he spoke of dying with dignity, 
Which of us in the Chamber, if blind, deaf, incontinent and enfeebled in mind, would 
not prefer to be given the choice to say enough is enough and a doctor or nurse to do 
the necessary for a quick and painless death (col 1638). 
Despite an assumed common desire for a dignified death, the concept of dignity was only 
articulated explicitly on a few occasions. In these contributions, dignity was mentioned in 
support of an assisted death though not explicitly expressed as a right. Instead, dignity, or the 
potential loss of dignity, was directly linked with respect for personal choice and the symptoms 
of serious illness that can cause great personal suffering.  
 
An important argument, and yet one that was made on only a single occasion in the 2003 
debate by Baroness Greengross (and one that she elaborated upon in 2014), referred to the 
right not to be discriminated against. Her argument in relation to a dignified death suggested 
that while able-bodied individuals had the capacity to take their own lives, the quest for 
dignity in dying may be limited by a physical state of deterioration or inability to end one’s own 
life when that life becomes unbearable. The right not to be discriminated against on the 
grounds of disability is protected through Article 14 of the ECHR 1950 and this critique of the 
current law mirrored that of Tony Nicklinson (and one that was alluded to by Diane Pretty) 
whose contribution to the 2011 Commission on Assisted Dying was referred to in this 2003 
debate. Nicklinson was quoted to say 
If…I want to end my life because I am terminally ill and I want to end it with dignity in 
the way I feel most appropriate, then if I am able to walk, move and reach those drugs, 
I can do it. If I am so disabled by my illness and I cannot reach those drugs then I 
cannot end my life. That is discrimination against disabled people that none of us 
should tolerate (col 1651).  
 
Critical summary 
Analysis of the data demonstrated similarities and differences between the 1936 and 2003 
debates. In common, members respected the inalienable and universal value of human life 
that was emphasized by a significant number of contributions both from secular and religious 
perspectives. A religious perspective on the sanctity of life was based upon traditional 
understandings of Judaeo-Christian morality. This was described in the following comment 
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…the deliberate taking of human life has been forbidden for centuries and is enshrined 
for Christians in the sixth commandment “Thou shalt not kill”…it forms an essential 
part of our legal system and of our way of life. To remove it would risk damaging the 
entire fabric of society (House of Lords, 2003 col 1665). 
However, a religious position on end of life was not always identified as incompatible with 
assisted death. Members who supported proposals in the Bill and identified with having 
religious beliefs, both in 1936 and 2003, articulated their principles for supporting a change in 
law as grounded in the value of compassion. For example, Baroness Richardson, as a Christian 
questioned “[how] can we in the name of our Christian conviction deny the final mercy of 
shortening the process of dying of a life that has become utterly wearisome and distasteful?” 
(House of Lords, 2003, col 1628). 
 
In contrast to 1936, analysis of the 2003 debate revealed that arguments have evolved to 
invoke human rights discourses at the end of life, generally moving away from compassion 
towards individual liberty to argue for self-determination over the manner and timing of 
death. Reasons for this are multi-factorial, some of which were expressed through this 
contribution 
Partly because of the changes and improvements in medical practice that have 
occurred; partly because of the longer experience that we now have of assisted dying 
in other countries; and partly-and I think most importantly- because in our own society 
we have strengthened and statutorily codified our understanding of individual human 
rights (House of Lords, 2003 col 1603). 
Numerous international human rights mechanisms currently offer protection for rights and 
these principles are enshrined on a national level through the HRA 1998, which has brought a 
concept of rights into the political arena and made this an accessible discourse with which to 
deliberate the issue of assisted death that was not available in 1936. Alongside social and 
economic changes, the political landscape has shifted in regard to human rights. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948) was drafted in the wake of WWII to represent a 
new era and revival of human rights. This drafting process was justified by the experience of 
the Holocaust rather than philosophical underpinning and epistemological preference in the 
merits of God, nature or reason for defending its values (Morsink, 1993). Other international 
human rights mechanisms have since developed that encompass not only civil and political 
rights but also economic, social and cultural rights to afford protection for the rights and 
freedoms of vulnerable individuals or groups of individuals. The proliferation of international 
and national human rights instruments has provided a new opportunity and language 
structure with which to debate complex, contemporary issues. 
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Following the 2003 debate, there was an intense period that focused on end of life provision 
and the role of palliative care services. Bills were proposed, once again, by Lord Joffe and 
assisted death was debated in the House of Lords in 2004 and 2006. In 2006, the debate 
largely discussed palliative care provision and for this reason is not analysed in-depth here. 
From 2006, the issue of assisted death became increasingly visible and discussed in the public 
sphere. The newly renamed organisation Dignity in Dying (formerly the Voluntary Euthanasia 
Society) increased their campaign efforts and, through close collaboration with Lord Falconer, 
the Assisted Dying Bill 2014 was proposed. 
 
6.3 Assisted Dying Bill 2014 
The Assisted Dying Bill 2014 was brought forward by Lord Falconer with the proposal to 
“[e]nable competent adults who are terminally ill to be provided at their request with specified 
assistance to end their own life” (Assisted Dying Bill 2014). Prior to this Bill, in 2010, the 
Commission on Assisted Dying (hereinafter The Commission) was established to consider 
whether the current law on assisted suicide in England and Wales was fit for purpose. Unlike 
the House of Lords Select Committees, this was not a Parliamentary instigated commission.57 It 
was chaired by Lord Falconer after being set up by the British think tank Demos, who 
responded to a privately funded tender from the late Terry Pratchett and Bernard Lewis; a 
relationship brokered by Dignity in Dying (Commission on Assisted Dying, 2012). The scope of 
the Commission included: 
…a public call for evidence which received over 1,200 responses from practitioners, 
professional bodies and members of the public; six public evidence meetings to gather 
oral evidence from experts and individuals with relevant experience; international 
research visits to four jurisdictions in which some form of assisted dying is legally 
permitted; original research on the relationship between suicide and serious physical 
illness and into attitudes on assisted dying among people from ‘vulnerable groups’; 
and commissioned research on the effectiveness of legal safeguards, and the quality of 
palliative care, in jurisdictions that permit some form of assisted dying (Commission on 
Assisted Dying, 2012). 
  
                                                          
57
The credibility of the Commission was also referred to by Lord Justice Toulson in the Nicklinson 
judgement,  
…it is important to stress that it was not an officially appointed commission. Its report contains 
an interesting analysis of arguments and views, but it would not be right for the court to treat it 
as having some form of official or quasi-official status (Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012] 
EWHC 2381). 
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The Commission published their report in January 2012 unanimously proclaiming the current 
legal status on assisted suicide in England and Wales to be “inadequate and incoherent” and 
suggested an alternative provision that was used to inform the content of the Assisted Dying 
Bill 2014 (Commission on Assisted Dying, 2012). Lord Falconer as Chair of the Commission 
emphasised a claim to neutrality through not inviting members identified as having a 
principled stance on the issue of assisted dying (Commission on Assisted Dying, 2012), but 
there were accusations of bias and lack of transparency by those opposing assisted death 
including the Care Not Killing alliance and the Church of England General Synod. In the 
introduction to the Assisted Dying Bill 2014, the words of Lord Falconer mirrored those used by 
Dignity in Dying in their campaign to legalise assisted death claiming “those who are terminally 
ill should have choice over where they die” and legal change “would lead not to more deaths, 
but to less suffering”. The nature of the relationship between Dignity in Dying as a 
campaigning organisation and their ability to influence political collaborators and to define the 
issue on the political agenda is an interesting research focus and one that is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 
6.3.1 The 2014 debate 
In comparison to the 2003 debate that occasionally articulated rights discourses explicitly as 
the right to choose, or through discussion of the scope of an already established right to life, 
the depth of arguments in the 2014 debate have been strengthened and advanced by what 
appear to be a richer and more widely recognised, used and developed notion of rights. 
Influenced by high profile legal cases, extensive media involvement and vociferous activities of 
campaigning organisations, the debate was gaining momentum and public sentiment appears 
to have shifted more in favour of increased choice to determine end of life. This change was 
reflected in the 2014 debate. Arguments were primarily grounded in individual liberty to 
underpin and enhance the value of personal autonomy in regard to end of life decision-
making. In addition, deliberation of specific rights including the right to life, the right not to be 
tortured or subject to inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right not to be discriminated 
against were also raised in the 2014 debate. Analysis of the contributions revealed a division 
between strong personal convictions highlighting rights as individual freedoms, weighed 
against concern for the safeguarding provisions of the Bill with regard to the impact of legal 
change upon other members of the community.  
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One new theme emerged to dominate the content of this debate. There were many moving 
references to personal experiences of severe and chronic illness or loved one’s dying by the 
Lords themselves or through letters received from the public. Personal opinion was coded as a 
category for analysis independent of rights discourses. However, a large number of these 
personal appeals focused on motivating members to consider the dilemma in terms of rights.58 
These contributions through their emphasis on aspects of rights including human dignity and 
the experience of unbearable suffering, did serve to strengthen the arguments made by some 
members of the Lords for respecting individual liberty in the end of life decision-making 
process. 
 
Rights 
In contrast to previous debates, analysis of the 2014 debate revealed that member 
contributions seemed accustomed to the concept of human rights and naturally articulated 
their arguments in terms of rights. It was clear that rights discourses had become familiar 
language with which to debate the end of life. A number of contributions elevated the ethical 
status of assisted death by positioning the right to die alongside other rights and fundamental 
freedoms recognised in a liberal, democratic society. Baroness Blackstone, for example, by way 
of supporting her arguments for a right to die, aligned it with other legally recognised rights 
reflecting the current social context. She claimed 
We live in a society that promotes individual autonomy and values allowing its 
members to choose how they spend their lives. We value freedom of speech, of 
association and of movement. We value tolerance and allowing people to make their 
own choices even if we wish to make different choices. The same freedom of choice 
that applies to how we live should also apply to how we die. If we respect human 
rights, we should not deny those who know they are dying the right to bring their lives 
to a more rapid end to alleviate their misery (col 804). 
In this comment, rights are understood to involve human freedoms and this is extended to the 
prospect of achieving a more dignified death. Rights were used interchangeably in the 2014 
                                                          
58 As part of the 2014 campaign initiative, Dignity in Dying, supporters were encouraged to lobby peers 
for a change in the law and such a high level of public sentiment may have prompted the Lords to 
deliberate the issue more seriously. During the debate, many Lords read out extracts from letters they 
received from the public reflecting upon their tragic and distressing experiences. Lord Philips 
commented 
…all of us have had extraordinarily moving letters- not Cyclostyle letters with just a name at the 
beginning and a name at the end, but very particular, individual and moving letters. I am sure 
they have moved all of us and given us more wisdom and determination to scrutinise this bill in 
subsequent readings to make sure that if it goes through, it goes through in the best possible 
form (House of Lords, 2014 col 879). 
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debate. There was evidence of fluidity in conceptions of rights that, at times, included 
grounding rights both in a foundational and anti-foundational understanding. In the example 
below, rights were articulated in connection with their legal status, a right to make up ones’ 
own mind and a right to die in peace were formulated in the context of legally recognised 
rights 
The right to die in peace is surely a personal choice that should be upheld and 
recognised in law. It is wrong that a person should be forced to endure great suffering 
because of the genuinely held strong views of others. We live in a democracy where 
citizens have the right in personal matters to make up their own minds and to act 
accordingly. Society should respect and protect the right to choose how you wish to 
die in the same way we respect other important personal freedoms (col 882).  
 
The following excerpts demonstrate that even when presenting arguments against the 
legalisation of assisted death, rights discourses were adopted. In effect, the language of rights 
is now informing both sides of the debate. The egoistic nature of rights was criticised and the 
extent of individual liberty rights questioned in regard to whether protection of individual 
rights, or the rights of a small group of terminally ill individuals, should be at the cost of the 
rights of other members in society. The contributions below are indicative of this sentiment 
…law is about more than a small group of individuals’ rights against the state. Herein 
lies the main weakness of our human rights law; it fails to take into account the rights 
of the rest of society (col 898). 
Much has been said about autonomy in this debate- about our right to take decisions 
about our lives. But all too often it ignores the reality that what we do or omit to do 
affects others… The reality is that all of us are part of a wider society. What we say or 
do affects others. Importantly our attitudes and decisions are influenced by those 
around us (col 869). 
 
Members who did not support a change in law also argued in terms of rights to refute the right 
to an assisted death, rather than selecting alternative discourses of compassion or need. Lord 
Shipley (col 858) considered the principles of an individual right to request assisted death. This 
would be his own choice, but as a law-maker he felt duty bound to consider the well-being of 
others, 
…in principle I believe individuals have a human right to exercise their own choice to 
end their own suffering. It is a right that I would like for myself to be taken with my 
family. But that right for me does not mean that it must transcend the human rights of 
others to safety and security under the law. No person should feel threatened by any 
change in law (col 858).  
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Opposition to a right to die, throughout all debates, was generally informed by the potential 
consequences of legal change and the difficultly in democratic society of balancing the rights 
of individuals without impinging on the rights of others. In 2014 this dilemma was the main 
focus of both sides of the arguments in the debate. While earlier debates articulated this as 
regard for the safety or well-being of others, in 2014 this was typically articulated through 
rights discourses. This is an important finding that clearly demonstrated the extent to which 
rights have come to dominate the issue of assisted death. Analysis of the data suggests, on this 
issue at least, a potential move from law determined by utilitarian tradition to one that is 
determined by rights.  
 
Arguments in the 2014 debate recognised the complexity of the assisted dying dilemma in regard 
to the interpretation and scope of other rights. In general, the contributions illustrated an 
awareness of rights recognised in legal mechanisms. In contrast to the earlier debates, there 
appeared to be a willingness to deliberate the appropriation of these rights and apply them in an 
end of life context. As one example, the ambiguous nature of the right to life, as posited by the 
appeal of Pretty in the previous chapter was addressed by Lord Judd 
 …if you believe in the right to life and that it must be protected at all costs, you cannot 
dodge the secondary question of what life is. If a person has reached the stage at which 
they say “What I am going through and experiencing cannot be described as life as I 
understand it” how can those of us who believe in life, if it is to have any sense, meaning 
or fulfilment, possibly reject that request? (col 884).  
Baroness Tonge, drew upon another right claimed by Pretty in her application to suggest 
extending the boundary of an existing right to protect the dignity of severely disabled and 
chronically ill individuals, who “are in the words of Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment. Should we allow 
this?” (col 822). 
 
In this 2014 debate, the concept of dignity was referred to implicitly as a component of human 
rights principles and on occasion, in relation to impingement upon other rights. Lord Falconer 
was one of the few members who specifically articulated the importance of dignity and argued 
that individuals who request assistance to die are often not motivated by pain “but the loss of 
independence and dignity” (col 775). Denial of a dignified death on the grounds of physical 
disability preventing an individual to commit suicide is directly linked to rights through 
violation of the right not to be discriminated against.  Baroness Greengross reiterated this 
point made in the earlier 2003 debate as she aligned her argument with the current legal 
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provision under the Suicide Act 1961, which permits people to commit suicide, but, in the case 
of physical incapacity, this right is restricted. She claimed 
 …the Bill is not a case of giving someone a new right. It is just the opposite. Without it 
at its most basic we are going to deny certain people who are terminally ill and have 
become disabled the right that every other adult has in this country: the right to 
terminate their life (col 786). 
There were, on a very small number of occasions, Members who completely rejected a 
concept of rights as applied to the debate. The comment by Lord Tebbit is particularly clear  
We have to be careful of the words we use. I noticed that the noble Baroness Lady 
Greengross referred several times to the “right” that we all have to take our own lives. 
We do not have that right; we have only the capacity to do it (col 788). 
 Lord Tebbit’s critique was dismissive of the so-called right to end one’s own life and replaced 
this with the notion of capacity, offering an alternative foundation for understanding end of 
life issues not articulated as rights. His contribution did not expand upon this position but 
personal views may be shaped by individual backgrounds and values that can be indicative of 
an orientation towards rights in general or the right to die in particular.59 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, considering the advanced age of many of the Lords, the adoption and use of 
rights discourses which is increasingly indicative of a contemporary approach to complex 
dilemmas, was, on occasion, prey to disregard. Lord Maginnis was also one of a minority who 
explicitly criticised a human rights approach through the fashion “systematically to discard 
every accepted rule for living in a civilized society and to replace them with a collective of 
legislation allegedly designed to promote human rights” (col 1644).  
 
Other comments did not completely reject concepts grounded in rights discourses but 
remained sceptical of a notion of rights that encompassed unrestricted liberty. This was 
expressed from both secular and religious perspectives. Traditionally, a religious perspective 
prioritised the will of a sovereign God over individual choice to determine matters of life and 
death, but there were also secular critics of an idealised notion of choice, 
I know that choice is the great aim of our age- choice in all things, as though we were 
all shopping. But who gets the choices? How many people in our communities have 
real choice? The issue of choice is a snare and a lure…Our society is becoming a harder 
                                                          
59
 In the run up to the 2014 debate, Dignity in Dying compiled a list of peers for their members to lobby 
based on their specified or supposed (through previous voting history) positions on assisted dying. The 
results are located in table format in Appendix 3 and demonstrate that 112 Conservative peers 
compared with 61 Labour and 24 Liberal Democrats were opposed to the Bill. Political allegiance that 
defines positions on assisted death and perspectives on understanding rights at the end of life is an 
unexplored and potentially interesting focus for further study.  
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place-harder on the elderly, the young, offenders, the unemployed and the poor. 
Society is full of people who have very few choices (col 874). 
This observation was raised in section 2.2.3 questioning the true extent of choice in end of life 
care and in the previous chapter where law and policy curtails freedom of choice in permitting 
third party assistance to die. Under current UK law and policy, and common to proposals in 
this Bill and the preceding Bills “people who have very few choices” include those who are not 
deemed mentally competent to request or refuse medical treatment, those under 18 years old 
and those who cannot communicate their wishes. 
 
Analysis of the 2014 debate revealed less opposition on the basis of religious arguments than 
in previous debates, perhaps reflecting the generalised trend of declining religiosity in England 
and Wales or the expanding remit of individual liberty regarding personal freedoms in 
contemporary society. Referring to the personal letters received prior to the debate, reasons 
suggested for an apparent increase in support for assisted death were postulated 
I felt that the arguments in the letters represented a big shift in thinking away from 
deference towards professionals such as doctors and politicians, and maybe even the 
church, and towards a stronger belief that individuals with their families should be 
able to exercise greater control over their own lives. There is an increasing reluctance 
to let others decide our fate (col 868). 
This “deference towards professionals” has been challenged by an increase in healthcare 
consumerism and alternatives to the medical model, supported by increasingly individual 
negotiation of lifestyle choices and an awareness of rights in relation to healthcare that is 
grounded in respect for personal liberty and dignity. A “stronger belief” in individual control 
over our own lives outside of the legal and medical domain may be perpetuated by what 
Turner coined the “precariousness of social institutions” when he argued that technology and 
social modernity have changed the circumstances of human ontology and modern life is now 
subject to a range of diverse threats and challenges (Turner, 1993:502). At the end of life 
especially, human beings are vulnerable. The dying body is subject to protection or 
exploitation by institutionalised or legal rights and practice. The desire to self-determine the 
dying process grounded in the right to individual liberty may be a reflection of the evolving 
relationship between contemporary society and social institutions. 
 
The 2014 debate was notable in that an increased number of faith leaders, and others who 
expressed their faith willingly, vocalised their support for assisted dying. There are 26 Bishops 
in the House of Lords that form the Lords Spiritual. These Bishops provide an important 
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independent voice and spiritual insight to the work of the Upper House and postulate that 
they seek to be a voice for all people of faith, not just Christians (Church of England, 2014). 
Assisted dying is a contentious issue that challenges traditional religious doctrine and the 2014 
debate observed this growing division within the Church of England, 
The church seems divided on this issue and rightly talks of the sanctity of life. There 
could be no greater subscriber to the sanctity of life than me, but surely part of that 
sanctity is constituted by-how can I put this?-a sacred stillness, a dignity, a precious 
humanity that is undone by rendering a dying human being into a screaming animal, a 
shadow of their former and real self, utterly deprived of the inalienable right of 
personal autonomy (col 872). 
This position was shared by other members from both a religious and secular basis, not only 
respecting the sanctity of life, but also supporting the sanctity of life through the realisation of 
an assisted death. In common, they emphasised respect for the inherent and universal dignity 
and liberty of the dying individual to determine when their life has become unbearable. This 
was an interesting development in the debate. Assisted death was not articulated as mercy 
killing. Instead a religious conception of the sanctity of life was challenged by an understanding 
of rights that grounded moral claims through a secular desire to relieve suffering and to 
respect individual autonomy. 
 
Perhaps the most spectacular revelation was made by the former Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Lord Carey, who was interviewed for the Daily Mail60 a few days prior to this debate initiating 
the front page headline “Carey: I’ve changed my mind on right to die” (Daily Mail, 11th July, 
2014:1). Lord Carey defended the opinion expressed in this article during the debate asking  
…how can I really repent of a decision that I believe more closely models and reflects 
God’s mercy and love...When suffering is so great that some patients, already knowing 
that they are at the end of life, make repeated pleas to die, it seems a denial of that 
loving compassion which is the hallmark of Christianity to refuse to allow them to fulfil 
their own clearly stated request…If we truly love our neighbours as ourselves, how can 
we deny them the death that we would wish for ourselves in such a condition (col 
847).  
The argument is not explicitly grounded in rights but refers to compassion (one of the few 
occasions where compassion surfaces in this debate). Compassion is, however, linked with the 
denial of individual liberty and used to support an assisted death through respect for the 
wishes of the dying to end a life of suffering. In relation to his own background, Lord Carey 
associated the notion of compassion with a Christian perspective; a different basis than rights, 
                                                          
60
In the few weeks prior to the 2014 debate, the Daily Mail newspaper ran a series of articles quoting 
support from high profile individuals in favour of a right to die, including some who had quite 
dramatically reversed their opinion on the issue. 
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but at the same time acknowledged individuals as having the capability or potential to want 
reasonably to determine the timing of their death under intolerable conditions. As a former 
Archbishop, the contribution of Lord Carey is especially significant and influential in that he 
disputed the religious arguments against assisted death and claimed that prohibiting 
assistance to die in cases of unbearable suffering was not indicative of a merciful and loving 
God.61 
 
Personal experience 
In 2014, a new topic was introduced that came to dominate the debate; the Lords own 
experiences of illness and disability or the deaths of loved ones. This was particularly 
interesting because the sharing of such personal circumstances had not previously featured in 
the debates and was now openly being discussed in a major political institution. Some read out 
postbag letters, others referred to their own experiences. It demonstrated the extent to which 
this topic has permeated the public and political consciousness. Although these contributions 
were not always argued or contemplated using rights discourses explicitly, the nature and 
degree of suffering at the end of life was often described in detail. It was suggested that a 
distressing or bad death was defined by an unbearable experience of suffering and lack of 
dignity. This implied an understanding of suffering as a human rights issue through the link 
with dignity and indignity. Examples included:  
…in the end she was in a hospital bed begging for help. She was in agony. I too, begged 
for help; I ran around the hospital trying to find a medic that would do something. But 
they argued that she was getting as much morphine as they dared to give her, that any 
more would be illegal and that they could not help (col823). 
My mother and mother-in-law both had long drawn out deaths, which in the case of 
my mother-in-law was accompanied by great suffering. In the end both took the only 
way out that they could by starving themselves to death (col 836). 
 
Some members did derive their position in the debate from their own experiences defining 
this through rights,  
                                                          
61 His position caused outrage among the Church of England, but the views of Lord Carey were not easily 
dismissed. Elaborating upon remarks made in House of Lords during the 2014 Assisted Dying Bill, he 
later reaffirmed his stance ahead of the 2015 House of Commons Bill arguing 
There is nothing noble about excruciating pain and I think we need as a nation to give people 
the right to decide their own fate…And in my view it is a profoundly Christian and moral thing 
to devise a law that enables people, if they so choose, to end their lives with dignity. (The 
Telegraph 12
th
 August, 2015) [online]). 
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I can see no reason at all for denying individuals the right to manage their own 
imminent, irreversible and prospectively painful, wretched or deeply distressing death-
in their own interests and in the interests of loved ones they will shortly leave behind 
(col 803). 
Analysis of personal stories described in the 2014 debate suggested that the experience of 
suffering is increasingly being drawn into the end of life debate and articulated as part of a 
rights discourse through the association with concepts of choice and dignity, or, in some cases, 
an undignified death. Human suffering, as expressed through the personal letters, highlights 
the vulnerability of the body. In the dying process, all individuals face an unknown amount, 
intensity, and manifestation of suffering and this experience renders them frail. The 
phenomenological experience of suffering and the aspiration of a dignified death appeared to 
justify the concept of rights in an end of life context for some members of the Lords.  
 
Critical summary 
The 2014 debate was on a grand scale. One hundred and thirty three members of the Lords 
spoke and even those who had not previously engaged with the debate, or had no firm 
position for or against the Bill, chose to participate. Such a high level of involvement confirmed 
that the issue of assisted death has become one of profound social and political importance. 
The prevalence of human rights discourses used to express arguments both in support and 
opposition to a legalised right to request assistance to die was greatly increased in comparison 
to the 1936 and 2003 debates and illustrated that this is now the terrain upon which the issue 
is debated. This finding is both interesting and significant in so far as human rights discourses 
that ground an understanding of individual liberty appear to have replaced a utilitarian 
approach to law-making as the dominant tradition in the UK. The findings of the data that 
characterise the discourses used and arguments that advance or constrain requests for 
assisted death in the historical 1936 debate, the 2003 debate and contemporary 2014 debate 
are summarised in the table below. 
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Figure 6.2 Comparing discourses and arguments of the 1936, 2003 and 2014 House of Lords 
debates 
Legalisation of 
assisted death 
Historical 1936 
debate 
2003 debate Contemporary 
2014 debate 
Supported by Compassionate 
discourses, “mercy 
killing” 
Individual rights, the 
“right to choose” 
Comprehensive 
articulation and  
understanding of 
liberty rights 
Opposed by Faith-based 
discourses that 
express religious 
position on sanctity 
of life.  
Concern for wider 
society, protection 
of the vulnerable 
from abuse and fear 
of a slippery slope  
Concern for 
unrestricted liberty 
and protection of 
community rights 
over individual rights 
and  
Aims to achieve “quick and painless 
death” 
Relief of suffering 
and respect for 
autonomy 
Respect for 
autonomy and “right 
to a dignified death” 
Challenged by Duties of a doctor to 
“cure and not kill” 
Medical model of 
care especially 
palliative care 
Debate over extent of 
right to self-
determine best 
interests 
 
Would protect Rational free will and 
against intolerable 
suffering 
Individual 
autonomy and 
against an 
undignified death or 
protracted suffering 
Right to die on same 
basis as other 
fundamental 
freedoms; privacy, 
association, speech, 
anti-discrimination 
 
Conclusion 
The issue of assisted death has been examined through a historical and political perspective on 
the House of Lords Bills and debates. This chapter has highlighted the arguments and 
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contributions of the Lords in relation to proposed legal change and assessed the language with 
which their positions in the debates were articulated. The content of all Bills has remained 
similar over time, proposing legal change to enable mentally competent, dying individuals to 
request assistance to die. Since 2006, emphasis has been on self-administration of lethal 
medicine to better reflect individual, informed choice. There was, however, a notable contrast 
between the initial and later debates demonstrating how language used in the contributions 
has developed to reflect the context of dying at a particular period in history. The 1936 debate 
was not defined by rights discourses. There was minimal articulation of rights, and rights were 
only referred to explicitly in two comments. Instead, the main focus was on a compassionate 
response to alleviate the suffering of those nearing death and this notion of compassion was 
grounded in Christian values. Arguments against assisted death cited respect for the sanctity of 
human life that was in the hands of a sovereign God. The positions in the 1936 debate were 
defined and determined through closer adherence to religious frames of reference, 
representative of this time.  
 
In contrast, the contemporary arguments in relation to legalisation of assisted death more 
commonly adopted rights discourses to underpin their values and beliefs. In particular, 
arguments in the 2014 debate drew upon an understanding of rights involving individual 
liberty and human dignity to justify their support for or against legal change. The contributions 
primarily centred on the interpretation and boundaries of individual liberty rights 
encompassing personal autonomy in end of life decision-making. This suggests that human 
rights discourses have proliferated and become more commonplace in this particular political 
forum. Complex issues, that now include the end of life, were discussed in terms of rights and 
in this way rights discourses were considered central to the contemporary assisted dying 
debates. Analysis of the data in this chapter demonstrates how rights discourses have, to a 
large extent, replaced compassionate and faith-based discourses over time in the context of 
death and dying. 
 
In the 2003 and 2014 debates, many contributions argued from a human rights perspective. 
However, understandings of rights were found to be inconsistent and variable depending on 
individual interpretations. A number of members in the contemporary debates appeared to 
understand rights at the end of life only in a legal context, while others articulated 
components of human rights discourses with specific considerations in the debate such as the 
right to maintain human dignity in the face of intolerable suffering and yet others constructed 
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their own interpretation of rights, for example “a right to choose” or “right to die in peace”. 
Some members who disputed or opposed a right to die even employed rights discourses to 
express their opinions or used an understanding of particular rights to enhance their positions. 
Concepts of individual liberty grounded in rights were used to support self-determination at 
the end of life. Equally, the protection of individual liberty was used to argue against the 
legalisation of assisted death on the basis of undermining or threatening the rights of others in 
society who may be at risk from abuse. Members of the Lords could also be sympathetic to 
articulating claims as rights and employ both foundational and anti-foundational aspects of 
human rights to enhance their arguments, without necessarily supporting all human rights 
principles or claims to rights. Rights discourses, especially in the most recent 2014 debate were 
widely used, albeit in complex and inter-related, sometimes unrelated ways. It is now apparent 
that human rights discourses have become central and are essential to defining the terms of 
the debate. Rights discourses were used extensively in the House of Lords in regard to 
negotiating the issue of assisted death, but rights were understood and interpreted in different 
ways. 
 
The House of Lords has the ability to propose and deliberate legislation on end of life. 
Members are important social actors who can contribute to shaping public opinion and 
conduct, and determine legitimate standards of behaviour. However, the Lords represent a 
political institution. As individuals they are not entirely independent. Their lives are not 
conducted in a social vacuum and they are not insusceptible to outside influence and 
prevailing discourses. On this basis, it was relevant to examine other social actors who may 
impact the ways in which assisted death is thought about and deliberated in the House of 
Lords. Members of the Lords, namely Lords Ponsonby, Joffe and Falconer proposing the 1936, 
2003 and 2014 Bills respectively have each collaborated with, and been supported by, Dignity 
in Dying (formerly the VES), an organisation that promotes and actively campaigns for the 
legalisation of assisted death. Dignity in Dying have a role in informing public perceptions on 
end of life. They have strategically generated a high level of public engagement including the 
lobbying of peers through personal letters and this had a demonstrable and significant effect 
on members’ contributions to the 2014 debate. The activities and intentions of Dignity in Dying 
could include shaping the opinion of both the public and the lawmakers through their 
campaign strategies. For this reason they were selected for closer analysis. The findings of the 
case study are discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Case study on Dignity in Dying 
 
Dignity in Dying (hereinafter DiD) are a well-established, national organisation that campaign 
to change the law and realise the right to an assisted death. They hold, as an objective, “to 
legalise assisted dying within upfront safeguards for terminally ill, mentally competent adults” 
(DiD, 2016). DiD were selected for a case study on the basis of their historic foundation, 
significant reach, and ability to stimulate debate on a right to die in the public and political 
arena. Not all members of UK society will be familiar with the organisation as such, but most 
will be aware of the notion of a right to die, legal debates on the issue, and media reported 
cases where individuals have requested an assisted death. Dignity in Dying offices are based in 
London. The current structure of the organisation includes nine permanent staff members and 
a number of volunteers who work under the direction of a Chief Executive, Sarah Wootton. 
DiD have substantial financial backing; there are over 25,000 members on record and this 
generates income that for 2014 totalled £2,163,141.62  
 
Considering the atypical focus of their campaigns and relatively small number of employees, 
Dignity in Dying have spectacularly impacted the landscape of death and dying through raising 
end of life concerns in the public sphere. Their endeavours have achieved national coverage of 
assisted death on mainstream television news and in newspapers and prompted, or 
persuaded, high profile figures to speak out in support for their aims.  The organisation has 
throughout its’ history worked closely with political figures, most recently including Lords Joffe 
and Falconer, both former lawyers, with whom they drafted the 2003, 2006, and 2014 House 
of Lords Bills. Affiliation with peers in the House of Lords has lent political credibility and 
power to their objectives and DiD has identified, as a target for their campaign efforts, political 
institutions that can instigate legal change. DiD are a key social actor in the assisted death 
movement. As a historic organisation that campaigns for social change on one exceptional 
                                                          
62
 This was broadly broken down as 33% from member subscriptions and general donations, 23% from 
legacies, and 40% from high net worth individuals (DiD Trustees Report, 2015:5). 
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issue, in-depth analysis reveals a unique insight into understanding rights discourses in an end 
of life context.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a case study analysis of Dignity in Dying as a 
campaigning organisation that has a specific focus based on clear guiding principles. The 
chapter will examine how and to what extent human rights discourses are used by DiD and 
why, or for what purposes, they incorporate the language of rights in an end of life context.  
Analysis of rights discourses and the use of a rights frame in relation to campaign strategies, 
demonstrates how rights can be applied within a new context to define the issue of assisted 
dying. The case study of DiD supports and builds on Miller’s (2010) contribution that develops 
alternative ways of using rights outside of “rights-based approaches” and confirms that a “one 
size fits all” label cannot be applied. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
introduces the organisation through its foundations to set the context for Dignity in Dying. 
Their aims and objectives are discussed in the second part of the chapter. The third section 
analyses the discourses used in mediated communication through an example of their 
newsletter and the website at the time of the 2014 House of Lords debate. The fourth part of 
the chapter explores the voices of Patrons and the public through their personal narratives 
considering how their language legitimises and embeds the values of DiD.  
 
7.1 Foundations of the organisation 
Dignity in Dying was originally established in December 1935 by Dr Charles Killick Millard under 
the name The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Society (VES). Members of the first VES 
Executive Committee included medical consultants, academics and Christian ministers whose 
intention was, not to build a popular movement, but rather a “network of distinguished 
sympathisers able to influence policy at high levels” (Kemp, 2002). The Society at this time 
consisted of a Consultative Medical Council and a Literary Group, and was endorsed by a 
variety of authors, progressive reformers, and feminists (Kemp, 2002). Catalysts for the 
emergence of a euthanasia movement in the UK are difficult to specify, as are the ideological 
foundations of the organisation. The literature is very limited in relation to this. It is thought 
that social reformer Annie Besant was the first to raise the issue of euthanasia in the 1870s as 
a social duty to society to “die voluntarily and painlessly” when one reached the point of 
becoming “a burden” (Dowbiggin, 2007:51). Kemp (2002:119) suggests that pre-1936 
arguments supporting voluntary euthanasia were driven by an intellectual stance on eugenics 
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and a desire to reduce the prevalence of feeble-minded and mentally defective individuals in 
society, promoting “survival of the fittest”. 
 
In particular, Dr Charles Killick Millard was instrumental in placing the issue of assisted death, 
or voluntary euthanasia as it was then termed, on the political agenda, when he proposed the 
first Bill for the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia in his Presidential Address to the Society of 
Medical Officers of Health in October, 1931. His contribution demonstrates how a concept of 
rights underpinned the early arguments for an assisted death when he emphasised that the 
act “should be regarded not merely as an act of mercy, but as a matter of elementary human 
right” (Millard, 1931:12). This is a significant finding. It appears to have been the first time 
euthanasia was thought of as a personal “right” and the right to die had been articulated as 
such. Expressions of rights at this time appeared limited in comparison to a contemporary, UK 
context. For example, the suffrage movement had campaigned for equal rights and won 
women over the age of 30 the right to vote in 1918, and this was extended to all women in 
1928. In 1919, the International Labour Organisation was founded with the aim of protecting 
workers’ rights (ILO, 2016). However, realisation of these objectives were articulated through 
liberal conceptions of equality and social justice rather than individual rights per se. Pre-
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), expressions of rights understood as human 
rights were minimal. Rights were more commonly associated with political and economic 
freedoms, rooted in the political revolutions of the previous centuries, rather than concerned 
with personal or ethical dilemmas.  
 
Some understanding of rights has been apparent throughout the history of the organisation. 
Considering the backgrounds of members of the Committee and the position of Killick Millard, 
who had also supported the extension of other individual liberties such as birth control, the 
early foundations of the VES could suggest a right to assisted death grounded in classic liberal 
ideology. Millard died in 1952, but his indication of a human rights approach to assisted death 
was demonstrated throughout the 1950s. By the 1950s, and more so in the 1960s, a notion of 
rights that entailed individual liberty had moved into focus, especially in regard to legislation of 
personal issues. From 1955 onwards, the organisation became known as the Euthanasia 
Society. As part of its campaign activities at this time, the Euthanasia Society placed adverts on 
the London Underground and on mainline railway services in the south of England, with the 
wording “The Euthanasia Society believes that incurable sufferers should have the right to 
choose a Merciful Death” (Kemp, 2002). This campaign message highlighted an individual 
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“right to choose” in relation to incurable illness, which bears a remarkably consistent 
resemblance to the rhetoric and ideology of the organisation today. Choice over the manner 
and timing of one’s death was, and is, prioritised, especially in cases of terminal illness.  
 
The most recent name change occurred in 2006 when the organisation became known as 
Dignity in Dying.63 From this time onwards, DiD centralised the value of human dignity and 
clearly positioned the act of assisting death to be understood in terms of rights (to the extent 
that human dignity is understood as a human rights issue). The emphasis on dignity by DiD was 
strategically employed to advance their aspirations and transform the terms of the debate 
through linking the option of assisted death with a dignified death. Emphasising a more 
universal aspiration of dignity in dying could also be construed as an attempt to lessen 
controversy, demobilise antagonists, and increase the appeal of assisted death. This use and 
interpretation of dignity reflects the official approach of the organisation based on values that 
have remained historically consistent. Permitting an assisted death would enhance individual 
rational choice, potentially alleviate great suffering and facilitate a more easeful and dignified 
death that would respect the humanity of seriously ill and dying persons.  
 
7.2 Aims and objectives 
The overall aim of the organisation has not significantly changed in the 81 years since it was 
founded. It has consistently held as an objective to legalise an assisted death in cases of 
incurable or terminal illness. Following the House of Lords Bills proposed by Lord Joffe in 2003, 
2004 and 2006, and renewed interest in the issue of assisted dying from this time onwards, the 
activities of Dignity in Dying have amplified. The focus of more recent campaigns has 
specifically utilised rights discourses. In 2014, the primary aim of the organisation was “to 
change the law to allow the choice of an assisted death for terminally ill, mentally competent 
adults, within upfront safeguards” (DiD a, 2014). The objectives of DiD are stated on the Home 
                                                          
63 Prior to this, palliative care had routinely used the phrase “dignity in dying” at the end of life to define 
their holistic approach encompassing respect for the physical, emotional, and spiritual care needs of the 
dying. The name change was heavily criticised by opponents to assisted death, including, as one 
example, the contribution of The Lord Bishop of St. Albans who claimed that the name change 
…seems to imply that there is only one dignified way to die-by euthanasia or assisted suicide. 
The organisation has taken a phrase that is used in palliative care and by the hospice 
movement and has turned it around to mean the exact opposite of what it originally meant 
(House of Lords, 2006 col 1211).  
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page of their website under “About us”. Their “vision” that has remained consistent over the 
four year period of study is articulated as follows  
           We believe that everyone has the right to a dignified death. This means: 
 Choice over where we die, who is present and our treatment options; 
 Access to expert information on our options, good quality end-of-life care, and 
support for loved ones and carers; 
 Control over how we die, our symptoms and pain relief, and planning our own death. 
 
The first two objectives of “choice over” and “access to” end of life care strategically mirrors 
provision in the NHS Constitution 2013 and the End of Life Care Strategy 2008 discussed in 
Chapter 5. The findings revealed choice over and access to good quality end of life care to be 
already defined and protected by UK policy. Kingham and Coe (2005: 148) argue that whilst 
campaign aims must be bold to generate momentum, internal objectives must be realistic in 
order to achieve progress. This is exemplified by the first two objectives of DiD that are 
attainable and have wide appeal, without being too specific. The availability of end of life 
resources may vary, and, due to the fluctuating nature of serious illness, the place of death may 
be difficult to determine. However, as illustrated in section 5.4.2, there is documented provision 
in government policy for some end of life decisions that afford a degree of autonomy in dying.  
 
End of life issues are complex. The objectives above demonstrate how a problem can be 
deconstructed and specific solutions or stages of solutions are identified that already are, or 
could be, achievable within the current political context (Kingham and Coe, 2005:25). Citing 
“control” over how we die as the third objective of the organisation is a powerful discursive 
strategy suggesting a natural progression of choice. It is implied that “access” should extend to 
and include, control. In order to achieve the third objective, “control over how we die”, DiD 
campaign tactics focus on emphasizing the limitations of current law. This aspect has been 
driven by media coverage and public focus on high profile cases where individuals have been 
denied a dignified death through conflict with current statutory law and policy provision. As the 
values of choice and control, underpinned by the notion of healthcare consumerism and patient 
participation become more prominent in contemporary society, not being able to control the 
manner and timing of one’s own death is projected as increasingly problematic.  
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7.3 Campaign for Dignity in Dying 2014 
Kingdon (2003) suggests opportunities will arise where campaign efforts are likely to attain 
maximum impact and these opportunities may be triggered by current or historic events which 
are experienced and/or reported as problematic. In relation to assisted death, a number of 
factors have created optimal conditions for achieving change in the period 2011-14. These 
include: the high profile legal appeals publicised by the national media in 2011-2012 of Tony 
Nicklinson; the publication of the privately funded Commission on Assisted Dying Report 2011 
that criticised current end of life provision as “inadequate and incoherent”; the emphasis on 
“choice” and “dignity” in the NHS Constitution 2013; controversy over, and later phasing out of, 
the Liverpool Care Pathway;64 and finally, the lead up to the Assisted Dying Bill 2014. These 
separate events together with a socio-cultural shift supporting individual rights and perpetuated 
by increasing healthcare consumerism, collectively paved the way for, and directed, renewed 
effort into the 2014 campaign for DiD. Mediated communication utilised by DiD in the period 
prior to the Assisted Dying Bill 2014 included information on their website, distribution of 
leaflets, published newsletters, poster advertisements, on-line petitions and picketed 
demonstrations outside Westminster. This section explores the typical discourses used in one 
example of their newsletter and on their website pages during the 2014 campaign.  
 
7.3.1 Newsletters 
Newsletters titled “Campaign” were, and continue to be, published three times per year. These 
are electronically distributed to existing members and to any interested parties who request 
this through the website or telephone contact. Hard copies are also available at the Dignity in 
Dying office and can be accessed at their events and the Annual General Meeting. Rights 
discourses were evident in these publications and are utilised specifically to target an intended 
audience who support, or may be persuaded to support, the aims of the organisation. One 
example of their newsletter selected here (issue 3 of 3, 2014) was distributed in the wake of 
passing the Assisted Dying Bill 2014 at Second Reading stage in the House of Lords. The 
content that is typical of the other newsletters includes thanking supporters, campaign 
updates, explanation of legal issues at end of life, personal stories, information on past and 
                                                          
64
 Following concerns by bereaved relatives, the Liverpool Care Pathway for the Dying Patient (LCP) was 
phased out during 2013. Instead, the Leadership Alliance for the Care of Dying People (LACDP), a 
coalition of 21 national organisations, was established with the remit to lead and provide a focus for 
improving the care of people who are dying and their families.
 
The LACDP produced a document that is 
currently in use detailing 5 new “Priorities of Care”, setting out standards of care for the dying in 2014-
2016 (NHS England, 2014). 
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upcoming meetings, and foregrounding high profile voices who support their objectives (see 
Appendix Three). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 2014 Dignity in Dying campaign newsletter, issue 3 of 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examination of the information and articles in the newsletter revealed rights discourses to be 
used extensively. Rights were articulated explicitly with reference to rights that feature in legal 
statute and a rights frame was used to emphasise ideals of choice and dignity. Framing is a key 
concept used in campaign strategies and is defined by Gramson (1989) as “a central organising 
idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue”. The personal story of 
Tracy Snelling features in the newsletter, issue 3 of 3 (2014). On page 6, her “undignified 
death” is described by her husband, where, following a diagnosis of stomach cancer, she was 
“denied the choice to decide how and when she died”. This visually emotive story, including a 
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beautiful wedding photo taken shortly before Tracey died, clearly frames the organisations’ 
objectives of choice and dignity as important to the end of life. DiD comment in an afterword 
to this story on page 7 that “Personal testimonies such as these are a fundamental part of the 
campaign” and they explain how, through the efforts of campaigning organisations, these 
stories are able to bring assisted death into the public consciousness. Dalton (2007:38) 
highlights the potential impact of this, claiming “testimonies and case studies provide valuable 
reinforcement to the more generalised messages directed at target institutions and the 
media”. More of these personal narratives are analysed in section 7.4.  
 
Explicit references to legal rights were made on page 22 of the newsletter, issue 3 of 3, 
detailing the Government response to a report published by the House of Commons Mental 
Capacity Act Committee in June 2014. This report found “vulnerable adults were not being 
fully protected or empowered to make decisions for themselves”. Government response 
acknowledged the importance of “individual patients’ rights and involvement in decision-
making”. The inclusion of this article in the newsletter serves to highlight a notion of patients’ 
rights and illustrate how rights discourses can promote autonomous decision-making. The 
article also drew upon rights to critique the inadequacy of provision for vulnerable adults in 
the current decision-making process and, in doing so, demonstrated how this signifies the 
need for political change.  
 
An understanding of rights as legal entitlements was also highlighted through another personal 
story under the heading “Protecting patient rights and DNR” on page 23 of the same 
newsletter. This feature illustrated how one patient was subject to a “Do Not Resuscitate” 
(DNR) order without her knowledge or consent. This individual’s story was linked to Article 8 of 
the HRA 1998 through the breaching of her right to respect for a private and family life. Direct 
reference to the HRA Art 8 in this newsletter demonstrates that DiD, drawing upon national 
human rights instruments to support their position, do, on occasion, take what has generally 
been understood as a rights-based approach. However, this is used only when it can benefit 
and advance their arguments and this strategic use is more typical of rights-framed 
approaches (see Figure 7.5). This particular example was used with the intention of promoting 
Advance Decision-making as empowering and necessary to protect individual preferences and 
rights at the end of life. Using the power of the HRA 1998 to challenge a DNR order reveals a 
strategic use of rights that, in this context, serves the purpose of the organisation by raising 
awareness of Advanced Decisions.  
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The cartoon below also features in newsletter issue 3 of 3, on page 5. The intention is to 
motivate and mobilise supporters by suggesting “Pressure for change is building”. It illustrates 
how DiD invoke human rights and attempt to legitimate their aims by drawing on the 
credibility of the Human Rights Act 1998. The HRA is characterised as an indicator of justice 
used to weigh the arguments on assisted dying and help tip the scales in favour of change. The 
cartoon also highlights strong public support for legalisation of the Assisted Dying Bill 2014 
that was formulated and proposed by Lord Falconer, through inclusion of the recently held and 
well-attended public demonstration outside Parliament to support change in law. The cartoon 
mocks the remaining politicians who refuse to acknowledge public opinion and the provisions 
of the HRA and respond accordingly to the mounting public and legal pressure.  
 
Figure 7.2 2014 Dignity in Dying “cartoon”, campaign newsletter, issue 3 of 3, p5 
 
 
7.3.2 Website 
The DiD website is comprehensive, informative and revised often. Since 2014 it has become 
more interactive to include access to social media sites Facebook and Twitter and the option to 
“Share” information. Below is a screenshot of their home page that reflects the style of their 
campaign shortly before the 2014 Assisted Dying Bill was debated in July in the House of Lords.  
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Figure 7.3. “Home” page Dignity in Dying website, June 2014 
 
 
This colorful welcome page demonstrates examples of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational 
framing techniques as defined by Snow and Benford (2000). These techniques, used as a 
campaign tactic, serve to analyse the cause of the problem, motivate action and suggest a 
viable solution. In the above example, terminally ill adults are portrayed as victims of tragic 
circumstances who are suffering and unable to attain control over a dignified and good death 
due to the ambiguity and limitations of (inadequate) binding UK legislation and end of life 
provision. This position was supported by a number of contributions in the personal narratives 
analysed below, in which the current law was criticised as failing to meet the needs of the 
dying. Discursive strategies such as these function to place social actors and institutional 
practices in competition. Positioning seriously ill individuals as being trapped by unfortunate, 
and potentially undignified circumstances, highlights a right to die as a humane solution that 
enhances human dignity and individual liberty. The message is personalised through a 
thought-provoking image of a wheelchair-bound gentleman. This representation may have 
wide appeal, including to persons who are ill or incapacitated, which is indicative of a number 
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of DiD supporters. DiD highlight the distressing situation caused by actual or anticipated 
suffering at the end of life to indicate a dubious morality and intent of current institutions 
where “some dying people are forced to suffer against their wishes. If we can change the law, 
no more will die but fewer will suffer” (DiD a, 2014). 
 
The problem of not permitting an assisted death is diagnosed as the current law, which forces 
people to suffer in the absence of provision for assisted death. The solution to the problem is 
clearly stated as a change in law and this is where the energy of the DiD campaign is directed. 
The assisted dying dilemma presented here is illustrative of Stammers (1999) social 
constructionist contribution referring to the relationship between human rights, power and 
social institutions. The NHS, as a UK institution, are representative of delivering the current 
medical model of end of life care. Law and policy dictate permitted actions and retain power to 
curtail or enhance liberty over end of life decision-making, while the dying represent those 
struggling for emancipatory change to self-determine the manner and timing of their own 
death. In this triadic relationship between the dying, law and policy and the NHS, the dying are 
portrayed as especially disempowered through their physical and emotional frailty. This 
highlights the poignancy of their cause.   
 
Discourses used by DiD must convince their members or potential supporters that the aims of 
the organisation have relevance, can offer benefit to them, and are in their best interests 
(McInerney, 2000: 137). All mediated contributions are designed to inform and inspire, 
ultimately seeking to build a collective identity through a common desire for a dignified and 
good death and one that is not constrained by unbearable suffering or limited choice at the 
end of life. Building identity is an important part of the process through which individuals give 
meaning to their own experiences or transformation over time, and DiD capitalise upon this 
need (Della Porta and Diani, 2006:92). DiD use a rights frame to promote solidarity with the 
campaign. Dying well and experiencing a good death are common aspirations that may be 
compatible with contemporary community values, especially when articulated as a right to die 
well and right to a good death. Not all individuals will desire or value the option of assisted 
death, but all human beings, irrespective of their backgrounds and beliefs, would like to die 
well and achieve what, for them, is considered a good death. DiD frame the denial of choice 
and liberty at the end of life as unjust, especially with regard to rational adults. This accusation 
is accentuated by the experience of actual or anticipated suffering. The use of rights discourses 
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that promote choice and dignity at the end of life to achieve a good death and die well, is a 
particularly influential and persuasive campaign tactic with wide appeal. 
 
Analysis of mediated communication over the period of study 2012-16 demonstrated that 
rights discourses have remained central to the organisation but the scope and application of 
rights, has at times been extended or different conceptions of rights brought forward. The 
newest addition to their website reviewed in May 2016 argued “We believe everybody has the 
right to a good death. Including the option of assisted dying for terminally ill, mentally 
competent adults” (DiD a, 2016). This recent shift in nuance suggests that a legal right to 
assisted death can help promote a good death, the importance of which was highlighted in 
section 2.2. In this way, the boundaries of a (hypothetical) right to die in the form of an 
assisted death have been extended even further to encompass a right to a good death.  This 
inference is strengthened through development of a notion of a right, not only to a dignified 
death, but “[t]he right, when dying, to die well” (DiD b, 2016) articulated as part of the 
campaign aims for 2016. DiD have refined their interpretation of rights in relation to assisted 
death, presently expressed through the “right to a dignified death” and a “right to a good 
death” or the “right to die well”.  
 
In addition, concepts of suffering, not usually associated with rights, are being engaged as part 
of the discourse on dying through idealised concepts of dignity and choice. In June, 2016, the 
“About us” page was yet again amended, introducing DiD as a “national campaign and 
membership organisation demanding greater choice and control to alleviate suffering at the 
end of life”. This indicated a potential shift at DiD away from explicit references to rights as the 
direction of the organisation began to focus more on the alleviation of suffering. Reasons for 
this are not apparent but may be related to defeat of the 2014 House of Lords Bill and 2015 
House of Commons Bill. This finding demonstrates a strategic use of rights discourses in order 
to maximise the social context.  The incorporation of rights discourses as a way to repackage 
the ideological underpinnings of the organisation and the foregrounding of rights to a greater 
or lesser extent at different times is indicative of rights-framed approaches (RFAs) proposed by 
Miller (2010) in Chapter 3. Rights discourses are applied, or in the case of DiD, prioritised in 
specific contexts where they are considered for a variety of reasons to be strategically 
advantageous (Miller, 2010). 
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Examining how and why rights discourses are adopted, or disregarded, by campaigning 
organisations in relation to particular social contexts can contribute towards understanding 
the “social life of rights” as defined by Wilson (2006). However, in relation to end of life, the 
reasons for this are not immediately obvious. Moving away from a rights frame could have to 
do with the ways in which the HRA 1998 may be beginning to lose traction in the current UK 
political climate. There is certainly a reduction in the number of cases taken to Strasbourg and 
number of findings against the UK is lower (Hoffman and Rowe, 2010:35). This may be argued 
as due to the development of UK equality and anti-discrimination legislation that encourages 
compliance with the HRA 1998 and thus negates the necessity of further intervention in 
human rights cases. The HRA 1998 is itself, at present, a contentious instrument. The current 
Conservative government have sought to reduce the influence of the HRA 1998 by not giving it 
constitutional status and have instead proposed replacing it with a Bill of Rights. The HRA 1998 
has also lost popularity with the UK public to judge by the negative tabloid press where it is 
perceived as being abused by “undesirable groups such as asylum seekers” (Sweeney, 
2010:76).  
 
7.4 Voices within Dignity in Dying 
Dignity in Dying utilise a variety of voices within the organisation with the intention of 
validating their objectives, creating impact, resonating with target audiences and mobilising 
public support. This section examines the voices of Patrons and members of the public through 
their personal narratives to assess how and for what purposes they draw upon rights 
discourses and the extent to which this is used to enhance their arguments or describe their 
experiences. 
 
7.4.1 Patrons 
Many of the DiD Patrons are celebrity or influential figures and they serve two important 
functions. Firstly, they contribute a large amount of essential funding as high net worth 
individuals. Secondly, Patrons can endorse the aims and objectives of the organisation. Their 
purpose is to engage public support and extend the reach of DiD through strategically framing 
and promoting a persuasive narrative of dying. Benford and Snow (2000:619) suggest that 
adopting a rights frame can be advantageous in transforming perceptions of what is just or 
unjust and in proposing generic values that may be compatible with moral systems. DiD utilise 
this frame encompassing a notion of individual liberty and respect for human dignity to 
resonate with contemporary aspirations, which for some individuals extend to determining the 
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manner and timing of death. In total, there are statements from 68 patrons on the website 
representing a wide variety of social and political backgrounds. These include actors Sir Patrick 
Stewart, Hugh Grant, and Kim Cattrall, Falkland Islands hero Simon Weston OBE, and 
entrepreneur Peter Jones together with a range of medical doctors, lawyers, political and 
religious figures. The voices of Patrons are quoted on the DiD “Home” page (accessed 
13.05.14). 
 
The majority of Patron contributions grounded their understanding of a right to die in the 
notion of individual liberty. Professor Anthony Grayling, as a humanist and scholar, asserted as 
fundamental “Decisions about the timing and manner of death belong to the individual as a 
human right” or popular actor Hugh Grant, “I strongly believe that-with the right provisos and 
controls-a person should have a right to end their life with dignity if that is their wish” (DiD d, 
2014). These statements are underpinned by concepts of choice and dignity that were also 
evident in Professor Sir Graeme Catto’s comprehensive and eloquent argument involving 
“dignity” “right” “choice” “control”. This mirrors the language used by DiD. In addition, it 
reflects his own medical background and aligns his position with other members of the medical 
profession. His comment linked compassion with rights. This strategic use of language invites 
support from doctors, who on the basis of compassion could perhaps be persuaded to extend 
their current practice and assist requested death out of respect for the rights of patients. He 
argued 
We do see patients who die without dignity and without the compassion that we 
should be providing. There are many doctors, like me, who believe that assisted dying 
should be a right for our patients. As more have the courage to speak out, the more 
we can work towards giving choice and control to the patient (DiD d, 2014). 
As former Chair of DiD, and former President of the General Medical Council, Sir Graeme 
Catto’s contribution is both tactically clever and important. His perspective associated the 
esteemed concepts of dignity and compassion with a rights approach, articulated as choice 
and control. 
 
Some statements from Patrons referred to rights as legal entitlements and critiqued the lack of 
current provision, for example Sir Patrick Stewart who tactically endorsed “control” to mirror 
the vision of the organisation “We have no control over how we arrive in the world, but at the 
end of life we should have legal control over how we leave it” (DiD d, 2014). This comment 
stimulates political deliberation on the issue and DiD tactically utilised this alongside the 
contribution from Patron Dame Elizabeth Hoodless DBE to draw the assisted dying debate into 
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parallel with other ethical dilemmas that have already been debated upon with ensuing 
legislative change. She advised “Respect for people’s freedom to choose is reflected in our 
abortion laws and civil partnerships. Respect for people’s choice on the ending of their life 
should be included too” (DiD d, 2014).  
 
The contributions of Patrons supported a broad liberal ideology. This was evident in their 
statements through their use of “virtue words” (Lee and Lee, 1972:23). The findings of this 
analysis revealed virtue words to be grounded in interpretations of rights. Many of the 
arguments invoked rights discourses that included “rights”, “choice”, “control”, “freedoms” 
“suffering” and “dignity”. Using the voices of Patrons as a campaign tactic to foreground 
different aspects of rights, for the purposes of resonating with target audiences, is 
characteristic of RFAs. Through these voices, a right to die could appeal to individuals accessing 
the website who may not yet be sympathetic to the cause, but may be sympathetic to the 
values, and discourses used to express those values, by celebrity figures, whom they view as 
representative and/ or who are held in high esteem. 
 
7.4.2 Public narratives 
On their website, in the section headed “Personal stories”, Dignity in Dying strategically 
chronicle the narratives of individuals who are living with a serious condition, are dying or have 
been bereaved. Wilson and Brown (2009:10) argue “Arousing sympathy and awakening moral 
qualms, and connecting them to real or imagined self-interest, appears to be the proven 
method for the realization of human rights”. Narratives resonate because dying is a universal 
phenomenon. All are susceptible to serious illness. The purpose of these individual stories is to 
engage readers on a personal level, enhance proximity to the issue and potentially transform 
public perceptions on death and dying. Personal experiences highlight circumstances of human 
frailty and vulnerability in the dying process. Graphic details of suffering and traumatic death 
in the personal narratives are used to motivate those accessing the website by invoking 
sympathy or empathy with the plight of the dying. Episodic framing that describes individual 
pain and symptoms is a powerful strategy that heightens proximity to the personal experience 
and provokes a response from the reader. 
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Each of the 36 personal stories selected from London and the South East region65 represents 
an undeniably real and individual lived experience and this has a vivid appeal. Analysis of the 
language used to describe the personal stories revealed frames of “choice” “dignity” 
“suffering” and “rights” that provided an insight of how the issue of assisted death was 
positioned, thought about and given meaning. A tag cloud was generated initially using 
NVivo10 software to provide an overview of the most frequently used words appearing in 
these personal narratives. These were then coded under different nodes and analysed in 
context. Those most frequently occurring and relevant to the debate are explored in detail 
below. 
Figure 7.4: Tag cloud to show word frequency in Dignity in Dying personal stories (DiD, 2014). 
2009 able allow also another assisted back became 
body cancer care change choice choose condition consultant 
control country death decision diagnosed died 
dignitas dignity disease doctor doctors dying 
even every experience family feel friends george good great health 
help home hospice hospital husband illness john just kathy 
knew knowing last left life like live living long made make 
many medical michael months mother much needed never option 
pain palliative peaceful people possible rather right 
sister still suffer suffering suicide support switzerland 
                                                          
65 Further research could include comparative analysis of attitudes towards death and dying and how 
these are expressed based upon the attributes of geographic location and gender. Focus on these 
indicators to address the discourses used by samples of the UK population, and reflect the thoughts of 
different groups of individuals towards end of life, could build upon theories of healthcare inequalities.  
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take taken terminally think three time told treatment want 
wanted weeks well went wife wish wishes without year years 
 
Suffering 
There were 311 references to the word “suffering” but different forms of the verb also 
included “suffer” (114) and “suffered” (50) that totalled 475 references across 36 personal 
stories making this the most commonly featured issue. The frequency with which suffering was 
mentioned initially suggested three things. Firstly, that concepts of suffering are particularly 
important at the end of life to dying people and their family members. Secondly, that suffering 
is a term used and understood by members of the public to reflect their concerns, and thirdly, 
that DiD strategically recognised the appeal of the articulated experience of suffering to both a 
public and healthcare professional audience. The literature in Chapter 2 showed that suffering 
often features as a generic or ambiguous term involving a tacit understanding of meaning but 
one which also allows for subjective and relative interpretations. Reading the personal 
narratives, it became clear that the phenomenon of suffering is complex and understandings 
of suffering were enhanced using the detail in their own words. The personal narratives 
analysed in this case study have informed the concept of suffering at the end of life and 
provided a contribution to knowledge on the experience of suffering through selected coding 
under three different nodes. These nodes were classified as: 1) emotional anguish; 2) physical 
symptoms; 3) incapacity and decline.  
 
The following excerpts illustrated emotional anguish 
 She was broken hearted and in a living hell while she waited to die… in a permanent 
state of existential suffering and some physical pain – a state worse than death 
(Penelope Duck, 2013). 
The option of assisted dying would give me such comfort; to know that I didn’t have to 
go on suffering forever, or have to take measures to end my life in another way (Lesley 
Evans, 2013). 
Emotional anguish associated with dying is infrequently addressed, but evidently present. In 
these personal narratives, under the node “emotional anguish” a selection of words coded 
included “dread, devastating, horrible, frustrating, doomed, broken-hearted, damaged, 
harrowing, terrible, agony, grieving, afraid, sadness”. This highlighted the psychological 
component of suffering associated with life limiting illness in a group of individuals who are 
especially vulnerable in ways that are perhaps not apparent, visible, measurable or greatly 
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spoken about. In society, issues of mental health and personal emotions are less frequently 
discussed. These are, or were, commonly considered “taboo”, and this finding reflects an area 
neglected by healthcare professionals. The emotional and psychological anguish associated 
with dying may not be prioritised because healthcare professionals are under equipped or lack 
resources to address and support these issues. However, personal stories that foreground 
these issues and openly describe emotional anguish may resonate with the dying, their 
families or grieving individuals who are reading and experiencing them. 
 
There were many examples coded under “physical symptoms” as an element of suffering. Dr 
Anne Turner, who chose to end her life at the Swiss Clinic Dignitas shared her experience,  
I am finding walking, speaking and swallowing difficult. I have had a series of nasty 
falls. I broke my wrist twice and thumb once earlier last year and seemed to spend the 
early half of the year in plaster and waiting for hours in out-patients (Dr Anne Turner, 
2007). 
In contrast to emotional anguish, pain and physical symptoms are often visible, easily 
measurable, and socially acceptable to speak about. Many of these can be alleviated through 
medical intervention, the outcomes of which can be studied and monitored. Pain is a concept 
that has usually been experienced by all human beings and the memory of a painful incident 
may trigger the desire to avoid this in future. In the context of suffering, the individual 
narratives described experiencing one or more of the following physical symptoms in different 
degrees:  
losing the power to communicate; difficulty or failure of breathing muscles; being fed 
through a tube; nausea and vomiting; affected speech and movement; physical pain; 
double incontinence; losing the use of hands, legs and arms; bedsores; muscle spasms; 
nasty falls, and broken bones.  
 
 The third node “incapacity and decline” combined the above elements to describe the mental 
and physical suffering associated with multiple losses during long-term or progressive illness. 
The narrative of Nicky Dalladay (2013) clearly illustrated the reciprocal relationship between 
his physical and mental suffering, “Every time another bit of my body stops functioning 
properly I have to go through a grieving process, so I liken it to a form of bereavement”. For 
some people, this process could involve a long, slow demise necessitating surgical operations, 
frequent medical appointments and becoming housebound or reliant on carers as the 
condition deteriorates. Chris Larner’s ex-wife Allyson Lee experienced this type of suffering. It 
was significant enough to prompt her to travel to Dignitas to end her life in November 2010. 
Chris (2010) described how “In the last 10 years her MS progressed, leaving her housebound, 
doubly incontinent, distressed by constant muscle spasms and reliant on carers: and with no 
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hope of her health improving”. A similar account of Pam Baker was written by her son Patrick 
(2013),  
 As her cancer progressed it had increasingly debilitating effects: first the paralysis of 
her legs, then the increasing deterioration of her speech, vision and hearing. In the 
final period of her life she made it clear that she wished to die; but her GP was not 
prepared to discuss ending her life. 
 
Suffering, as a concept usually distinct from rights, is increasingly becoming associated with 
arguments supporting the right to an assisted death through rights discourses that involve 
respect for human dignity and a desire to avoid an undignified death. The experience of 
individual suffering in the above accounts clearly described the indignity associated with 
serious or terminal illness, not solely through painful symptoms and incapacity, but also 
through emotional anguish causing distress and the perception of losing dignity.  Concepts of 
dignity and their connection with suffering are examined further in the following chapter 
through focus group discussion.  
 
Choice 
When “choice” was coded as a singular word, it appeared as the eighth most frequently used 
word in the personal narratives.66 However, when other words associated with choice: 
“option”, “control”, “choose”, “wish”, “wishes” were coded at this node, there were 457 
references in total, making this the second largest category after suffering. All references to 
“choice” were used in the context of personal liberty, and choice as reflecting decisional 
autonomy. “Control” was linked either to human agency whereby a person retains control 
over their bodily integrity in their current situation, or to the administration of drugs 
controlling pain and symptoms. Reading the personal narratives, a sense of maintaining 
control and choice over one’s options was perceived as important to affirm identity and 
individual personhood. These narratives grounded the vision of DiD in human experience. This 
was illustrated by the account of Joyce Skerrett referring to her husband’s death from 
oesophageal cancer, 
He begged the doctor to allow him to die, he had suffered enough. If we had known it 
was possible for him to be assisted to die in Switzerland he would have chosen to do 
so. As it was, he suffered 8 more weeks of agony. It is so important that we are all 
given the choice to die in these circumstances.  
                                                          
66
 The most frequently occurring singular word was life. It featured a surprising 408 times in the personal 
accounts of dying! Life references were made in relation to personal experiences, general thoughts on 
life, the taking and ending of life, and in connection with the phrases “quality of life” and “life 
expectancy”. Life quality, although frequently alluded to, was not specifically defined, or discussed in-
depth, in the personal stories.  
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Individual choice is a desirable characteristic, increasingly respected in a contemporary social 
context and is, to a degree, reflected in current healthcare policy. However, realisation of 
individual choice at the end of life fundamentally conflicts with the paternalist medical model 
of care. In response to the study by Auerbach, (2001) cited in section 2.2.3 that the majority of 
dying individuals would encourage collaboration and information sharing with their doctors 
but would not wish for decisional control at the end of life, one contribution from the personal 
narratives shared   
I would like there to be a more open and honest discussion with medical professionals, 
patients and their families about the dying process. This would mean that decisions 
about end of life care came from the patient, where possible, rather than the doctors 
(Liz Silvester, 2013).  
 
A number of personal stories linked choice at the end of life with their desire to see a change 
in the law, perceiving the current legal system as restrictive of individual liberty. Typical 
examples of this included Peter Chesterfield (2005) who argued that the current law is morally 
unacceptable as it forces individuals to suffer in the dying process 
…the law prevents a doctor from helping me to die at my request… Only with a law 
that allows a patient to have a choice and to express this within a properly 
safeguarded system will we allow true human justice and dignity. 
And an 18 year old male, with the gene for Huntingdon’s Chorea who chided 
The law as it stands is simply not fair; assisted dying needs to be made law to protect 
the dignity of those who live life with pride and want to face death in the manner that 
they choose. With such a law, people such as myself won’t be forced to go through a 
slow decline with complete loss of dignity (Josh Cook, 2013). 
 
Rights 
References to rights in the personal narratives were predominantly used in the context of 
articulating the right to die and the right to choose. They were also expressed in conjunction 
with “right” as referring to timing, position, and right versus wrong, as in Joanne’s (2013) 
contribution that uses rights in two different contexts, “I am a believer in giving people the 
right to end their life early if they are terminally ill and are one hundred percent certain that it 
is right for them to do so”. There were 181 explicit references to the word “right” in the 
personal stories selected and these were used in different contexts. Personal narratives 
making explicit references to concepts of included the following 
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Allyson was very clear that it was her right to do what she wanted with her life (Chris 
Larner, 2013). 
To die with dignity should be everybody’s right (Dr Anne Turner, 2013). 
These expressions of rights attempted to justify the choice of assisted death grounded in free 
will through the inherently rational nature of human beings, especially in the face of serious, 
debilitating illness. Both contributions position a right to die as a fundamental, individual 
liberty right. 
 
Human rights discourses used in the public narratives, in contrast to Patron support and the 
dominant rhetoric of DiD, demonstrated relatively little consideration of rights as legal 
entitlements, although some patients were aware of the current limitations of the law. This 
was expressed clearly in the comprehensive contribution by Jane McDonald who died from 
Multiple Sclerosis and bone cancer in August 2009, 
As a former nurse I am aware that despite the best medical care and the finest 
hospices, there is a chance of dying in pain and certainly in distress, with a loss of my 
personal dignity. I would like the opportunity to choose the time and place of my 
death if life becomes unbearable. To do this I would need the help of a doctor who 
would be open to prosecution by offering help. The law needs to be changed so that 
this simple humanitarian assistance can be offered to those who wish for it, this should 
be within the law, provided that appropriate safeguards are in place. 
 
When an initial query was run using NVivo10, the term “right” appeared as only the eighth 
most frequently occurring word. The apparent lack of references to rights understood as 
human rights in the public narratives seemed to dispute the hypothesis that rights were 
central to the end of life policy and debate on assisted death. Analysis of the personal 
narratives suggested that not all voices within the organisation explicitly articulated rights or 
defined their experiences through rights discourses. Personal stories referred less to 
understandings of rights compared to other actors in the organisation and with information 
presented through mediated communication. Analysis of the themes running throughout the 
personal stories revealed that “choice” was referenced 54 times in 31 sources and “suffering” 
was referenced 49 times in 29 sources, compared to “dignity” that only featured 22 times in 15 
sources and “rights” that occurred 16 times in 11 sources.  
 
The main reasons suggested for this unexpectedly low reference to rights is that members of 
the public through their personal accounts demonstrated that they were not familiar or 
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comfortable with explicitly using rights. Members of the public could also have a very limited 
understanding of human rights per se. Instead, their stories focused on their own experience 
of illness, their symptoms and the suffering they endured as part of their illness. Arguments 
were largely validated through their phenomenological experiences using everyday language 
such as pain, suffering and choice. These concepts, which typified the discourse used by 
members of the public, are characterised as having localised and immediate meanings (Christie 
and Martin, 2007: 6). Although the personal narratives, compared to other voices in the 
organisation, showed less engagement with their predicament in terms of rights, an implied or 
implicit understanding of rights discourses was revealed in a number of personal accounts. 
These implied associations with rights informing end of life primarily included individual choice 
and a desire to alleviate suffering in order to maintain human dignity. The findings of the data 
also confirmed that singular components of rights, including choice and control, were valued 
so that rights were implicitly understood to promote and support human self-determination 
and free will as a natural desire.  
 
Dignity 
In the word frequency query, “dignity” occurred 134 times, but was coded infrequently at 
nodes because it was mostly used in the context of referring to the organisation Dignity in 
Dying. The lack of reference to human dignity in the selected narratives was surprising. It was a 
significant contrast to the language used generally by Dignity in Dying to support their 
objectives and to earlier findings in the research, where the concept of dignity featured 
prominently in current UK healthcare policy and was also discussed during the later House of 
Lords debates. The minimal references to dignity expressed in only 15 out of 36 personal 
stories, were mostly ambiguous, and, when not used to refer to the organisation Dignity in 
Dying, were used and understood implicitly as part of a rights discourse citing respect for the 
maintenance of inherent personal dignity. Although the narratives did not articulate dignity 
and indignity as such, it is suggested that their comprehensive experiences of suffering and 
focus on painful symptoms, did encompass aspects of this. As proposed above, the lived 
experience of suffering indirectly relates to public perceptions of dignity and is frequently used 
to describe what is regarded as an undignified situation at the end of life. In addition, the 
desire for an assisted death in order to relieve unbearable suffering implies a means to being 
able to achieve a more dignified death. In this way, concepts of suffering and dignity are being 
spoken of, and woven together, through an understanding of human rights. 
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Critical summary 
Analysis of the individual narratives that prioritised choice, and dignity through the relief of 
suffering, has demonstrated how a sample of the public has interpreted and articulated their 
understanding of rights within the context of death and dying. These particular frames 
resonate across a broad spectrum of target audiences. Narratives are crucial to defining the 
terms of the end of life debate. They serve to construct a shared meaning and social identity 
and, to an extent, the findings have revealed that rights discourses are understood as 
important at the end of life.  Readers can identify with these narratives in relation to their own 
experiences or that of loved ones, enhancing Turner’s notion of collective sympathy discussed 
earlier. In some of the personal stories, the focus was not on rights but the distressing 
symptoms and state of suffering where support for a right to die was generated through 
evoking a common human sympathy at the distressing circumstances endured by some dying 
individuals. In the context of a campaigning organisation, the personal stories that foreground 
rights to a greater or lesser extent explains how rights discourses may be adopted or 
disregarded as a strategy to suit the objectives of the organisation and the current social or 
political context. This is indicative of RFAs as proposed by Miller (2010).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an insight into the strategies of Dignity in Dying as a national 
organisation campaigning to legalise assisted death. They are unique on the basis of their 
historic foundations. The organisation has campaigned on a single issue over a period of 81 
years and operated in a social environment that has seen many changes during this time. The 
original VES was established in 1935 and a right to assisted death, or voluntary euthanasia as it 
was termed, was initially defended as an act of mercy on the basis of a concern with dying 
terribly and in pain. At the outset, the organisation showed some awareness of rights when it 
was argued by Killick Millard (1931) that “incurables” should be permitted voluntary active 
euthanasia as an “elementary human right”. However, rights were not articulated explicitly in 
the aims or ethos of the organisation, nor discussed further at this time.  
 
The case study findings suggested that rights discourses are more widely used by the 
organisation in a contemporary context and have become central to defining the terms of the 
end of life debate. An increased life expectancy, together with the ability of modern medicine 
to prolong and postpone the dying experience, has revealed unbearable suffering at the end of 
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life as a reality in the typical experience of death and dying. Understanding rights in the 
context of increasing healthcare consumerism, and highlighting the poignant inequalities in 
healthcare policy and legal statute where “some dying people are forced to suffer against their 
wishes” issues a challenge to medical paternalism and argues that assisted dying is a credible 
alternative, or at least an additional option, to the mainstream medical model (DiD b, 2016). As 
a result of changes evident in the late modern dying trajectory, the apparent proliferation of 
rights discourses, and the activities of campaigning organisations, assisted dying has been 
redefined as an individual right to die. This case study analysis has illustrated how, when, for 
what purposes, and to what extent, rights discourses have come to be utilised to interpret and 
articulate the complex issue of requested death and embed rights in this context.  
 
Responding to the call by Miller (2010) to further develop understandings of rights strategies 
outside traditional rights-based approaches, the data from this chapter largely corroborates 
that DiD did adopt a rights-framed approach (RFA, as defined by Miller, 2010). As an 
organisation campaigning on one distinct and peculiar issue, DiD are indicative of how RFAs 
continue to emerge in other sectors and contexts. Within an end of life context, rights 
discourses were used strategically and specifically by DiD as a key part of their campaign to 
legalise assisted death. The research data demonstrated that, particularly in the campaign 
period leading up to the 2014 House of Lords debate, the activities of Dignity in Dying reflected 
the social context and employed rights discourses in conjunction with their own purposes. As a 
specific strategy, this was intended to resonate with target audiences, namely, members of the 
public and political figures who were soon to debate the issue in the House of Lords.  
 
The concept of framing is one of the six key dimensions of a RFA (Miller, 2010:925). Since 
2006, DiD centralised the value of human dignity, both through the name of the organisation 
and more recently through their aim of a dignified death, expressed as a “right to a dignified 
death”, a “right to die well” and the “right to a good death. Choice was also expressed and 
foregrounded through the vision of the organisation in order to enhance their objectives of 
“choice”, “access”, and “control” at the end of life. The strategic use of a rights frame linking 
notions of choice and dignity understood as rights, was evident through analysis of mediated 
communication, the voices of Patrons and personal narratives. This instrumental use of rights 
discourses was used to enhance arguments for permitting individuals to die according to their 
own values and beliefs.  
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The application of a RFA represents a tool, used to serve the official approach of DiD. In the 
case of DiD, this was not necessarily defined by a normative understanding of human rights 
frameworks but rather reflected and supported the liberal foundations of the organisation that 
highlight individual liberty to determine the manner and timing of death. Through the desire 
for a good death, DiD offered a new basis for a collective identity based on a universally 
aspirational understanding of rights that challenged the indignity of dying, instead promoting 
the option of dying well. In light of Miller’s (2010) contribution, the case study of DiD 
supported and built upon her conclusion that there are different ways of using rights. It 
confirmed that a “one size fits all” label cannot be applied. The case study findings are 
presented below to illustrate the ways in which DiD utilised a rights-framed approach in the 
context of their campaign to legalise assisted dying. This table has been developed from 
Miller’s (2010:924) original table with her permission. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Illustrating Dignity in Dying’s use of a rights-framed approach  
Rights-framed approaches as 
developed by Miller (2010)  
Example of a rights-framed 
approach demonstrated by 
Dignity in Dying 
Used as a tool to serve the official approach Contemporary, official approach 
emphasises dignity and liberty “We believe 
that everyone has the right to a dignified 
death”. Realised through “choice, access 
and control” 
Is driven by NGO policy Policy goals to legalise assisted death (right 
to die) for mentally competent, terminally 
ill adults 
Starts from ideological base, then 
strategically repackages beliefs and ideas 
through a human rights frame to 
potentially: motivate/mobilise collective 
action; demobilise antagonists; legitimate 
Liberal ideological base (more apparent in 
contemporary context). Repackages right 
to choose and right to dignified death to 
mobilise public. Demobilises antagonists 
and legitimises actions through desire to 
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action; advance own beliefs; transform 
terms of the debate, and ‘fit’ institutional 
venues 
alleviate suffering. Transforms debate 
through belief that everyone has a right to 
a good death and to die well. Resonates 
with healthcare policy and institutions 
through emphasis on dignity and patient 
participation 
Will strategically utilise the power of the 
idea of universal human rights to motivate 
others (activists and campaign targets) 
Dignity centralised within the organisation 
since 2006. Reflecting foundational 
position on rights, inherent and universal 
dignity used strategically to motivate all 
members of public and potential political 
allies 
Strategic priorities may make references to 
ideas of human rights (and less frequently 
international standards) but this is not 
required 
Strategic priorities use Patrons and 
personal narratives to articulate their 
understandings of rights and draw debate 
into parallel with other complex dilemmas. 
No direct references to international 
human rights standards, for example, the 
right to life or the right to privacy 
Only appeals to ideas of rights when 
considered to be strategically advantageous 
to specific campaign contexts 
Rights discourses most emphatic at the 
time of the 2014 House of Lords debate, 
particularly evident in campaign newsletter 
issue 3 of 3 
Only on occasion and when beneficial will 
cite specific human rights language, 
covenants or agreements 
Provisions  in the HRA 1998 cited in 
campaign newsletter issue 3 of 3 to 
highlight patients’ rights and promote 
advance decision-making 
 
 
The case study analysis of DiD demonstrated some common findings with the House of Lords 
debates in respect of the language used and the ways in which rights discourses were adopted 
and given meaning. Data from both stages of the research revealed a historic variation in 
language, and provided examples where different understandings and interpretations of 
human rights were evident and had been developed to a greater or lesser extent. These 
findings suggest that rights discourses have become central to, and are currently being used to 
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define the end of life debate and policy on assisted death, but in ways that are complex and 
warrant further sociological exploration.  
 
The following chapter examines the views of selected members of the public to hear the 
language with which they articulate their concerns and thoughts on death and dying, and how 
they understand a right to die in the current social context. The reach and impact of rights 
discourses can be indicated, in part, through hearing the perceptions of members of the public 
as they contemplate the issue of assisted death. This could suggest how widely or effectively 
rights discourses are permeating the public sphere, and to what extent they are being used to 
negotiate issues at the end of life. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
Focus group discussions with Death Café participants 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how focus group participants used and understood 
human rights discourses when considering issues at the end of life. This chapter will examine 
the ways in which, and to what extent, a previously unexplored subject group adopted rights 
discourses to discuss death and dying, independent of any apparent or organisational purpose. 
The participants represented a London-based sample of members of the public associated with 
Death Café, Hampstead who identified themselves as having a specific interest in speaking 
about end of life, evidenced by their attendance at Death Café. This research is the first to 
analyse these new voices through three focus group discussions conducted at the Café Rouge, 
Hampstead in September 2014, October 2014, and February 2015. Participants included 
professional, educated individuals living in a relatively affluent area and each group comprised 
both males and females of a varied age range. Although this was not a truly representative 
sample of the public and the findings are not definitive, analysis of their discussions did 
illuminate the language with which some members of the public conveyed their concerns and 
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values on end of life. Such voices act as a supplementary finding, constituting part of a wider 
narrative informing the debate in a current context.  
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first section begins by introducing participants’ 
responses when they were directly asked what they understood by having a right to 
something. Subsections then examine, more specifically, predetermined concepts identified as 
important from the findings of the earlier stages of the research. These concepts, including 
dignity, liberty, capacity, and suffering were also of interest to focus group participants and 
were mostly grounded in, or associated with, human rights discourses. However, they may not 
have been explicitly articulated or interpreted as such. The second section examines 
alternative approaches to the end of life expressed by participants in light of their religious 
beliefs and cultural backgrounds. The chapter concludes with an analysis of how central rights 
discourses were to participant discussion on end of life and the extent to which this informed 
their perceptions of a good death. 
 
 
8.1 Understanding rights 
Approximately half way through each discussion I asked “So what do you understand by a right 
to die, what is a right to something?” This question was met with complete silence in all three 
groups! Despite having allowed participants time to become comfortable with each other, 
generate good discussion and share their thoughts and experiences on topics that included 
dignity, choice and suffering, this question clearly proved awkward. Non-verbal 
communication indicating this included the raising of eyebrows, frowning, looking away, 
audible sighs, sniffing and intake of breath, murmurs, slight raising of shoulders and shifting of 
position. The only direct and immediate response came from a 30 year old female in the first 
focus group who touched upon the essence of rights from the perspective of individual liberty, 
“It comes back to the issue of having control”.  
 
Participants were noticeably uncomfortable with this direct question, so I prompted on each 
occasion “Do you think people should have a right to ask for assistance to die?” This question 
did initiate conversation. There was a general murmur of agreement and nodding of heads but 
rather than speaking in-depth on rights, each of the discussions moved quickly in other 
directions. This finding was key to the research data that certainly demonstrated how 
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members of the public had difficulty relating to rights, as such and did not seem to 
contemplate rights explicitly in this context. All participants appeared unfamiliar with the 
concept of having a right to die and were reluctant to engage further in discussion. The sole 
participant who articulated a notion of rights directly spoke about a “right to choose” in 
relation to her desire for a pain-free death, 
I would like the right to choose should I get cancer, which I don’t believe I will. I would 
like to have the morphine in my hand, or to have someone I could trust…and even 
though I want to have a conscious death, I don’t know how I am going to respond to 
severe pain (Female, aged 59). 
This conjunction of a right to choose has been evident throughout the history of Dignity in 
Dying and has surfaced more recently in the later House of Lords debates and healthcare 
policy as choice becomes an increasingly esteemed concept. Although no other comments 
spoke of a right to choose directly, this idea was obviously inherent and implied throughout 
the discussions that emphasised choice as an expression of individual liberty.  
 
During the focus groups, a number of responses recognised the constructed nature of a right 
to die as they acknowledged variations on attitudes towards death and dying that were time 
and context specific. One indicative example argued 
You could say it’s the baby boomers belief that they can decide how they want to live, 
they can decide how they want to die, they can have a baby, birth control and they can 
have assisted dying if they want to (Female aged 63). 
This “baby boomers belief” highlighted the extent to which individual choice in contemporary 
UK society has become an idealised and accepted concept. Interestingly, this comment 
illustrated how belief in personal liberty was not defined or limited by traditional frameworks 
or institutionalised norms, corroborating the earlier observation that the UK is becoming more 
secular and less community oriented. Instead, it supported a notion of unconditional liberty, 
allowing “baby boomers” to make unrestricted decisions in complex and personal dilemmas, 
including matters of life and death. Another comment raised cultural, geographical and class 
differences to show how particular discourses could develop in relation to a social context, 
I think the issue around life and death is still taboo. People find it very hard to deal 
with…in other countries it’s not even an issue. In Greece where I come from I don’t 
even think people…if we die, it’s an end to suffering, especially in rural places, so I 
think the right to die is kind of a middle class construct (Female, aged 36). 
 
When speaking directly about a right to die, most group participants referenced this in relation 
to a legal context, as in having a right and being entitled to something. One could say that their 
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understanding of an explicitly articulated right to die was reflective of a legal positivist 
approach to rights. There was, however, a noticeable lack of knowledge over the current legal 
status of assisting a suicide suggesting participants had not explored these options in detail. 
Perhaps they had no need or interest in doing so. In each of the group discussions, I briefly 
explained the legally permitted options at the end of life and outlined the most recently 
proposed House of Lords Bill. Armed with this information, opinion was divided on whether 
legislation would be a definitive course of action. One comment that indicated faith in the role 
of the law argued “somebody’s got to decide, you can’t have it not enshrined in law or 
everybody would be bumping everybody off!” (Male, aged 60). Another person continued this 
discussion to question the limitations of the law, in particular, the ability of institutions to 
monitor and implement a (hypothetical) right to die fairly, “ Once a law is passed who is going 
to check whether this is their real choice or if it’s uncertain because it’s for their will or 
money?” (Female, aged 66). This was an insightful observation and one that was also raised as 
a concern in the more recent House of Lords debates in opposition to legalising assisted death. 
From a liberal perspective, state responsibility entails the regulation and enforcing of moral 
conduct to protect citizens from harm. However, establishing legality does not prevent abuse, 
and, even where there are stringent safeguards in place, the extent of “real choice” can remain 
ambiguous. 
 
In one group, rights were generally understood as legal entitlements and here participants 
were especially concerned that the current prohibition on assisted death was forcing 
desperate individuals to take measures to end their own life and how this could have a 
detrimental impact on other people. One person commented 
I think it’s far better to do it in controlled conditions than it is for somebody to jump 
off a building or in front of a bus or train. That is cruel on anybody else. At least in your 
own environment you’re not traumatising anyone else (Male, aged 65). 
In contrast to the House of Lords debates where it was argued that legalisation of assisted 
death may potentially lead to abuse of the vulnerable, elderly and disabled who may be 
subject to assisted death without their consent, this remark expressed concern for not 
legalising an assisted death through fears for the direct and immediate consequences upon 
those witnessing a suicide. Individuals do not exist in isolation. Their death will impact upon 
other members of the community and the impact of watching the suicide of an individual may 
be traumatic and distressing. Assisted death, legally permitted within a controlled 
environment, enables dying individuals to determine the timing and conditions of their death 
with the possibility of loved ones being present. This was argued as less traumatic than 
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sudden, and desperate, actions impacting upon unrelated members of society. This 
contribution demonstrated some similarity to the argument of Diane Pretty in 2002 when she 
petitioned the court citing violation of Article 8 of the HRA 1998 claiming that ending her life 
was a private matter that ought to be free from state interference. There was no direct 
reference to the right to a private and family life in the focus groups, but in the same way that 
there was an evident respect for personal choice in the discussions, privacy was also valued.   
 
All three focus groups were hesitant and unsure how to explain their attitudes towards a right 
to die and to elaborate upon their positions on rights in general. Despite the repeated 
question, their minimal responses suggested that for them, there was no apparent benefit, 
social, legal or political in using rights discourses explicitly in the context of death and dying 
which may explain the ambivalence. Although participants were used to sharing their own 
personal experiences and emotions in a group discussion, they may not be familiar with, or 
comfortable, speaking specifically in terms of rights in an end of life context. Focus group 
participants, in a similar manner to the personal narratives on the Dignity in Dying website, 
drew upon, and prioritised, their life experiences rather than thinking about dying from an 
intellectual or conceptual perspective. This may not negate the importance of rights as a 
plausible basis from which to debate the end of life, or dispute the essence of rights, but may 
be due to lack of understanding or familiarity with this discourse.   
 
The idea of having a right to die in its literal sense was completely dismissed on a single 
occasion. This person who openly shared her spiritual beliefs and did not speak English as her 
first language observed “well we will die, so there’s not a right” (Female, aged 66). This critique 
was similar to that of Lord Tebbit in the House of Lords (2014, col 788) who argued “We do not 
have that right; we have only the capacity to do it”, and the question posed by Scolding (2011) 
in Chapter 1 “how can a right to something that inevitably happens to all of us suddenly 
arise?” These arguments are critical of a rights label. They take issue with a literal notion of 
rights and dispute the validity of rights discourses in relation to the end of life. Instead, these 
comments emphasise the natural and universal reality of death. This type of critique that 
totally rejects the application of rights to the end of life debate is a rare example. Additional 
participant contributions that did not support a rights approach from a religious or cultural 
perspective, are considered in section 8.2. 
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8.1.1 Dignity 
In each focus group, I began the discussion by circulating the following quote typed on a piece 
of A4 paper: “I like to think that I have lived my life with dignity and I would like to be able to 
die with dignity” (Lisa Cooke, 2013). Participants were then asked directly “What does dignity 
mean to you?” At this stage of the research, I had corroborated dignity as an important but 
poorly theorised and ambiguous concept. Dignity constituted an essential component of 
human rights (Chapter 3), it was highly regarded in healthcare policy (Chapter 5), it was 
referred to in the historical debates (Chapter 6) and foregrounded in the campaign rhetoric 
and objectives of Dignity in Dying (Chapter 7). On this basis, I prioritised further exploration of 
the public perception of human dignity. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the direct question on 
rights, there was an immediate and enthusiastic level of engagement with the concept of 
dignity across all group discussions. Participant responses demonstrated that dignity in an end 
of life context was highly valued. In each group discussion, participants were conscious of the 
division between physical manifestations and the emotional/ psychological components of 
dignity. They identified concepts of both inherent human dignity and bestowed dignity 
through the relationship with others in a social context. The two are not mutually exclusive 
and focus groups supported the position of Jacobsen (2007) in section 3.1.1 who argued that 
dignity is a characteristic primarily residing in individuals but may then be earned, bestowed or 
diminished through social interaction.  
 
Inherent dignity encompassing autonomy and free will was typically expressed in the following 
comments as         
…control over your own bodily functions, maybe at the second level, autonomy of 
movement and will, whether that be assisted or not, but being able to go somewhere 
and do it if you want. Those are the two main things (Female, aged 50).  
Dignity is being able to take care of yourself and feel comfortable with it (Female, aged 
67). 
I believe it’s the ability to live according to the principles of one’s mind…if I was in a 
situation where my mind was damaged, if I was to be resuscitated then don’t 
resuscitate because it wouldn’t be me (Female, aged 30).  
These perceptions of inherent dignity assume a relationship between dignity and autonomy. 
Review of the literature confirmed that the status and protection of human dignity reflects a 
central issue in human rights. Conditions that enhance dignity of the dying experience are 
often reciprocally linked with autonomy expressed through sentiments of personal choice and 
control, using rights as the common basis for this association.  
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In response to the prompt ”does dignity depend on how other people act towards you?” the 
general consensus approved the concept of bestowed or socially acquired dignity through 
vigorous head-nodding and murmurs of agreement. This relational aspect of dignity, noted to 
be consistent across all three groups, centred upon being treated by others with dignity and 
receiving high quality personal care. One person explained “Dignity for me is also about when 
you’re not able to care for yourself and someone else cares for you and shows respect for you 
in that situation when you can’t really express your needs” (Female, aged 36). Another person 
commented “it includes also respectful care, caring” (Female, aged 63). All participants were 
aware that at the end of life they may become dependent upon others and they prioritised 
receiving care that enhanced their sense of dignity. Dignity and respect are central tenets of 
care of the dying and earlier analysis of government healthcare policy in section 5.4 revealed 
these concepts to be grounded in rights discourses emphasising the need for good quality care 
and efforts that strive to maintain dignity at the end of life. Notably, no-one referred to the 
experience of witnessing a sudden, violent death, or considered the likelihood of this in their 
own end of life scenarios during any of the discussions. Instead, participant comments 
assumed that death would occur slowly as a result of chronic or degenerative illness and 
would, most likely, involve a period of incapacity. This is reflective of the late modern dying 
trajectory and it was interesting to observe how this awareness had filtered through to 
members of the public to become the socially accepted norm.  
 
Speaking about the experience of her elderly father who had recently died in a care home, one 
participant illustrated her understanding of the reciprocal relationship between inherent and 
social dignity,  
…it seemed that he had such lovely care because he was in a kind of care home, part of 
the NHS, and there was something about how carefully they treated him. The nurses 
there were just so nice and they also thought what a lovely man he was. He had 
dignity because he had a dignity within him (Female, aged 61). 
Treating others with respect and care involves elements of bestowed dignity. In the above 
comment, this was interpreted as reflecting the inherent humanity and dignity within a person 
and this could be meaningful to those who knew the dying individual.  
 
Dignity was discussed at length and in-depth which suggested that it was especially important 
to members of the public contemplating end of life. The findings of this thesis strongly suggest 
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that dignity is a central component of rights and, although the data from this stage of the 
research found that rights were not articulated explicitly, focus group participants did 
reference concepts associated with rights implicitly throughout their exchanges. Participants 
were willing and able to discuss, and elaborate upon, dignity in particular and this informed 
their perceptions of dying well. Even those participants who had some difficulty describing 
how they understood the concept of dignity were able to contribute to the discussion through 
their interpretation of what it meant to lose dignity. Not being able to describe what dignity is, 
but what it is not, confirmed that for these selected participants, it remained important. By 
way of illustration, an awareness of implied dignity that also included relational aspects of 
independence and control was suggested, “When you can’t look after yourself, can’t physically 
do things that you normally do, like going to the toilet, getting up and washing, dressing, and 
not being able to communicate” (Male, aged 65). 
 
Control, personal choice, and the maintenance of independence in activities of daily living, 
especially personal hygiene, were considered important components of dignity. The third focus 
group in particular, spoke at length about the issue of personal hygiene and toileting as 
reflecting their interpretation of a dignified or undignified situation until the following 
comment referred to the case of Stephen Hawking and argued that “he managed to preserve 
dignity and value in spite of having almost no physical ability at all. It does make me think that 
perhaps even more important than the physical bit is the mental part” (Male, aged 75). This 
observation considered dignity and value as reflecting one’s own perception of self and state 
of mind rather than the outward physical, social or practical aspects. It was also the only 
comment made by a male who considered dignity as an inherent quality rather than a social 
quality. This prompts the question of whether men and women assess dignity by different 
standards. Do men identify dignity as primarily measurable in a physical or relational capacity?  
         
During the course of long term illness, interpretations of what is dignified or acceptable may 
change. Perceptions of dignity are dependent on many factors and circumstances specific to 
the individual and the context. One person explained 
I think the problem with dignity is that it’s subjective, highly subjective. What one 
person thinks is undignified for someone else, it’s been that way for their whole life. 
They’ve never had the liberty that this other person has. So you can’t talk about 
dignity as any kind of static benchmark (Female, aged 50).  
This remark generated in-depth discussion on the concept of dignity linked to quality of life. 
Participants acknowledged that measures of life quality could change when diagnosed with 
175 
 
serious illness and challenge personal interpretations of human dignity. One testimony from a 
wheelchair dependent participant with a serious, progressive illness described 
I knew how my illness was going to go. I knew that it would be gradually debilitating 
and I had goalposts. Used to think that when I reach this level I don’t want to live 
anymore, and when I got to that level I thought “it’s not so bad, I can still do this or 
that, I’ll wait until the next level”. And yet again, I say that the next level is the last 
level, yet again, and still now at the end level…the next level is the last level, but I’m 
here, I’ve got this far (Female, aged 64).  
Human beings are resilient and their perception of dignity can shift over time. This was a new 
finding which had not yet arisen in the data; to suggest that dignity is not a static concept, 
rather it is subject to re-interpretation and re-evaluation, and this is key at the end of life 
where personal circumstances and symptoms experienced in the dying process can fluctuate 
over time. One male, (aged 60) in the same group spoke about a friend with Aids who had 
described his illness in a similar manner,  
…if it progressed to a certain stage he was going to top himself. He wouldn’t allow 
himself to live if this happened and he went beyond that. Then he got to that stage 
and it was alright and he said if he ever got to this level then just do me in, I don’t want 
to live like that. But then he went through that again, as you were saying, the decisions 
you make will change. The human condition is infinitely adaptable and we will adapt to 
our conditions, and what we want to project for ourselves will change.  
In the discussion on dignity, both these experiences invoked rational agency as a basis for 
individual liberty to determine and redefine their own boundaries and interpretation of human 
dignity as it changed over time.  
 
Most focus group participants comfortably articulated what dying with dignity involved for 
them. This suggested that they had already contemplated their own death, perhaps through 
their involvement with Death Café discussions or their experiences of seeing loved ones die. 
Examples of dignified death were considered as “being allowed to go in your own time” (Male, 
aged 65) and  “to have that sense that you’ve done what you can, that you’ve enjoyed what 
you can and that you are going with a sense of completion” (Female aged 67). These two 
comments made in lieu of each other by participants in the second group, understood a 
dignified death to comprise a sense of personal achievement linked to aspirations of autonomy 
suggesting dignity involved self-determination of the manner and timing of ones’ own death.67 
Studies reviewed in section 2.2 proposed that maintaining dignity in conjunction with the 
feeling that life has been lived to the full, is constituent of a good death according to Western 
                                                          
67
 Personal experiences and backgrounds of group participants varied but their understandings and use 
of rights discourses involving liberty and dignity across all three groups was broadly consistent. 
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standards and this could support an argument for legalising assisted death in order to respect 
individual decision-making when one feels life no longer has a purpose or meaning.  
 
The realisation of dignity in practice, was challenged by one group member who referred to 
the current legal status, “you can live your life with dignity, that’s up to you. But when it comes 
to ending your life, you don’t have a choice and that’s it, there is no choice at the end of life” 
(Female, aged 64). This participant referred to the legal prohibition of assisted suicide and 
limitations in regard to end of life decision-making to suggest that, while individuals are 
afforded liberty and can act with agency to maintain dignity in regard to their actions and 
preferences in life, a dignified death is not necessarily within your own control. Others 
supported the idea that death is often outside their control and unlikely to be dignified. There 
is provision in UK law and policy for individual choice in relation to some aspects of end of life 
decision-making that could enhance human dignity. However, the only legal option for an 
autonomous, dignified death that participants were aware of was self-starvation as discussed 
below.  
Despite the debated nature of dignity in the literature, dignity was prioritised by most focus 
group participants across all the groups as an important concept. Reasons for this are not 
definitive. The Death Café concept does not particularly promote dignity, (or other values) but 
individual motivation for attending Death Café events could have been triggered by a 
bereavement or experience of serious illness provoking deeper contemplation of options at 
the end of life. Receiving medical treatment and attention in a hospital, hospice, or home 
setting will also have impacted upon individual perceptions of dignity. As one participant 
observed, dignity “also includes respectful care, caring” and personal experiences may have 
generated some thought as to the level of care and the manner in which care was given to 
themselves or loved ones. Dignity and dignity-conserving practices feature prominently as an 
aspirational standard in UK healthcare policy. This language may have filtered into the public 
discussion on end of life and been adopted on the basis that it is an accessible and generally 
agreeable discourse. In the 2003 House of Lords debates, Lord Laing highlighted the universal 
nature of dignity when he spoke of dying with dignity asking “Which of us…would not prefer to 
be given the choice to say enough is enough?” (House of Lords, 2003 col 1638). Many of the 
focus group comments also aligned dignity with choice. Their positions reflected an 
understanding of rights that strengthened a notion of human agency and may be empowering 
at the end of life. This way of understanding rights implicitly was evidenced in healthcare 
policy, the House of Lords debates and the campaign strategies of Dignity in Dying, but was 
embraced to an even greater extent through Death Café participants’ discussions. 
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8.1.2 Suffering 
The concept of suffering was criticised in the literature as relative and having ambiguous 
meaning. Personal stories on the Dignity in Dying website addressed the issue of suffering in 
detail and reinforced this subjective and individual nature of suffering in an end of life context. 
However, analysis of their narratives identified three distinct components typifying suffering at 
the end of life: emotional anguish; physical symptoms; incapacity and decline. In contrast to 
these personal narratives, focus group participants spoke more in general terms and only for a 
short time specifically on the nature of suffering but their responses did depict an awareness 
of both mental and physical aspects of suffering. Most importantly, their comments disclosed 
that they understood suffering as a rational basis for having a right to die. Some contributions 
focused on physical symptoms, primarily pain 
When people talk about it being acceptable for somebody to die, I don’t think it’s 
about any esoteric meaning of suffering. I think it’s about being in pain and you don’t 
want them to be in pain because that’s miserable for them and you don’t want people 
to be in misery (Male, aged 75). 
I’ve been caring for somebody with terminal cancer who was in a lot of pain. This thing 
about “oh yeah we can control the pain”, that’s bullshit you know. They can keep 
increasing the morphine but it never seems to quite catch up… (Female, aged 50). 
 
Other contributions discussed the differences and commonalities between physical and mental 
suffering  
This goes back to the whole question of… whether mental suffering is not thought to 
be as bad as physical suffering… For me, I think physical pain is generally more 
bearable than emotional pain because emotional pain can go on for much longer and 
is more tortuous” (Female, aged 50). 
…physical pain is also more socially acceptable and there is more room to say my back 
hurts because I fell over or a lorry got me, or I’m in excruciating pain, or how are you 
this morning? Oh, my back’s killing me. But if people ask how are you doing this 
morning, and you say pretty bad, I see no hope in the future and I want to die…” 
(Female, aged 59). 
Suffering as physical pain is more easily spoken about. Physical pain is often more visible and 
can be measured or related to concrete actions and experiences that form a generally 
understood basis for mutual sympathy and empathy. Findings of the group discussions gave 
the impression that physical pain and symptoms were involved in suffering and the desire to 
relieve that pain or distress was based on a natural instinct to enhance the well-being of 
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others. Interestingly, the vocabulary used to discuss this did not include compassion or 
sympathetic expressions grounded in compassionate discourses.  
 
Emotional anguish, as part of death and dying, is more difficult to articulate in linguistic and 
relational terms. Our emotions, alongside our fears, are more private rather than publicly 
expressed. Even though focus group participants were aware of the spiritual and emotional 
components of suffering, they had difficulty describing this anguish and may, in this respect, be 
representative of the UK public in that they demonstrated unfamiliarity with articulating 
emotional pain and suffering. The language available to express emotional anguish may also be 
dependent upon social and cultural factors. Focus group participants were from a variety of 
different backgrounds. However, this finding contrasts to the rich and graphic descriptions of 
emotional anguish analysed in the personal narratives offered on the Dignity in Dying website. 
Without having access to detailed demographics of focus group participants including cultural 
and ethnic backgrounds, the reasons for this cannot be elaborated upon. 
 
One group in particular linked the incapacity and declining health aspects of suffering with life 
quality. However, this, like suffering, is an ambiguous concept. What one person considers as 
suffering and an unacceptable quality of life, will be different from another as this example 
revealed  
…seeing people who have had accidents and are confined to wheelchairs and can only 
move their head and they can operate equipment with straws, is that quality of life? 
Who would want to live like that? I personally wouldn’t, but you can’t say they have a 
crap quality of life because they might not (Male, aged 65). 
Quality of life is a subjective concept that varies according to personal circumstances. In the 
same manner that perceptions of dignity can change, the understanding of life quality may 
need to be reinterpreted depending on variation in the progression and severity of illness or 
disability.  One person related her understanding of life quality to dignity and noted in severe 
illness 
…it’s not just about dignity and dying, it’s about dignity in life, living life and what 
counts in life and death, especially in intensive care units there is a blurring of the 
boundaries about what is life and what is death and I think doctors are in the dark 
about that. They make many hard decisions about what to do… (Female, aged 36). 
 
The data from all stages of this research has demonstrated that the experience and 
articulation of human suffering in the dying process has increasingly been drawn into the end 
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of life debate through an association with, and understanding of, dignity and indignity. This is 
an unexpected finding revealing how the concept of human suffering has shifted from being 
traditionally located in faith-based or compassionate discourses, to rights discourses. 
Arguments by focus group participants and personal narratives cited in the DiD website in 
favour of assisted death, frequently raised the desire to alleviate unbearable suffering as a 
rational explanation for requests for assistance to die. In this way, they could achieve, what for 
them, would be considered a dignified death reflecting personal choice and control in the 
dying process. The experiences of focus group participants, in common with the personal 
narratives, supported a universal notion of frailty and vulnerability proposed by Turner (1993). 
In the process of dying, they suggested unbearable or protracted suffering and increasing 
levels of pain could disrupt self-embodiment and challenge individual values and human 
agency. Suffering was also perceived to be lessened through the maintenance of human 
dignity and, in this way, the experience of suffering has shifted from one that previously 
provoked a compassionate response to one that has become the domain of human rights, 
involving the preservation of dignity and the avoidance of indignity in dying. These findings 
suggest that in contemporary society, the desire to relieve suffering is based on recognition of 
the dignity of fellow man. Demonstrating a link between suffering and dignity underpinned by 
normative understandings of rights, could help explain how it is possible to extend the scope 
of rights so they can be used to validate and protect new interests or new claims not 
traditionally or usually defined in terms of rights.  
 
8.1.3 Individual liberty 
Despite a general reluctance to engage with human rights per se, most participants across each 
of the three groups prioritised the values of individual liberty and free will at the end of life. 
Strong personal convictions defended the notion of individual choice in end of life decision-
making as a fundamental and innate value and this conception of liberty reflected a 
foundational position on rights. The underlying assumption for many of the participants 
discussing choice, was that human beings are rational, freely thinking and selective individuals. 
In the same way that they decide how to live their lives, control of their own death should also 
be free from interference by others. The following contributions were typical of those who 
emphatically defended freedom of choice underpinned by respect for human agency 
I think we should be able to choose. It’s us that’s choosing. If you’ve got to the point 
where your quality of life is not as you’ve had it then you want to go (Male, aged 65). 
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…you are the only person who should be allowed to decide. Everyone should be able 
to decide for themselves (Male, aged 60)68. 
The majority of participants who firmly defended a notion of liberty regarded this freedom to 
choose and freedom to decide for oneself as an individual and universal value. All persons 
were considered sovereign over their own life and death decisions. (The few comments that 
rejected this application were defended from a religious or cultural background, as discussed 
below in section 8.2).  
 
The curtailment of liberty in respect to end of life decision-making was strongly rejected by the 
majority of focus group participants, most vehemently by the same 60 year old male 
participant who continued  
The thing that makes me angry is the disrespect for people who want to die. You are 
not allowed to say “I’ve had enough of this”. That’s what makes me angry, it’s the lack 
of respect that no one individual has the right to say “I want out” and I think that’s 
wrong (Male, aged 60). 
This emotive outburst demonstrated a depth of feeling on the extent of personal freedoms. A 
number of participants prioritised unrestricted liberty and this included in circumstances 
where decisions taken were not necessarily in their best interests. Even where individual 
choices were not conducive to preserving life, there was an indication that an implied right to 
choose was important. In conjunction with this, the notion of mental capacity with regard to 
personal decision-making was discussed in detail and these findings are analysed in the 
following section. 
 
Not all comments were so forcefully expressed. The desire for individual liberty in the dying 
process also surfaced in accounts of an ideal death as in this comprehensive example 
I would like to have the option of assisted dying if I wanted to, and I would like to have 
the option of really good palliative care. I would like the option of having a death 
midwife with me and I would like to have my family with me. My ideal death is that I 
live a really long life in full vigour and social engagement and then I have a short illness 
that lasts maybe two or three months, so that I will be a little bit pounded and a little 
bit suffering. I think that’s rather good because it makes you feel “done” that you’ve 
“had enough” (Female, aged 63).  
                                                          
68
 All male participants emphatically defended a conception of personal liberty. The numbers in this 
study are too small to generalise but further study to assess male/ female differences in attitudes to end 
of life could enhance an understanding of gendered perceptions on death and dying, including assisted 
death. 
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This scenario involved a number of options that may be available at the end of life and 
presented a stark contrast with the previous comment. Priorities in dying were expressed in 
terms of attractive possibilities and potential ideals rather than fundamental rights or 
entitlements that could be demanded. These two participants’ attitudes at the end of life were 
clearly influenced by their individual backgrounds. The former participant’s personal 
experience, which he openly shared, had shaped his views. He had had a serious accident that 
was followed by numerous resuscitation attempts and this had left him angry and feeling 
dissatisfied with the medical treatment he received, primarily because he had preferred to die 
at this time. The latter participant was a psychotherapist and bereavement counsellor whose 
husband had been killed suddenly in a road traffic accident with no opportunity to take leave 
of his family, put his affairs in order or make decisions about how he died. These very different 
experiences demonstrate how individual perceptions and thoughts on end of life may arise. 
 
Only one participant observed that the exercise of individual rights could also entail a 
responsibility to consider the wider implications of human actions in relation to a community 
environment. This included an obligation to reflect upon personal choices with respect for 
other members of society, 
…you are part of a wider social group. That idea of individual choice disconcerts me a 
bit because it suggests that individuals are on their own… But individuals are in a 
society and that determines what you desire in many ways, what you consider as your 
right (Female, aged 36). 
This argument provoked a short reflection on the fulfilment of individual wishes against 
concern for the wider community. Participants acknowledged the sociable nature of human 
beings and a general desire to consider others. However, discussion then quickly turned to 
speaking about suicide and depression. These findings contrast with analysis of the data from 
the House of Lords where a large part of their debates was concerned with balancing the rights 
of individuals who request assistance to die with the rights of other members of society and 
discussion of state responsibility to protect potentially vulnerable groups of people. Reasons 
for this may be on account of their professional backgrounds. Many Members of the Lords 
were, or had been, connected with legal professions or institutions, and a number of focus 
group participants were therapists or counsellors. 
 
Two out of three groups spoke in depth about self-chosen options that were available and 
permitted outside the traditional medicalised model of care. In particular, a natural death 
through the choice of self-starvation was discussed. One female (aged 67) noted 
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The medical profession has this duty to prolong life, but I think that if you have a 
choice, there are ways of saying that I don’t want to die but I don’t want to live 
anymore, so the way to do that is to stop eating and drinking and you won’t last very 
long. 
Apart from suicide, the only legal options for adults wishing to end their lives are self-
starvation and refusal of life-prolonging medical treatment. To refuse medical treatment 
including artificial hydration and nutrition, adults must be deemed mentally competent 
(Mental Capacity Act, 2005). Participants shared examples where their loved ones had been 
recipients of a medicalised model of care or housed in institutions and had expressed a desire 
to hasten death through the refusal of food. These decisions were respected as a conscious 
demonstration of human agency as the following stories revealed  
When both my parents died, they said they’d had enough and stopped eating and 
within days they were dead (Male, aged 65). 
…she had been saying for years since my father died, 10 or more years before, that she 
wanted to die, but somehow not in a way that we quite believed…but right at the end 
of her life she said this in a new way and it was partly the exhaustion with the 
treatment she was receiving for all the infections and reacting badly to the antibiotics 
she was given getting nauseous…eventually we felt she said “enough of this” and she 
stopped eating and she died a dignified death, it was under her control, it wasn’t 
painful, it was in a good loving place (Male, aged 75). 
In each case, the experience of parent death was perceived as natural and dignified, occurring 
as a conscious response to illness and one that was determined by themselves. The option of 
self-starvation reflected autonomous decision-making at the end of life in a difficult situation 
where there was an opportunity to control the timing of death and achieve this in a dignified 
manner. Appetite is suppressed as a side-effect of many illnesses. The body does not need the 
same amount of nutrition when inactive, and self-starvation, although it may be prolonged and 
sometimes uncomfortable, does reflect human agency and facilitate a natural death.  
 
Although it was not expressed explicitly in the language of human rights, personal choice 
involving human agency was respected. This was articulated at times as control over the dying 
process, and from a participant perspective, as revealed in the following contribution, this also 
had implications for human dignity, 
…control is very much a part of it, in the sense of control of what happens… When I say 
control, what I mean is, having some agency which need not involve being able to wipe 
your own bottom but it must involve being able to connect with other people (Female, 
aged 75). 
Participants across all focus groups agreed that choice at the end of life was important. But, as 
with the concept of suffering, they spoke in general terms rather than specific wishes or plans. 
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In one group this led to wider discussion about the extent and relevance of choice, including 
the ability to make choices prompted by this comment 
I think choice should be there in healthcare much more, but the problem is, how can 
you decide what you want if you don’t know what it’s going to be like? When you’re 
judging your death from the vantage point of life and you don’t know how you’re 
going to die? (Female, aged 36). 
Despite advances in medicine and technology, the symptoms and prognosis of the individual 
dying trajectory cannot be accurately predicted and whilst one can plan, prepare and state 
personal preferences, the availability and ability to fulfil these cannot be guaranteed. There is 
information available with regard to existing legal provision for choice at the end of life.  
Advance Directives and Lasting Power of Attorney were briefly mentioned in the focus groups, 
but only one person had written an Advance Directive and there was a general lack of 
knowledge concerning these. Where discussed, participants thought these could be a useful 
indication of personal wishes but were unsure of their legal validity or how they would operate 
in practice.  
 
8.1.4 Capacity 
In connection with discussions about individual choice, the concept of mental competence 
arose and this was addressed in-depth in the first focus group. Respect for fundamental 
human liberty is supported by a natural law perspective on rights, but there is a historic and 
philosophical importance attached to rational decision-making within this approach to rights. 
Mental competence as defined in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has featured as a safeguarding 
criteria in all of the House of Lords Bills examined in Chapter 6, to ensure that only requests 
from rational individuals with certified mental capacity are permitted assistance to die. This 
criteria of mental competence, whilst argued as a necessary safeguard, negates an idea of 
universal and innate human rights to suggest that rights are only held by rational agents.  
 
In a contemporary UK context, rational capacity is determined by psychiatric assessment. 
Some focus group participants argued that mental competence was an important 
consideration in regard to end of life decision-making, particularly among the frail or elderly 
who could be influenced by others, 
As you get older, thinking about my mother, I don’t think she was as capable mentally 
at the end, so she wouldn’t have been thinking with as good a mind as to when she 
was younger so I think that when people are old they can be swayed, so there is the 
184 
 
worry of undue influence that people could influence them to make a decision 
(Female, aged 58). 
The degree of what is classified by the lay person as acceptable mental capacity is often 
difficult to define and capacity is inclined to fluctuate depending on the nature of illness, life 
events, and possible side effects from medication. This participant who referred to her own 
mother, associated being “capable mentally” with being of sound mind and not being 
susceptible or prone to influence.  
 
The notion of undue pressure is cited in opposition to the legalisation of assisted death and is 
relevant to the end of life debate, but was not considered or indeed prioritised by all focus 
groups.  One participant dismissed the influence of undue pressure solely in older age 
Throughout your life everybody influences other people to make decisions that they 
wouldn’t if so and so hadn’t said such and such so it’s not anything different to normal 
is it? The idea that only when you’re old can you get pressured into making decisions 
that you’re not happy with…it’s just not real (Male, aged 60). 
Although not typically part of a rights discourse, these concerns regarding capacity and undue 
influence are indirectly associated with understandings of rights because they are grounded in 
the limitation of personal freedoms, which has implications for human agency. 
 
In cases of chronic, debilitating illness, it would not be uncommon to experience periodic 
feelings of hopelessness, depression, and psychological stress. Clinical studies in Chapter 2 
revealed that incidences of depression were often used to question decision-making capacity 
and mental competence at the end of life. Focus groups did discuss severe depression in 
relation to requested death but participant contributions were most commonly related to their 
experiences of suicide. Rights discourses were not explicitly evident, but rather implied, 
through their contributions that inferred the decision to end one’s life was an expression of 
individual liberty. The following comments were indicative of this sentiment  
Those suicides where there isn’t an irrational ‘relieve me of my anger element’ are 
well thought out and even discussed and planned and things are put into place 
(Female, aged 63). 
I had a friend who did kill herself…I felt it was a waste but I knew how much she 
suffered and I respected that decision. She did it in a very clever way, she’d researched 
it, been on assisted dying sites on the internet, she’d set things up to do it properly 
(Female, aged 50). 
I don’t think you can say everybody who commits suicide is depressed. Some people 
think ‘you know what, it isn’t for me’ and they make a long plan and afterwards 
families will discover that everything has been put neatly in order (Female, aged 67). 
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Participants related their thoughts to incidences where depression was linked to suicide and 
wanting to end their own life, but their own experiences (of family and friends’ suicides) 
testified that suicides were not solely associated with depression. There were other factors 
involved and suicide could, and on occasion, should, be considered as a rational option. These 
experiences described suicides that were contemplated, planned or shared in advance. 
General impressions of suicide not indicative of a “relieve me of my anger element” were 
mostly regarded as a rational decision demonstrating regard for others and reflecting 
individual choice.   
 
Accounts of rational suicide challenge the historical and medical assumptions that has 
traditionally stigmatised suicide as a desperate and violent act, and literature positioning 
suicide with insanity and depravity. Focus groups instead articulated a sympathetic 
understanding of individuals who took steps to end their own lives. Not negating the need for 
stringent monitoring in general, and some level of competence in end of life decision-making, 
if the person has a settled intent to end their life, one must also respect decisional autonomy 
as an innate human value. At what point is individual mental capacity deemed not worthy of 
determining the end of life? Analysis of focus group discussions highlighted that dying is 
individual. There are deaths that include incidences of depression, and behaviour often outside 
what may be considered in healthcare as competent, but respect for personal liberty and 
human agency in the dying process was commonly and consistently prioritised.  
 
8.2 Alternative perspectives on death and dying 
In general, focus group participants inferred and understood concepts of individual liberty, 
freedom of choice and the maintenance of human dignity as the basis for having a right to die. 
This supported the literature that observed a decreasing trend in religiosity and rise in secular 
attitudes. However, a minority of individuals expressed their opinions on end of life from 
alternative perspectives. An understanding of rights used to determine the dying process was 
negated or challenged by some participants on account of their cultural backgrounds and 
religious beliefs. One participant defended her general reluctance to consider end of life 
choices and referred to her religious background that attributed decisions about the timing of 
death to a divine source rather than one determined by man. She explained 
…this comes from a longer belief that I have that when my time is right, I will know and 
have chosen it on another level. Therefore there is no need for me to be obsessed with 
death, more like how I live my life and when I start running out of time because I am 
186 
 
getting older to say, ‘what choice is there today to live?’…a dignified life with my 
fellow beings and myself (Female, aged 66). 
For this person, her religious belief also determined her attitude and understanding of a good 
death, “I would allow the illness or whatever is going to take me, to take me naturally” 
(Female, aged 66). 
 
Group demographics in relation to religious beliefs were not recorded in the data. Initially 
there appeared to be a high incidence of secular perspectives suggested through enthusiastic 
support for individual liberty and self-determination in all aspects of life and death. However, 
during the course of discussions, religious convictions became apparent and were shared 
openly by some. A number of participants expressed their commitments and values as 
“spiritual”. References were also made to the Christian, Catholic and Jewish faiths. One person 
who discussed her spiritual beliefs criticised the increasingly secular and physical parameters 
employed by contemporary society to address dying. She argued 
We don’t consider our spiritual being and we are in a box labelled “I am a suffering 
body, or a suffering mind” …we make decisions based on our pain and suffering rather 
than the greater things that there are that we can’t access when we are in pain and 
suffering and also on medication (Female, aged 60+).  
This participant had a firm belief in the after-life reflected in her interpretation of a good death 
and wishes at the end of life, 
For me it would be to have somebody there with me to remind me that I’m going to a 
better place and not focus on all the things that are wrong with me, the hospital, the 
tubes, and the needles and all that, but that the soul is going to a better place and will 
return in a better way (Female, aged 60+). 
Religious belief, including belief in an after-life, may negate the importance of rights in relation 
to end of life. A few participant contributions appeared dismissive of rights discourses in 
preference to faith-based discourses. For these individuals, the experience of dying was not 
the ultimate end. Instead, individuals were being rewarded by “going to a better place”. 
Ethnicity was not recorded as part of the information requested from participants but 
throughout the discussion those, other than British descent, identified themselves as Canadian 
(2), Greek (1) and Brazilian (1). The Greek and Brazilian participants, in particular, expressed 
difficulty in thinking about choosing the manner or timing of their own death. This, in part, 
could be associated with their respective orthodox and spiritual faiths which were discussed, 
plus their cultural backgrounds. 
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Two participants spoke of their experiences in caring for a dying parent and these 
contributions did support the perhaps easily disregarded notion that dying could be a period of 
transformation and growth both for the dying individual and care givers. These findings 
complemented the religious argument that dominated the 1936 House of Lords debate and 
has also arisen in subsequent debates; life is sacred and can be valuable even in the dying 
period where suffering is present. A 66 year old female participant explained 
My mother had four months before she died and we had to clean her bottom and for 
her it was awful, and yet what she learned and what my sister and I learned, was 
amazing …To see her having to trust us and to let go of her power and her capacity 
into our hands was a huge thing for her, but it was quite amazing how she transformed 
herself in those four months. 
A longer living/ dying interval arising from chronic illness is dominating the late modern dying 
trajectory and this has implications for human agency and personal liberty as the dying person 
becomes more dependent on others and must relinquish some aspects of liberty, in some 
cases including the ability to independently manage personal care. Participants considered the 
loss of freedom to manage personal hygiene and self-toileting to have an impact on dignity at 
the end of life. This finding contrasted with the clinical studies conducted by Gennip et al 
(2013a) that suggested physical symptoms were not significantly related to dignity. This 
confirms the subjective and relational nature of human dignity. The above account, despite 
having to perform intimate, personal care demonstrated how the dying process could involve a 
period of reconciliation with family members and enable personal growth. 
 
At the end of life, all human beings become vulnerable, and participant accounts of the dying 
experience of loved ones did support a universal notion of frailty and vulnerability. Human 
vulnerability in the dying process also influences the nature and quality of personal 
relationships with others as was observed in this account of caring for an elderly parent,  
…your vulnerability is no longer something you can hide, and that gives you such a 
chance for growth in the dying process…she allowed me to be close to her and we 
shared…she had been so emotionally closed and she became so open (Female, aged 
63). 
Focus group participants admitted that vulnerability in the face of death, combined with great 
suffering, could challenge established beliefs. Speaking about the experience of a religious 
friend who pleaded for assistance to die, one person shared 
I know that even goes against his own belief. He would generally have thought that 
suicide was wrong, he was a Christian, a pacifist, a conscientious objector, he thought 
killing was basically wrong and yet he was begging me to kill him because he had 
basically had enough of the pain (Female, aged 50).  
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As increasing levels of pain disrupt self-embodiment and challenge one’s values and beliefs, 
actual or anticipated suffering is increasingly used to justify the arguments for an assisted 
death. Even prominent religious figures, as illustrated through the example of former 
Archbishop Lord Carey in section 6.3.1, have been persuaded to change their position and 
support an assisted death for some individuals, on account of their having witnessed 
unbearable and protracted suffering.  
 
One participant challenged requests for assistance to die disputing the desire to die as valid or 
rational. Their opposition had a background in the Jewish faith which prohibits suicide as an 
immoral act. She argued that great suffering could prompt claims for a right to die, but felt that 
this still did not validate a request to die, 
No-one wants to die, what they want is an end to the conditions that they are 
experiencing in that moment that is causing them to suffer physically or emotionally, 
and were you to wave a magic wand and take away that suffering as often happens 
with people who do get better and don’t die when the doctors tell them they 
will…they are glad they didn’t…we need to differentiate between people wanting to 
die which is the experience and to make that distinction that they don’t really want to 
die, they want to have the conditions different (Female, aged 59). 
Initially this resonated as a well-articulated and valid point. If the conditions causing suffering 
were to be removed, then the individual would no longer be experiencing suffering and 
therefore not want to die. This comment also demonstrated awareness of a clear distinction 
between wanting unbearable suffering to end through death, or the preferable option of 
ending suffering that was separate from wanting to die. However, this viewpoint was quickly 
contested. Arguments were made that some individuals do, for different reasons that may or 
may not include suffering, wish to die, and that this show of self- determination was equally 
worthy of respect. 
 
Conclusion 
The data in this chapter appeared initially to contrast with the earlier research findings that 
revealed human rights discourses to be central to the UK end of life debate and policy on 
assisted death. The responses presented by focus group participants seemed inconsistent with 
other findings to the extent that rights seemed superfluous to public understandings of death 
and dying. When asked directly, participants had difficulty articulating or even attempting to 
articulate how they understood a right to something and what having a right to something 
could/ should/ would entail. This was surprising, but perhaps my own knowledge of conceptual 
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understandings and discursive expressions of rights should not have led to an assumption that 
group participants would be using this language. Selected members of the public, through 
their personal contributions demonstrated that they were not familiar or comfortable with 
explicitly using rights and had a very limited understanding of human rights per se.  
 
Analysis of focus group discussions revealed that explicit references to rights, including a right 
to life or a right to die were not articulated and a “right to choose” was expressed on only one 
occasion. However, if participants did not directly adopt rights discourses in contemplating 
death, they did nevertheless express their priorities at the end of life and desires for a good 
death grounded in an implicit understanding of rights. These implied associations, 
commensurate with the personal narratives analysed in section 7.4.2, primarily included 
individual choice and a desire to alleviate suffering in order to maintain human dignity. 
Concepts underpinned by a notion of human rights, including choice and control, were valued 
so that rights were implicitly understood to promote and support human self-determination 
and free will as a natural desire. By implicitly using components of rights discourses, the 
prioritisation of individual liberty was foregrounded in focus group discussions through 
definitive support for human agency and confidence in the ability of individuals to evaluate 
and determine their own values and beliefs in relation to life quality and end of life choices. 
Choice was frequently highlighted as important by participants who respected this as an 
expression of free will and rational self-determination perceived as inherent in human beings.  
 
The majority of contributions, in all group discussions, demonstrated compelling support for 
individual freedom with an emphasis on choice and (mostly) rational free will, suggesting these 
as the basis for making claims at the end of life. That said, participants also acknowledged the 
uncertain and ambiguous extent of choice. At the end of life, prognosis and symptoms are 
often fluctuating and difficult to predict which makes decisional autonomy difficult, but 
participant sentiments expressed that the experience of suffering and perceptions of life 
quality could only be determined by the dying individual. On this basis, the ability for 
autonomous decision-making should be maintained. In general, participants felt that they 
were entitled, or ought to be entitled, to make their own decisions about the manner and 
timing of their death. Some emphasised this as a fundamental aspect of being human, others 
seemed more ambivalent and considered the ability to choose as desirable, but not essential.  
 
190 
 
Respect for autonomy in dying can be grounded in universal notions of human frailty and 
vulnerability including losing independence, self-identity and altered relationships with others 
and the community. Analysis of the data in this chapter builds upon findings from the 
preceding data to suggest that it was not the physical act of being in control, but rather the 
emotional feeling of being in control that is important in the dying process. This feeling of 
being in control was linked with notions of agency, identity and human dignity that 
emphasised the importance of dignity in dying. Perceptions of focus group participants that 
are to some extent representative of the public was that the maintenance of human dignity 
was essential, particularly at the end of life and in circumstances where independence may be 
lost and the opportunities for autonomous decision-making become less, or less highly, 
regarded.  
 
Participant engagement with the concept of human dignity suggested that it was prioritised 
highly at the end of life. All participants could speak at length on their interpretations of 
human dignity in relation to dying well and for many this involved aspects of autonomy and 
human agency. Dignity as a concept was discussed in depth by participants. Their 
understandings supported and elaborated upon earlier suggestions of an inherent dignity 
indicative of a foundational position on rights expressed as “a dignity within him”. In this way, 
human beings were understood to be entitled to dignity solely by virtue of their humanity. 
Seeing loved ones treated with dignity was also interpreted as a reflection of one’s inner 
dignity “in a situation when you can’t express your own needs”. The exploration of dignity by 
participants is grounded, one could say, in a foundational perspective on dignity as a 
component of rights, but might also be understood from an anti-foundational or 
constructionist approach. The constructed nature of dignity was illustrated, by way of 
example, in the comment on dignity as a value being “more societal than personal”. 
Participants acknowledged the relational aspect of dignity as a social concept that could be 
accorded to a situation or bestowed upon an individual, or indeed lost or taken away by 
human action or circumstances.  
 
In response to a direct question on rights, there was widespread agreement across all groups 
that individuals did have a right to request assistance to die, but there was a general lack of 
knowledge of the law and little mention of a legal framework of rights in relation to 
determining options at the end of life. Even when discussed in the context of law and having a 
legal right to die, the public discourse on dying eschewed respect for a legal approach to rights. 
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Participants did refer briefly to the necessity of law around the issue of assisted death to 
prevent indiscriminate “bumping everyone off”, and a necessary degree of professional 
regulation to ensure failed suicides did not “botch the job”. Participants were also aware that 
the current status of assisting a suicide was illegal. They spoke instead about other options at 
the end of life, including suicide or self-starvation, which, in their experiences of parent death, 
had been a relatively peaceful, natural, and dignified death reflecting a method of self-
determination in the dying process.  
 
Focus groups did, on a few occasions, mention contested areas in relation to legalisation of 
assisted death. These mirrored the issues raised in the House of Lords debates but were not 
expanded upon or discussed in depth. Therefore they were not addressed specifically in this 
chapter. These included: the role and nomination of duty bearers (in the words of one male 
participant, aged 65 “who is going to do it?”); the possibility of undue pressure; confusion over 
the safeguarding criteria, and definition of a terminal diagnosis (“well, what’s terminal then?” 
female aged 64). In general, participants did not regard a legal positivist approach to assisted 
death highly. This was evidenced by instances where individuals had assisted in a death or 
where they expressed the prioritisation of autonomy and choice to attain a dignified death 
over respect for the prohibited status of assisting a suicide. 
 
The group discussions revealed a small number of contributions grounded in a religious or 
cultural background that were sceptical of a notion of rights and, in contrast to the majority of 
participants, did not prioritise individual liberty and freedom of choice as inherent and innate 
values. This position was similarly articulated in the House of Lords debates, most notably in 
1936 in opposition to the legalisation of assisted dying. At the end of life, values and beliefs are 
relative. They are influenced by socio-cultural norms, personal experiences and the dictates of 
individuals, families, institutions, whole societies and discourses that changes over time. 
 
Analysis of focus group discussions in common with the earlier research findings has 
corroborated that rights discourses are articulated by a range of social actors who apply their 
understanding and interpretation of rights in a range of contexts. Group discussions with 
Death Café participants contemplating end of life, has provided an original analysis of these 
voices in the debate and contributed to an explanation of how and to what extent particular 
discourses are adopted or rejected to ground individual values and beliefs. Group discussions 
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indicated the ways in which prevailing discourses were received by the public, and contributed 
to shaping their opinion. In the focus groups, it appeared that an explicit discourse of rights 
had not ensconced itself in participants’ vocabulary. There was limited references to rights per 
se, and they seldom used the language of rights directly to share their perceptions of death 
and dying. However, they frequently used an implicit understanding of rights, underpinned by 
an essence of rights that primarily invoked respect for individual liberty involving choice and 
human dignity. Most contributions implicitly drew upon rights discourses to describe what 
dying well meant to them as individuals as they shared their personal experiences and debated 
differences of opinion. The overwhelming impression from focus group participants 
highlighted that at the end of life the opportunity to die well and experience a good death was 
universally desirable. The majority of participants, in common with other actors who 
supported the option of an assisted death, thought this to be enhanced through respect for 
individual liberty, beholding a sense of identity based on human dignity and maintaining the 
feeling of being in control to achieve the death that would reflect their personal values in life. 
In this way, the responses of focus group participants complemented the earlier research 
findings and helped confirm the notion that human rights discourses have become central to 
the current UK debate on end of life. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
Conclusion 
 
Interest in this research area was triggered by my own perception that human rights 
discourses were becoming more prominent in defining end of life. The ways in which end of 
life issues, including the option of assisted death, are articulated and understood has 
implications for how individuals think about death and dying. Assisted death, expressed by a 
number of social actors as a “right to die”, is a controversial and very personal topic but one 
that was important to address in light of the late modern dying trajectory, and, on the basis of 
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the universality of death. Premised on a social constructionist approach, this research has 
enabled comprehensive exploration of the discourses used in end of life policy and debate, to 
reveal how rights can be interpreted and applied in a different context. The findings of this 
study confirmed that human rights discourses have become central to end of life policy and 
debate in the UK. They have impacted our understanding of dying but in ways that are 
complex, and arise as a reflection of dying at a specific period in history.  
 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to draw together the different threads of my 
research and findings to explain, through analysis of the data, how, when, for what purposes, 
and to what extent, rights discourses have become central to death and dying. It will also 
illuminate the role of different social actors who have articulated and understood rights 
discourses in this context. This chapter is divided into six sections to reflect the research 
findings. The first section reviews the contemporary landscape of death and dying to 
contextualise a notion of rights at the end of life. The second section explores how different 
approaches to rights inform the understandings of rights that social actors draw upon. Across 
all stages of the research there were both similarities and differences in the use and 
interpretation of rights discourses. Prior to discussion of the data, the main findings are 
presented in Figure 9.1 for the purposes of clarification and illustration. This table summarises: 
how; when; for what purposes, and to what extent, rights discourses have featured in the 
research. The third part of this chapter demonstrates, through document analysis, how rights 
are currently being defined in UK law and policy, although this has been challenged in a 
number of ways. The fourth section examines how explicit and implicit understandings of 
human rights have been used to argue both for and against the legalisation of assisted death 
during the historic and contemporary debates. The fifth part of this chapter refers to the case 
study analysis of Dignity in Dying to illustrate how a rights-framed approach was used by a 
campaigning organisation in an end of life context. The findings from focus group discussions 
with Death Café participants are discussed in the sixth section to reveal how they understood 
rights with regard to death and dying.  
 
9.1 Contextualising rights at the end of life 
This study has confirmed that there is, at present, a high level of public engagement with the 
end of life debate. Issues associated with death and dying are increasingly being brought into 
the open in a number of different ways. Political debates have taken place in both the House 
of Lords and the House of Commons, high profile figures have publicly spoken out about their 
194 
 
views, and emotive legal petitions have been raised by individuals requesting an assisted 
death, all of which have received extensive media coverage. The activities of “right to die” 
organisations are encouraging public awareness and support for assisted dying through various 
strategies involving mediated communication, public demonstrations, lobbying, and locally 
targeted campaigns. Death is becoming more visible through a number of public, and private 
enterprises, independent initiatives, and social franchises such as Death Cafes, workshops, 
support groups, and festivals. The Dying Matters Coalition offer a wide range of resources to 
help people discuss death, dying and bereavement. Their reach extends across a host of 
different organisations and they promote local and national events to raise awareness of end 
of life concerns. These efforts have stimulated discussion in the public domain so that end of 
life concerns are now considered less of a taboo and more easily spoken about.  
 
Changes to the late modern dying trajectory in Western societies have been facilitated by 
advances in medical technology enabling early diagnosis and the possibility of treating a host 
of potentially life-limiting conditions. This has resulted in a longer life expectancy and one that 
typically involves chronic, or serious illness, and multiple ailments. As follows, individuals now 
have an extended period of time to reflect on their situation and prognosis, and this raises new 
areas for debate. NHS management of health and illness, through a doctor-led medical model 
of care, is becoming indubitably contentious. The limits of currently available options at the 
end of life are heavily criticised by some and the patriarchal model of care with associated 
superimpositions of knowledge and power is being challenged by individuals who are 
increasingly demanding respect as a self-determining participant in the dying process. This has 
been exacerbated through an emerging emphasis on, and prioritisation of, individual choice 
that is reflected in the marketisation of healthcare provision and the positioning of patients as 
healthcare consumers.  
In light of the decline in traditional religious and community frames of reference, discussed in 
section 2.2.2, individuals are more commonly negotiating and validating their own lifestyle 
choices. These choices, to some extent, are shaped by the prevailing discourses. The findings 
of the data confirm that human rights discourses involving concepts of individual liberty and 
human dignity have become central to the debate on end of life and this represents a shift in 
ways of thinking about death and dying in contemporary UK society.  Individual liberty, 
expressed as choice and control has been prioritised and a strong correlation between a sense 
of dignity and autonomy has developed. These concepts were revealed through this research 
as key to influencing current attitudes towards the end of life. Some actors have interpreted 
this as suggesting that individuals could, or should, be permitted to decide the manner and 
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circumstances of their own death, and this includes requesting help from others to assist in 
their death.  
 
Attitudes towards death and dying in late modernity have been transformed by the application 
of rights discourses, to the extent that assisted death on occasion is expressed as a right to die. 
The notion of rights is, as this research has discovered, currently being thought about in a new 
context. The process of dying is especially personal. An understanding of rights at the end of 
life is being applied to enhance the idea that individuals are sovereign over their own property 
and able to self-determine, not only how they live, but how they die. The effect that particular 
discourses have on social, political, and cultural processes has been a fascinating area for 
study. During the research process, it became evident that more clarity was needed to 
ascertain how rights discourses are employed and understood at the end of life and to focus 
on the actors who are using this. This research was able to offer some explanation for how, 
when, to what extent, and, for what purposes, issues at the end of life have come to be 
articulated using rights discourses, and on what basis assisted death may be conceived as a 
right to die.  
 
9.2 Contemplating human rights 
The findings of the data suggest that the ways in which a right to die could arise and operate in 
practice depends on how rights are understood, and imbued with meaning, by different social 
actors. Sociological research on death and dying had not explored how aspirations and values 
at the end of life have come to be articulated as “rights” or the role of actors that are using this 
discourse. Human rights frameworks were examined in Chapter 3 to explore different 
positions on rights that social actors may use, and to assess, on what basis, a right to an 
assisted death could possibly be envisaged. Both foundational and anti-foundational 
approaches to rights could arguably validate a right to determine one’s own death and both 
these approaches were evident in the research data as it emerged. Through a foundational 
position on rights, pre-social, innate values of liberty and dignity were grounded in a common 
humanity. Freedom to determine the manner and timing of one’s own death could be 
defended through this approach to rights that emphasised individual liberty, human dignity 
and, in light of Bryan Turner’s contemporary contribution to a foundational ontology, human 
frailty in the dying process. This position suggests a fundamental right to die on the basis of 
man as a rational, freely choosing individual, sovereign over matters of life and death. A 
foundational approach to rights also respects human dignity as inherent. A right to die could 
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similarly be conceived through the desire to maintain a sense of dignity in the face of suffering, 
or to avoid potential indignity at the end of life. Turner’s frailty theory of human rights is 
underpinned by a notion of vulnerability of the body, and, by virtue of all individuals being 
vulnerable in the face of their own mortality, the idea of universal human rights at the end of 
life is enhanced. Given the certainty of death and uncertainty of the dying process, which 
leaves individuals vulnerable, a foundational perspective could reasonably be argued to 
support personal choice at the end of life and protect the dignity of the dying.  
 
An anti-foundational approach to human rights offers an alternative basis upon which to 
consolidate the values of individual liberty and the preservation of human dignity at the end of 
life. Legal positivism is reflective of an anti-foundational approach to rights, which recognises 
rights as legal entitlements. In the UK, established legal instruments, including the HRA 1998 
and ECHR 1950, currently protect individual liberty rights relevant to the end of life. These 
include: the right to life; the right to privacy; the right to freedom of expression; anti-
discrimination rights, and protection from inhuman or degrading treatment, all of which are 
conducive to maintaining human dignity. With the exception of the right to life that is non-
derogable, the other rights may only be curtailed in the interests of national security, public 
health or where fulfilment of these rights are detrimental to other members of society (HRA 
1998, ECHR 1950). Analysis of the two most prominent cases of Diane Pretty and Tony 
Nicklinson revealed how these provisions have been interrogated and used to question the 
boundaries of specific legal rights. New configurations of rights that challenged the scope of 
existing rights referred to in these legal petitions included a right to die and a right to waive 
the existing right to life. Driven by these appeals and wider debates involving the 
interpretation of rights at the end of life, in particular the right to privacy, the issue of 
requested death has become so tangible that there is a possibility of the UK law courts making 
a Declaration of Incompatibility, or using the principles of statutory interpretation to override 
current provision. In this way, a right to assisted death could be established through setting a 
legal precedent. 
A social constructionist approach is also part of an anti-foundational position that disputes 
rights as inherent and pre-social. In contrast to validating rights through legal entitlement, 
social constructionism enables a focus on the social life of rights, exploring how claims to rights 
arise in response to, or as a reflection of, a specific time and social context. In the section 
above, death and dying were contextualised within a contemporary, Western frame of 
reference to illustrate how different interpretations of rights were coming more into focus. 
The media, and “right to die” organisations, have been particularly persuasive in developing a 
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notion of rights at the end of life. The adoption of specific language strategies has been shown 
to function as a powerful tool that can shape the way that people think about, and give 
meaning to, their interests and this can also “sustain a system of beliefs” (Hastings, 1998:193). 
This research has explored Dignity in Dying in relation to their use of rights discourses as an 
organisation that campaigns to legalise assisted death and discussed how this may influence 
attitudes and values towards end of life. Through framing the notion of requested death as a 
right to die to reflect their ideals of choice, human dignity and relief of suffering, Dignity in 
Dying have constructed a new narrative of assisted dying. Framing human rights as claims to 
something, in this case a right to die, can be empowering and through foregrounding specific 
aspects in the debate the objectives of the organisation may appeal to a number of target 
audiences. The example of DiD has demonstrated how one campaigning organisation has used 
rights discourses strategically to construct and articulate the right to an assisted death through 
a common desire to experience a dignified and good death. 
 
Exploring the use of rights discourses from a sociological perspective has helped illuminate the 
ways in which understandings of rights have been appropriated and embedded in the context 
of death and dying. The main findings from each stage of the research are presented below in 
table format, before being discussed further. These findings offer answers to the questions 
initially posed in the introductory chapter. By way of illustrating how, when, for what purposes, 
and to what extent, rights discourses have featured in the data, the findings contribute 
towards answering the question by Scolding (2011:320), “how can a right to something that 
inevitably happens to all of us suddenly arise”?  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Illustrating how, when, for what purposes, and to what extent rights discourses 
feature in the data 
RIGHTS 
DISCOURSES 
Law/ policy Legal cases House of Lords 
debates 
Dignity in 
Dying 
Focus groups 
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9.3 Advancing human rights principles to challenge UK law and policy 
This study explored the current provision for end of life in existing UK law and policy 
documents to find there were a number of ambiguities and areas open to challenge. The terms 
“assisted death” or “right to die” were not found in statutory law. “Assisting suicide” was 
defined in the Suicide Act 1961 where the act of aiding and abetting of suicide was, and still is, 
 
 
 
How 
Not expressed 
explicitly in 
Homicide Act 
1957 or Suicide 
Act 1961 with 
regard to 
assisted 
suicide. Used 
explicitly and 
implicitly in 
policy, but 
variable and 
ambiguous“ eg 
“right to be 
treated with 
dignity and 
respect” (NHS 
Constitution, 
2013) 
To challenge 
scope and 
boundaries of 
existing human 
rights principles 
in ECHR 1950: 
Art 2 right to 
life; Art 3 
prohibition of 
torture; Art 8 
respect for 
private and 
family life; Art 9 
freedom of 
thought, 
conscience and 
religion, and Art 
14 prohibition of 
discrimination 
Explicitly and 
implicitly to 
define arguments 
both for and 
against legalising 
assisted death. 
“Right to choose” 
at end of life 
aligned with 
other 
fundamental 
freedoms 
Explicitly 
through “right 
to a dignified 
death”, “right 
to a good 
death” and 
“right when 
dying, to die 
well”. 
Implicitly, 
through 
personal 
stories, as 
choice and 
relief of 
suffering.  
Not used 
explicitly, and 
had difficulty 
engaging with 
rights as such. 
Understood 
implicitly 
through liberty, 
dignity and 
vulnerability at 
end of life 
 
 
When 
Increasingly 
features in end 
of life policy. In 
2015, “choice” 
as the 
dominant 
rhetoric 
(Borgstrom  
and Walter, 
2015) 
Bland 1994 
initiated legal 
interest, but not 
explicitly citing 
rights. Appeals 
increasingly 
based on  
deliberating  
rights, especially 
Nicklinson 2012 
case 
Minimal in 1936 
(twice 
mentioned). 
Increased over 
time. Most 
prevalent in 
2014. Displaced 
historic, 
compassionate 
discourse 
More 
prominent over 
time. Since 
2006, added 
focus on 
“dignity”. 
Strategic use of 
rights 
maximised 
with regard to 
social context 
Takes place in 
static, 
contemporary 
context 
therefore no 
historic 
comparison 
 
 
For what 
purposes 
To establish 
normative 
frameworks 
and standards 
of care. To 
define these 
using widely 
appealing and 
acceptable 
discourses 
To legitimise 
individual liberty 
to determine 
end of life (with 
assistance). To 
achieve dignified 
death based on 
rational choice. 
To oppose and 
support right to 
assisted death. 
To debate the 
nature and 
boundaries of 
individual liberty 
rights 
To resonate 
with public and 
political 
figures, to 
foster 
collective 
identity, to 
mobilise public 
support, and, 
ultimately, 
achieve legal 
change 
To achieve a 
good death. (No 
apparent 
political or 
organisational 
purpose). 
 
 
To what extent 
Central to 
policy. 
Emphasis on 
dignity and 
dignified care. 
In law, through 
HRA 1998 
which protects 
principles of 
dignity and 
liberty 
Maintenance of 
dignity 
prioritised in 
Bland, Pretty 
and Nicklinson. 
Grounded in 
Arts 2,3, 8, 14 
(ECHR 1950) 
Contemporary 
debates operate 
on terrain of 
rights, balancing 
individual rights 
with community 
rights and 
protection of the 
vulnerable/ fear 
of slippery slope 
Central in 2014 
campaign 
context. Liberty 
as fundamental 
and historic 
value, 
expressed as 
“choice” and 
“control” 
Dignity as key 
value, commonly 
prioritised. 
Includes 
recognition of 
inherent/ social 
dignity and 
encompasses 
understanding of 
human agency 
and choice 
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punishable with up to 14 years imprisonment. An interesting discovery in this research was the 
Policy for Prosecutors in Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide 2010 document. This policy 
was formulated by the Director of Public Prosecutions in response to the legal appeal of 
Debbie Purdy in 2009. The policy was intended to reduce the legal ambiguities surrounding the 
circumstances under which prosecution was likely, or less likely, to occur in cases of assisting 
suicide by listing mitigating factors. Development of this policy indicated some recent interest, 
and possible opportunity for interpretation in the law with regard to assisted suicide, 
particularly where this was driven by compassion. It also highlighted the need to develop an 
appropriate legal response in cases such as these. This research unveiled a lack of prosecutions 
by the Crown Prosecution Service in cases where encouraging or assisting suicide was 
suspected, which did suggest that, in certain circumstances, assisting death is being tolerated 
through guarding the exercise of discretion.  
 
Analysis of the law, rather surprisingly, revealed additional circumstances where unbearable or 
prolonged human suffering justified the ending of life without being subject to risk of criminal 
prosecution. Legal provision in the Criminal Justice Act 1967 permits doctors to end life 
through the doctrines of “double effect” that involves administering sometimes lethal doses of 
medication and “letting die” where life-saving treatment may be legally withdrawn or 
withheld. These findings demonstrate that, where great suffering with little or no possibility of 
recovery is evident, there is, again, some degree of scope for interpretation in the law. In these 
examples, the law supports the medicalised model of care. Decisions are made in, what is 
deemed by the medical profession to be, the patient’s best interest, and these actions are 
permitted and protected in UK law.  The language differs, but the notion bears a similarity to 
the contributions of the 1936 House of Lords Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) debate that 
also held a patriarchal model of care in high regard and considered unbearable suffering to 
justify the act of “mercy killing”, as it was framed at that time. The doctor-led model of 
healthcare is, in contemporary UK society, being increasingly challenged by an emphasis on 
patient participation and this is enhanced by human rights discourses demonstrated through 
this research as holding traction in an end of life context. 
Healthcare policy, including the NHS Constitution 2013 and the End of Life Care Strategy 2008, 
prioritised respect for personal choice in end of life decision-making and the importance of 
dignity and dignified practices as standard. The concept of choice is the principal rhetoric in 
government policy, revealed in this research through Borgstrom and Walter’s (2015) 
comparative analysis of “choice” and “compassion”. Dignity is also emphasised. The 
conservation of dignity is prioritised in a similar manner to personal choice, which suggests 
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rights discourses have become central to defining end of life care. The importance of human 
dignity was reflected in the NHS Constitution 2013 that considered the “right to dignity 
includes a right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment”. This rather peculiar 
example not only constructed a right to dignity but proposed that it includes an already 
existing right not to be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment through perpetuating 
suffering at the end of life and impinging upon the agency of the dying individual. This 
amalgam of rights is grounded in ECHR 1950 Article 3 that was similarly used in the legal 
petition of Diane Pretty in 2001. Pretty claimed that in not permitting a right to assisted death, 
she was forced to suffer an undignified death by remaining in an intolerable situation which 
constituted inhuman or degrading treatment.  
 
Analysis of healthcare policy discourses demonstrated a strong correlation between a sense of 
dignity and liberty to control life and death events. There are possibilities for autonomous 
decision-making at end of life. These presently exist in the form of Advance Directives, a 
Preferred Place to die option and provisions found in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. These 
findings indicated that government policy discourse is currently prioritising personal choice 
and human dignity and concepts of rights are being strengthened in an end of life context. The 
data revealed some evidence of law and policy changes over time which may, in part, have 
been driven by concerns on the inadequacy of statutory law. For example, the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 has extended the remit of individual choice for competent adults through permitting 
them the right to refuse any, including lifesaving, treatment or the provision of hydration and 
nutrition to sustain life. To this effect, there is then already, a right to die. But, for some 
individuals this degree of personal choice is not enough, they demand a right to request 
assistance to die. 
 
The legal petitions of Diane Pretty in 2001 and Tony Nicklinson in 2012 invoked human rights 
arguments to deliberate the current prohibition on assisted death.  The case of Pretty was 
pivotal in that it initiated discussion on the boundaries of human rights principles, recently 
enshrined in the HRA 1998, suggesting that understandings of rights were fluid, open to 
interpretation, and could be appropriated in a new context. The case of Nicklinson in 2012 
interrogated in greater depth the scope of existing human rights, particularly the right to 
privacy. By this time, rights arguments were gaining traction to the extent that the UK 
government was confronted with the accusation that the state was acting unlawfully and not 
in accordance with the rights protected in the ECHR 1950. The cases of Nicklinson and Pretty, 
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heard in High Court, and their appeals to the European Court indicate that the prevailing legal 
narrative is being rigorously challenged through rights arguments that protect the decision-
making ability of competent individuals to determine their own death. In this respect the law 
needs more solid justification to maintain prohibition on assisted death. 
 
This research has, only briefly, examined other countries outside the UK where assisted dying 
is permitted. In the case of Carter v. Canada, discussed in section 5.3, the Supreme Court 
justified their decision to lift the longstanding prohibition on assisted death through respect 
for human rights principles. In cases of serious, incurable illness, the judgement found the 
experience of “intolerable suffering” to entrench upon constitutional rights to “life, liberty and 
security of the person” (Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) [2015] SCC 5). Reflecting on the 
cases of Pretty and Nicklinson in the UK, further study of the ways in which human rights 
discourses, and (violation of) human rights principles have facilitated changes in global 
legislation is indicated. Examining how, and to what extent, arguments for determining the 
end of life are framed using human rights discourses in other countries or jurisdictions could 
inform and complement this research. Extending the parameters of study outside of the UK 
may also provide much needed suggestions to why human rights discourses have become 
central to the end of life debate. 
 
9.4 Articulating rights explicitly and implicitly to debate assisted death 
The topic of assisted death has been debated in the House of Lords on a number of occasions 
since 1936. Exploration of these debates has helped map the discourses of dying over time and 
illuminate how an understanding of rights has been developed and used to negotiate 
arguments in an end of life context. Textual analysis of transcripts of the Bills and debates from 
1936, 2003, and 2014 has provided a unique perspective on assisted death. The research 
findings clearly evidenced the evolving of rights discourses and an increasing use of rights on 
both sides of the argument, for and against, assisted death. These findings substantiate the 
hypothesis that rights discourses have become central to the current end of life debate. This is 
especially significant in such a political forum because the House of Lords debate complicated 
issues in great depth and have the potential to impact UK law and policy. Analysis of the data 
did, however, reveal a complex picture; rights were interpreted and used differently in 
members’ contributions.  
The content of all Bills from 1936 to 2014 has remained similar over time. Each Bill has 
proposed legal change to enable mentally competent, dying individuals release from suffering 
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through assistance to die at their own request. However, analysis of the debates revealed a 
historic contrast. Arguments have been developed and the language used to define these 
arguments has changed. In the 1936 debate, there was minimal articulation of rights, neither 
explicitly nor implicitly. The case for voluntary euthanasia primarily focused on the value of 
compassion that reflected the prevalent Christian beliefs at that time and this discourse of 
compassion justified assisting death as a merciful release of suffering. Opposition to this initial 
Bill centred upon the conflict of medical interest to preserve rather than shorten life, and the 
sanctity of life which was articulated from the majority perspective as respect for a sovereign 
God to determine when life should end. 
 
The recent debates since 2003 have transformed the issue of assisted death into one that 
centres on the balancing of individual liberty rights in end of life decision-making. There was an 
increasing prioritisation of liberty and respect for freedom of choice over time so that in the 
2014 debate, the right to self-determine end of life was the dominant argument for assisted 
death. Common to the contemporary House of Lords debates, arguments over the extent of 
liberty rights was revealed as troubling for many members who were cautious or sceptical of 
protecting individual rights at the expense of the well-being of the community. This reflected 
the traditional utilitarian approach to law-making in the UK that emphasises the general well-
being of citizens and encompasses an obligation by the state to balance the rights of 
individuals in relation to the rights of other members of society. There was widely expressed 
concern that a legally established right to die whilst protecting the rights of the dying person 
may affect the welfare of vulnerable individuals, including the elderly or disabled. However, 
this was argued on a terrain of rights rather than utilitarian basis, which confirms a shift in 
ways of thinking about complex issues.  
 
The findings of the data in Chapter 6 clearly demonstrated that arguments in the debates have 
moved from a discourse of compassion to one of rights. A number of arguments used rights 
discourses explicitly to justify their support for legal change, valuing end of life decision-making 
as a fundamental human right reflecting personal choice, or aligning a right to die with other 
personal freedoms enshrined in national and international rights mechanisms. Others used 
rights implicitly, emphasising aspects of choice and free will, or focused on specific 
considerations in the debate such as maintaining human dignity or relieving intolerable 
suffering. In the 2003 and 2014 debates, arguments both for and against the legalisation of 
assisted death commonly used rights either explicitly or implicitly to underpin their values and 
beliefs. The research findings indicated that even those members who disputed or opposed a 
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right to die, could adopt rights discourses to express their opinion, or use an understanding of 
legal rights to enhance their position, without necessarily supporting all human rights 
principles or claims to rights.  
 
Analysis of the debates revealed that most of the Lords, including those in favour of, and 
opposition to, assisted dying, had become familiar with, and confident in, using what was their 
interpretation of rights, to argue their positions. On this basis it is apparent that, over time, 
human rights discourses have become central to the end of life debate, and understandings of 
rights are currently informing the way in which assisted suicide is discussed and thought about 
in a political forum that is one of the UK’s major political institutions. Human rights have come 
to play a key role in this important forum for debates. Further sociological research could build 
upon this analysis with regard to other complex issues involving personal freedoms. For 
example, the House of Lords has debated the laws against homosexuality and legislation 
relative to the ensuing decriminalisation of homosexuality, on a number of occasions since the 
initial debate in 1960. Examining the discourses used in the historic debates and comparing 
this with the more recent 2013 debate on same-sex marriage could map the centrality of rights 
discourses in a different context. This could then contribute further towards explaining why 
rights discourses resonate at particular historical time periods.  
 
9.5 Campaigning at the end of life through rights-framed approaches 
The findings of this research suggest that the prevalence of human rights discourses are not 
random but arise in response to, and reflect, the social context. The ways in which individuals 
think about, and give meaning to death and dying can be influenced by social actors who adopt 
rights discourses strategically, often with a specific purpose. In-depth examination of Dignity in 
Dying has demonstrated how campaign objectives can be articulated using a rights frame, for 
the purposes of resonating, mobilising, and holding traction with targeted audiences. As a 
national organisation, campaigning to change the law on assisted dying and enhance “choice, 
access and control” at the end of life, Dignity in Dying have shaped perceptions of both the 
public and the law-makers. Their instrumental use of rights discourses has informed the House 
of Lords Bills through close collaboration with selected members and this collaboration may 
have had implications for the terms of these debates. DiD have influenced the sentiment 
around end of life through constructing and foregrounding discourses that have permeated 
the public domain and impacted the political debates on assisted death, but their significance 
has gone largely unremarked. 
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In a similar manner to the House of Lords debates, analysis of the discourses used by DiD, as a 
historic organisation, revealed changes over time. The research discovered that there was an, 
albeit minimal, reference to assisted death as a matter of “elementary human right” (Millard, 
1931) during the time the organisation was founded. This appears to have been the first 
occasion that assisted dying was articulated as having a basis in rights. Contemporary 
arguments have been strengthened through a more prevalent rights frame that reflects the 
emerging focus on human rights and their recognition through national and international 
instruments. This strategic use of rights was evident through analysis of campaign tactics, 
especially in the run-up to the 2014 House of Lords debate. DiD consciously employed rights 
discourses that maximised the social context in order that their objectives would appeal to a 
wider audience.  
 
Different voices within DiD understood rights from both foundational and anti-foundational 
perspectives. Their vocabulary expressed rights both explicitly and implicitly. The language of 
the personal narratives less commonly used explicit references to rights but concepts of choice 
and suffering advanced their arguments for an assisted death. This informal and familiar 
language may have greater appeal and more relevance to members of the public who are 
seriously ill or their families. A number of high profile celebrity and patron contributions did 
explicitly express a right to determine one’s own death as an issue of fundamental liberty. On 
occasion, this was aligned with other examples of personal choice already reflected in law, 
namely sexual orientation and permitted abortion. DiD articulated a “right to choose” through 
the voices of Patrons and in the personal narratives for the purpose of idealising perceptions of 
death and dying as matters of personal choice and resonating with members of the public. A 
constructed right to choose reflects aspirations grounded in individual liberty rights. Human 
beings are sovereign over their own bodily integrity and, on this basis, there is a fundamental 
assumption that, acting as rational autonomous agents, they can self-determine their own life 
and death. A right to choose encompasses concepts of human agency, and this was promoted 
through the mediated communication of DiD as important at the end of life, and as 
contributing towards the contemporary understanding of a good death.  
 
Building upon the work of Miller (2010), the data from this case study analysis was used to 
reflect upon alternative approaches to rights outside of traditional rights-based approaches. 
The findings largely corroborated DiD as an example of an organisation using a rights-framed 
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approach. There was a demonstrable strategic use of rights that was more prevalent in specific 
campaign contexts. For example, in the more recent campaign period 2014-2016, DiD 
reconstructed their own interpretations of rights to reflect the aims and aspirations of the 
organisation and generate wider support. These were expressed on the Home page of the 
Campaign for Dignity in Dying as a “right to a dignified death”, the “right to a good death” and 
the “right, when dying, to die well” (DiD, 2016). In contrast to choice, the notion of human 
dignity is less contentious. The idea of a dignified death has generic appeal such that no human 
being would wish for an undignified death. Framing dignity as important at the end of life also 
mirrors the language used in government policy and this may resonate at political level. 
Strategic use of rights at certain times and the use of rights as a tool to serve the official 
approach of the organisation is indicative of rights-framed approaches developed by Miller 
(2010) and this was especially evident in the lead up to the 2014 Assisted Dying Bill in the 
House of Lords. The findings of the case study support Miller’s (2010) hypothesis that there are 
different ways of understanding and articulating rights outside of rights-based approaches and 
this has been demonstrated in a new context: to validate and support a claim to the right to 
die. To build upon these findings, a wider range of case studies outside of development and 
“right to die” organisations could be selected to expand upon Miller’s (2010) analysis and 
illustrate other variations of rights-framed approaches.  
 
As the largest UK organisation campaigning to legalise assisted death, the contribution of 
Dignity in Dying has been influential. Through a rights-framed approach, DiD have used rights 
discourses to foreground values of choice and control in order to determine the manner and 
timing of death and avoid an undignified death. Rights discourses used by this organisation 
were intended to promote a right to die by enabling individuals to avoid unbearable suffering 
and experience a good death. A different perspective on dying could be provided through a 
comparative case study to explore the discourses used by pro-life counterparts, for example 
the Care Not Killing alliance. There is a possibility that their campaign strategies would use 
rights discourses to dispute an individual right to die or instead highlight the right to life. As a 
recognised “pro-life” organisation, Care Not Killing may adopt alternative strategies to discuss 
the end of life debate and policy. Their aims and objectives might be grounded in 
compassionate or faith-based discourses in preference over rights in order to better resonate 
with their own members and supporter base, many of whom are affiliated with religious 
organisations. 
9.6 Using rights discourses to contemplate death and dying 
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In a large part of all focus group discussions, there was overwhelming support for individual 
liberty and dignity that encompassed both an inherent, human dignity and a social or 
bestowed dignity. Dignity was discussed at length and in-depth, which suggested that it was 
especially important to this selected group of participants contemplating end of life. The 
findings of this thesis strongly suggest that dignity is a central component of rights and, 
although the data from this stage of the research found that rights were not articulated 
explicitly, focus group participants did reference concepts associated with rights implicitly 
throughout their exchanges. Dignity, in particular, informed their perceptions of dying well to 
the extent that even those participants who had some difficulty describing how they 
understood the concept of dignity were able to contribute to the discussion through their 
interpretation of what it meant to lose dignity.  
 
Participant understandings of liberty emphasised respect for personal choice and human 
agency. These priorities were considered a valid basis for making claims at the end of life. 
Choice was articulated as an expression of free will and this was largely assumed on the basis 
of inherently rational human nature. One group, however, did not consider a lack of mental 
competence, or even a diagnosis of mental illness, as a hindrance to respecting personal 
choices in end of life decision-making. Another group of participants recognised that, at the 
end of life, prognosis and symptoms often fluctuate, as does one’s state of mind. This 
complicates and makes it difficult to assess decisional autonomy on the basis of mental 
capacity. The safeguarding of autonomy in cases of questionable mental capacity directly 
conflicts with current legal and policy provisions that permit only mentally competent 
individuals to determine certain aspects of end of life decision-making. In general, focus group 
participants felt that they were entitled to make their own decisions about the manner and 
timing of their death. Even in circumstances where mental competence was questionable they 
had a “right to choose”. 
 
Analysis of focus group discussions revealed that an understanding of rights were significant to 
the majority of individuals contemplating end of life. However, these were not generally 
articulated explicitly as rights. Across all focus groups, there was minimal reference to “rights” 
as such. Participants did not express their end of life concerns in terms of rights and commonly 
had difficulty articulating both how they understood a right to something, and what having a 
right to something would entail. This reluctance to engage with rights per se initially appeared 
inconsistent with earlier findings of the research and, on the surface, suggested that human 
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rights were not central to this sample of public perceptions of death and dying. However, 
participants spoke in-depth about concepts that are grounded in human rights discourses: 
choice, dignity, and, to a lesser extent, suffering. These findings confirmed that focus group 
participants did use rights discourses as the basis for contemplating issues at the end of life 
and also when discussing their own experiences of illness or loved ones dying. 
 
It was interesting to compare the language used in the Dignity in Dying personal narratives to 
focus group discussions on end of life. These two selected groups of actors, both involving 
members of the public demonstrated a similarity in the ways in which they expressed their 
concerns. Personal narratives had been curated by DiD and were based on individual 
experiences of dying or bereavement, but Death Café participants also had a prior and specific 
interest in discussing death and dying. In common, they tended not to refer explicitly to rights 
as such, there were minimal references to understanding rights as legal instruments or in 
conceptual or philosophical terms. Instead, rights discourses were used and interpreted as 
having localised and immediate meanings, their priorities at the end of life and desires for a 
good death were implicitly expressed using rights discourses, foregrounding individual choice, 
human dignity and the relief of suffering.  
 
Using a focus group model as part of the research design proved an interesting and accessible 
method to explore public perceptions on death and dying. This discussion format could be 
extended to other participant groups. Regular meetings and events are organised by the 
Multiple Sclerosis Society and the Motor Neurone Disease Association and both these groups 
have expressed to me their interest in discussing end of life issues, especially when these are 
articulated as rights at the end of life. Personal experience of two local hospices suggests that, 
in general, they still decline to discuss assisted death with patients and their families. However, 
there is an indication from end of life practitioners that hospices are gradually recognising the 
heightened focus on choice in end of life decision-making and this, alongside pressure from a 
number of patients who do want to decide their own end, is challenging their current practice. 
Death Cafes have been conducted at some London-based hospices, which suggests that open 
discussion on death and dying is becoming more common practice, including among those 
who are seriously ill. This could support further research into public sentiment on end of life.  
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Concluding remarks 
A social constructionist approach has enabled comprehensive insight into how, when, and to 
what extent rights discourses have been used and understood at the end of life and the 
purposes for which social actors have employed these. Exploring the social context in light of 
advances in medical technology, changes in the dying trajectory and the evolving emphasis on 
patients as healthcare consumers has demonstrated how the landscape of death and dying has 
shifted over time. Human rights discourses, as articulated by a range of actors, have been 
proven key to developing and defining the perception of dying in contemporary society. 
Aspirations of a good death are now commonly grounded in understandings of rights that 
include respect for individual choice and human dignity.  
 
Analysis of the data confirmed that rights discourses have become central to UK end of life 
policy and debate, but the interpretation and articulation of rights at different times and by 
different actors was variable. Analysis of this relationship is complex. Through a sociological 
understanding of rights, the research findings illuminated the ways in which human rights 
discourses were being used with regard to death and dying. By understanding different 
positions on rights, and critically examining human rights discourses, a notion of rights at the 
end of life could be substantiated and embedded in this new context. Further research to 
explore the reasons why rights discourses hold tenure over others, at this specific period in 
history, could build upon this analysis. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Invitation, information letter, consent forms and interview schedule used 
to recruit and conduct focus groups 2014-15 
                                Invitation to participants September 2014 
                                                        KINGSTON UNIVERSITY 
                                                        FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
                                                         Email sharon.young@kingston.ac.uk Mobile 07939585166  
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
I would very much appreciate your help with my research on people’s attitudes towards end of 
life issues. I am interested to hear your personal thoughts and experiences on concepts 
including suffering, human rights, dignity, and personal choice. 
  
The House of Lords have, again, recently debated the issue of assisted dying for seriously ill 
individuals, and campaigning organisations champion the notion of a “right” to die. However, 
no in-depth studies have been conducted on the opinion of the wider public and I believe, in 
view of current campaigns and media focus on medical care and health policies, that it is 
important to hear your views. 
  
If you would like to join in the study, it would be a group discussion with 6-8 other people who 
are interested in taking part in research and this would last approximately 1½ hours. I would 
be there to prompt or ask questions and ensure the discussion ran smoothly with respect for 
the views of all those taking part. I will record the discussion but all information will be 
confidential and only used for research purposes. 
 
Times will be arranged to suit those participating and travel expenses would be reimbursed. 
Refreshments would be provided. If you would like to join the study or have any further 
questions, please contact me as above. 
Yours sincerely, 
Sharon Young 
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                               PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
  
Description of the research: 
In an effort to understand what is important to people at the end of their lives and how this is 
articulated, a group discussion involving members of the public is undertaken.  
 
Data Collection Process: 
Your involvement as part of a group discussion with 6-8 participants will last approximately 
one and a half hours. I would record our discussion using an audio-recorder and then write up 
it up fully afterwards, deleting the recording immediately. You are welcome to request a 
written summary of the discussion for your own private use.  
  
Intended Publication: 
The findings of the study will form part of my PhD thesis and may be used in subsequent 
journal articles, conference presentations or as teaching materials. Your name and personal 
information will not be identifiable in any of these publications unless you choose not to 
remain anonymous. This is done by signing a separate section at the bottom of the consent 
form.  
 
Obtaining Consent 
You are under no obligation to take part in the study and of course you are free to reconsider 
or leave at any time without explanation. All aspects of the discussion will be confidential and 
in reporting the study, no information will be released to identify individual comments unless 
you have signed to agree to be named. In order to give your written consent please read and 
then sign the accompanying consent form when you come to the discussion. 
 
Afterwards 
I hope you enjoy participating in the study and feel that it has been conducted in a professional 
manner. If you have any comments, feedback or complaints on the study, please contact either 
me or my Director of Studies Dr Hannah Miller.  
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Contact details: 
Chief Investigator: Sharon Young sharon.young@kingston.ac.uk 
Director of Studies: Dr Hannah Miller H.Miller@kingston.ac.uk   
Kingston University, Penrhyn Road, Kingston, Surrey KT1 2EE 
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             WRITTEN CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
 
Statement by participant 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet/letter of invitation for this study. I 
have been informed of the purpose, risks, and benefits of taking part. 
 
 I understand what my involvement will entail and any questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
 
 I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, and that I can withdraw at any time without 
prejudice or the need for explanation. 
 
 I consent to being recorded with an audio-recorder on the conditions that the original and transferred 
data is deleted on completion of the thesis. 
 
 I understand that all information obtained will be confidential and have been informed that data 
gathered for the study will be anonymised unless I have signed the statement below. 
 
 Contact information has been provided should I (a) wish to seek further information from the 
investigator at any time for purposes of clarification (b) wish to make a complaint. 
  
 
       Participant’s Signature________________________________ Date___________________ 
 
 
Statement by investigator 
 
 I have explained this project to this participant without bias and I believe that the consent is informed 
and that he/she understands the implications of participation. 
 
 
Signature of investigator ______________________________       Date____________________ 
 
Anonymity 
 I do not wish to remain anonymous and consent to be named when quoting from or in 
writing about the discussion. 
 
Participant’s signature ____________________________Date__________________ 
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FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION FORMAT 
  
 On arrival, people will be greeted by myself and have opportunity to order 
refreshments. Travel expenses will be reimbursed and consent forms explained 
where necessary and signed. Participants will also be asked to fill out the 
following information in the format:  
 
 
First name:                                      Gender:   M / F   (Please circle) 
 
Profession:                                      Age:  
 
Do you have a serious illness? Y / N    (Please circle)                               
 
 
 After ensuring that everyone is seated comfortably and has everything that they 
need with them, I will sit around the table on the same level with participants in 
a position I feel is appropriate. 
 
 INTRODUCTION: Thank you all for coming. Welcome to everyone. I would like 
to start by introducing myself and saying a little about what we will be doing 
today. My name is Sharon Young; I have a background in Physiotherapy 
working in hospitals, clinics and the community. A few years ago I had a career 
change and started studying Human Rights and Politics at Kingston University- 
a bit different I know- but it combines my interest in people, their wellbeing and 
how they interact with each other in society. Today we will be having an open 
discussion lasting around one and a half hours. In this time I would like 
everyone to have an opportunity to express their ideas and thoughts. On this 
basis it is important that we respect each person’s view and experiences and 
that our discussion is confidential so that the things people share, ideally remain 
within this room. I will be recording this session with the voice recorder so that I 
can listen to the discussion again later and write it up accurately. When I am 
writing it up, all comments will be anonymous and it will not be shown to anyone 
else. If you would like a summary of our discussion, or have any other feedback 
about today then please phone or email me- you have my contact details. 
  
 
 
 OPEN QUESTION: I would like to start by sharing this quote by Lisa Cooke and 
hearing your opinions about it; 
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“I like to think that 
I have lived my life 
with dignity and I 
would also like to 
be able to die with 
dignity”. 
  
(Lisa Cooke, 2013) 
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 PROMPTS may be used depending on the direction of the conversation, to 
reiterate and/or probe a particular point raised or in an attempt to include all 
participants. 
 
 KEY QUESTIONS: I would like to hear what you think about the following 
concepts;  
 
1. The “right” to die 
      2. Personal choice 
3. Suffering 
 
 CLOSING QUESTION: It is time to bring our discussion to a close now, but first 
I would like to draw your attention back to some of the things we have been 
talking about and ask each of you what you consider to be most important at 
the end of your life? 
  
 Thank you to everyone for participating in the discussion today, it has been 
really helpful to hear all your views and opinions. We have finished the session 
now but I am happy to take any questions or comments you may have and do 
feel free to mention anything you feel you didn’t get a chance to say earlier. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
Political allegiances of House of Lords Members targeted for lobby in 2014 
on the basis of their positions on assisted dying 
(Reproduced by kind permission of Tom Davis, Dignity in Dying 2016) 
 
Total Peers (c. June 2014) organised by specific position on assisted dying. 
 
Total Peers organised by general position on assisted dying. 
 
 
Total Peers included on targeted lobbying list (i.e. excluding confirmed and immutable opponents). 
 
 
 
Position Labour Conservative Crossbencher Lib Dem Other Total 
Immutably Opposed 18 35 35 12 31 131 
Opposed 35 61 28 11 4 139 
Likely Opposed 8 16 7 1 1 33 
Neutral or WNV 2   3 2   7 
Unknown 17 33 19 18 3 90 
Likely Supportive 30 20 16 9 2 77 
Supportive 89 49 42 38 5 223 
Strongly Supportive 20 3 20 6 3 52 
Total 219 217 170 97 49 752 
Position Labour Conservative Crossbencher Lib Dem Other Total 
Opposed total 61 112 70 24 36 303 
Unknown / Neutral 19 33 22 20 3 97 
Supportive 139 72 78 53 10 352 
Total 219 217 170 97 49 752 
Position Labour Conservative Crossbencher Lib Dem Other Total 
‘Target’ Peers 166 121 107 74 14 482 
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Dignity in Dying Campaign Newsletter Issue 3 of 3, 2014 
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